

**THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JAMAICA AND ISRAEL**

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THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JAMAICA
AND ISRAEL

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For Alice and Ossie,
You have taught me faith, love and perseverance.

“If yuh waan good yuh nose haffi run!”

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to illustrate the shortcomings of the majoritarian political model in promoting democratic values and facilitating development as is evident in Jamaica. Instead, it is hypothesized that a centripetal democratic model that has proportional representation, a multi-party system and allows for coalition governments, like in Israel, is better for democracy and development as a whole. The study looks at the conceptualization of democracy and how electoral engineering affects good governance and development in small states. The research focuses on the quality of democracy in Jamaica and Israel by looking at specific variables to determine the extent of good governance. In the end, Israel acts as a research control in finding a political solution to the socio-economic and political issues of Jamaica.

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INTRODUCTION

This work is an exploration of the politics of Jamaica as it relates to its continuous political and socio-economic issues, and the state's road to greater development. The thesis stands on the hypothesis that some political systems and their electoral rules are more democratic than others. The argument is that any political system and model of democracy that promotes representation through a multiparty system and coalition government will see inclusive policies, effective and responsible government, increased participation of the populace as well as the positive political competition that democracy is defined by. These political factors will reduce issues in the political system and help to promote development, simply defined by Siaroff as "becoming a developed country with effective state institutions and good outcomes."¹ Effective state institutions, here, meaning a political system that is inclusive and competitive with a government that has a sense of authority to come to agreed policies, and good outcomes meaning that policies are effective in advancing good governance and overall growth of the state. As will be noted later, development can be facilitated through good governance, which is in turn affected by the democratic model and political system that is in place in the state. The thesis in its entirety provides a specific look at the relationship between politics and development by providing a comparative analysis of Jamaica and Israel based on their quality of democracy. Notably, while Jamaica and Israel prove to be unlikely pairs, the research was limited by specific variables. Since Jamaica is the focus of the thesis, Israel

¹ Alan Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) 32.

is the only state that has a centripetal democracy and is considered to be “developing” at some point in time. While Israel is not considered the pillar of democracy across political science scholarship, other centripetal states were either in northern Europe (the Scandinavian states) and were never “developing” or found in South America but are presidential. Since both of these factors would have skewed the research, Israel proved to be the only viable choice for the comparative analysis.

Jamaica is indeed the center of the thesis, as the research and analysis revolves around finding practical political solutions to Jamaica’s slow development through improving democracy. In truth, Jamaica struggles with a high crime rate, political violence, voter apathy, adversarial political competition, and low standard of living. These issues are pervasive and have continued throughout history. In fact, they are so prominent in the Jamaican context that these problems have been blamed for Jamaica’s lack of prosperity. Over the years, Jamaica has also struggled with economic growth as they work to decrease their international debt, improve their economic sectors and improve their human development indices. While there exists extensive research and scholarship on the state of Jamaica’s economy and politics as well as how to foster development, there is little done on the relationship between politics and development. In fact, much of the scholarship on Jamaica looks at the relationship between development and economic factors, not how political reform could foster improvements in development. As a result, this thesis is critical of the Jamaican democracy and looks at the possibility of improving Jamaica’s development through democratic reform. The assumption as noted above, is that centripetal democratic factors such as multiparty politics, coalition government and proportional rules could allow for improvements in

democracy and promote development factors in Jamaica. To assess this, the centripetal democracy of Israel will be compared to Jamaica's majoritarian political rules to see which state truly has a better quality of democracy.

At first, the thesis delves into the different forms of democracy that exist in political science scholarship. There is focus on majoritarian and consensus political systems and importantly, centripetal democratic systems. Notably, the characterization of these systems is crucial to the entire thesis, since it is that the paper seeks to find alternatives to the majoritarian political system of Jamaica. Chapter Two is the conceptual framework that seeks to highlight the deeper conceptions of democracy and development. The conceptual framework explains how political systems differ based on electoral rules and party systems. The chapter also conceptualizes 'democracy' as it relates to this thesis and notes that the thesis focuses on electoral democracies rather than the more famous concept and practice of liberal democracy. The argument of this section is that proportional rules and multipartyism are definitive of true democracy and form the political mechanisms for good governance and ultimately development. Chapter Two flows into Chapter Three which is the empirical framework. This chapter delves into the relationship between politics and development. Notably, the hypothesis is that good governance is an avenue to better human development and the best prospects of good governance in Jamaica are found in the democratic rules of centripetal democracies. Chapter Three provides an explanation for this hypothesis as well as outlines how good governance will be assessed through the quality of democracy by defining this concept and providing the variables for assessing democratic quality in the comparative analysis of Jamaica and Israel. Both chapters four and five focuses on the political and

socioeconomic backgrounds of Jamaica and Israel respectively. These chapters will look directly on the historical and current political situations in these countries, specifically as it relates to the political systems and their rules, party politics and relations, political culture and political history.

Similarly, there will be information on the socio-economic and current level of development of these states, as well as specific political issues. The analysis is provided in Chapter Six where the democratic quality of Jamaica and Israel will be examined to see if the centripetal political system of Israel has a better democratic quality when compared to that of Jamaica. This would give hope to the hypothesis that a centripetal democracy fosters good governance and a better quality of democracy than majoritarian systems, which is one way to foster high levels of human development for developing states. The analysis of democratic quality in Jamaica and Israel will be based on the quality of participation, the quality of political contestation and competition, the level of corruption, the quality of socioeconomic outcomes of policy and attitudes towards government and political institutions. Chapter Six will provide the methodology of the analysis, interpret the data and provide a clear analysis and discussion of each variable. At the end of the thesis, Chapter Seven provides a conclusion of the thesis by summarizing the main points and findings. It will outline the prospects of Jamaica in regard to electoral engineering and reform, as well as discuss proposals for future work.

CHAPTER ONE: TYPES OF DEMOCRACIES

This chapter shall specifically discuss majoritarian democracies, as adopted by most democratic states across the world that were colonized by the United Kingdom. There will be discussion on the democratic system itself, as well as its benefits and criticisms as a political system in enhancing democratic values and development for Jamaica. Similarly, there will be focus on the Consensus Democratic Model as postulated by Arend Lijphart as an initial alternative to the majoritarian model for Jamaica. The chapter will highlight the elements of the consensus model, as well as its shortcomings in being applicable to the Jamaican context. Lastly, this portion of the thesis serves as an introduction to the centripetal democratic theory and model of democracy that was proposed by Gerring, Thacker and Moreno as a form of consensus democracy. This model is important as it is presented as the ideal form of democracy and alternative to the majoritarian system in Jamaica, so as to achieve good governance and development. Acknowledging the unusual pairing of Jamaica and Israel, this chapter is important in introducing and highlighting the basic theoretical differences between the democratic systems of both states, noting too that all models have their specific particularities that will be discussed and applied to the comparative analysis. The thesis will not seek to analyze the entire conceptions of these theories and models, but instead focus on specific elements as it relates to good governance and development in Israel and Jamaica.

Norris makes a distinction between adversarial democracies and consensual democracies as first presented by Samuel Finer.² An adversarial democracy is one where the ideal function of the political system is to promote government accountability, transparent decision-making, and responsible parties through single-party executives, effective opposition parties and vigorous parliamentary debate and decisive elections.³ The electoral system then should work to “maximize electoral decisiveness by directly linking the votes cast to the parties and members elected to parliament, thereby providing an indirect link from voters to the party government...ensuring that the leading party gains a workable parliamentary majority.”⁴ In this democratic model, the opposition’s duty is to scrutinize government policy proposals and actions, with the citizens left to evaluate the policy proposals of the government and alternative parties for the next election.⁵ Elected representatives within adversarial democracies are “community spokespersons” who should reflect local concerns and represent local constituents.⁶ This model of democracy falls in line with Lijphart’s postulations on political systems. He argues that political systems exist on a spectrum from majoritarian systems that follow adversarial democratic practices to consensual democracies.⁷

²Samuel Finer, *Adversary Politics and Electoral reform*, (London: Anthony Wingram, 1975).

³ Pipa Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting rules and Political behaviour* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 69.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performances in thirty-six countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) 246.

Majoritarian Democracy

The Majoritarian or Westminster System of Government, modeled off the British parliamentary and governmental institutions exemplifies adversarial democracy. Proponents of the majoritarian model argue that there is increased democratic accountability. They postulate that “an electoral system that systematically reduces the multiple contenders for office to the leading parties that win power both simplifies electoral choices and clarifies responsibility for government decisions” is best for democracy.⁸ Austen-Smith and Banks state that the single party that was in government is accountable for its policies and legislative performance even after they leave office. That being said, the electorate can punish the incumbent administration if they so wish in a majoritarian system;⁹ while it is more difficult for voters to “assign blame or praise for the government’s performance, and to reward and punish parties accordingly, even if the public becomes deeply dissatisfied with those in power”¹⁰ in a proportional system. Similarly, it is argued that the majoritarian system and its single-member districts allow for elected members to be responsive to constituency concerns and reflect their voice in government. Carey and Shugart present that there is strong voter-member accountability¹¹ as single member districts and candidate ballots allow for members to “have stronger electoral incentives to provide constituency service, and thereby, build a personal vote...”¹² This, proponents argue, is better than the party-ballot and closed party lists in

⁸ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 71.

⁹ David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, “Elections, coalitions and legislative outcomes,” *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 405-422.

¹⁰ Kaare Strom, “Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies,” *European Journal of Political Research* 37, no. 3 (2000): 261-289.

¹¹ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 71

¹² John Carey and Matthew Shugart, “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas,” *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 4, (1995): 417-440.

multi-member proportional systems, where elected members are thought to be more accountable to party leaders.¹³ Additionally, proponents of the majoritarian system argue that a majoritarian system promotes better governability as they “generate single-party executives and limit the degree of party fragmentation in parliament.”¹⁴ It is seen that “single-party governments with an overall parliamentary majority, can enact whatever policies they feel are necessary during their term of office, making difficult or unpopular decisions they believe are in the country’s long term interests, while knowing that they face the judgement of the electorate when their term ends and the potential sanction of losing power.”¹⁵ It is argued that the provision of a direct chain of command and a single part government is more important than the inclusion of all parties in strict proportion to their share of the vote.¹⁶ Proponents also argue that the majoritarian system allows for decisive elections where they “maintain a direct and transparent link between the share of the votes cast and the single party government”¹⁷ as “only the leading contenders win parliamentary seats and governing power.”¹⁸ Lastly, the majoritarian system is argued to provide responsiveness to the electorate as politicians “must remain responsive to the interests and needs of the populace, as they are aware that even a small swing in the popular vote in a competitive and balanced two-party system is sufficient to bring the opposite into office.”¹⁹

¹³ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 72.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 72.

¹⁷ Ibid, 73.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

While there are benefits to having a majoritarian system, many scholars are critical of the model and are quick to point out its flaws. Firstly, in majoritarian politics, there is a concentration of power in one party and bare majority of cabinets. As illustrated by Lijphart, coalition governments or cabinets are rare in a majoritarian political system, as the two dominant parties in the usual two-party system are of approximately equal strength and the party that wins the elections usually represent a mere majority with a large minority.²⁰ This large minority is left as the opposition, set to criticize the political actions of the government with little to no power until the next election when they try to gain a majority. According to Lijphart, “the British one-party and bare-majority cabinet is the embodiment of majority rule: it wields vast amounts of political power to rule as the representative of and in the interest of a majority that is not of overwhelming proportions. A large minority is excluded from power and condemned to the role of opposition.”²¹ This is due in part by the two-party system that is commonly found in majoritarian systems where the politics of the state is dominated by two large parties that tend to alternate in power. It is noted that while other smaller parties may contest elections and may even win seats, they are not large or popular enough to win an overall majority to form government. Additionally, majoritarian governments allow for cabinet dominance. The reality of a majoritarian parliament is that because cabinet is composed by the leader of a cohesive party, cabinet is normally backed by the majority in the house and therefore confidently count on getting its legislative proposals passed no matter what.²² This is in stark contrast of the theoretical foundations of parliamentarianism, whereby the cabinet is

²⁰ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 9.

²¹ Ibid, 10-11.

²² Ibid, 11.

held accountable, and therefore dependent on the confidence of parliament. The dominance of the cabinet in Majoritarian models is defined as “elective dictatorship.”²³ Norris notes that “if one party is returned in government repeatedly over successive elections, with a majority or even just a plurality of votes, the opposition has limited powers of checks and balances.”²⁴ Another definitive characteristic of majoritarian systems is the majoritarian and disproportional system of elections. Members of Parliament are usually elected through single-member districts governed by plurality rules, otherwise called first-past-the-post, where the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins. As noted above, these electoral rules do not promote democratic elements, and as stated by Lijphart, “it tends to produce highly disproportional results.”²⁵ This system can lead to what are called manufactured majorities, where a party wins a majority of the seats with a minority of the vote due to the rules of the electoral system.²⁶ It is easy to argue that the majoritarian system in Jamaica is not as defective as outlined above as there is no true majoritarian political system that fits perfectly to the theory or that which existed in the United Kingdom. However, Jamaica and other former British colonies are the closest sovereign states to the Westminster Model.²⁷ The political system of Jamaica therefore stands true to the rules and criticism of the system.

²³ Lord Hailsham, *The Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and Prescription* (London: Collins, 1978) 127.

²⁴ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 73.

²⁵ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 14.

²⁶ Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Law*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) 74.

²⁷ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 205.

Consensus Democracy

On the other side of Lijphart's political spectrum is the consensus democracy that "promotes consensual decision-making, bargaining, and compromise among multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in power, dispersed decision-making processes."²⁸ The electoral system within a consensual democracy should follow proportionality, where there is a maximization of choice among multiple political parties, fair translation of vote shares to seats and the promotion of an inclusive representation in parliament.²⁹ The opposition is also an active part of policy-making and the consolation process as they act as an important check on the largest party. Norris argues that in consensual democracies, "citizens should be able to evaluate the performance and policies of parties that are empowered to negotiate, bargain and compromise on behalf of their supporters."³⁰ Similarly, elected representatives should deliberate, negotiate and bargain as spokespersons on behalf of their supporters and their interests.³¹

To correct the shortcomings of an adversarial system, Lijphart's consensus democracy postulates a model of "sharing, dispersing and restraining power."³² Firstly, the consensual model of democracy allows for executive power-sharing in broad coalition governments that facilitate deliberative and collaborative governance, as opposed to the majoritarian model's concentrated executive power in one-party and bare majority cabinets. This element of the consensus model is "to let all or most of the important

²⁸ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 69.

²⁹ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 69.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 33.

parties share executive power in a broad coalition.”³³ Norris highlights that this model of democracy has “many institutional checks and balances, including multiple political parties in parliament, to ensure that plural interests are heard in a consensual decision-making process.”³⁴ It also presents an executive-legislative balance of power. Lijphart argues that there is “formal separation of power [that makes] both the executive and the legislature more independent, and their relationship is much more balanced than cabinet-parliament relationships...”³⁵ Similarly, the consensus model is conducive for a multi-party system rather than a two-party system, where smaller parties can develop freely, and elections occur without any party coming close to majority status. This model of democracy reduces the barriers to minor parties as it “emphasizes the need for the electoral system to give fair and just representation so that the distribution of parliamentary seats reflects the share of the popular vote won by all parties.”³⁶ It allows for there to be checks on majority predominance as well as provide voters a wide range of party alternatives. This allows for a maximization of electoral participation as “fewer votes are wasted in a PR system...therefore [they] generate higher electoral turnout than majoritarian or plurality electoral systems.”³⁷ Lastly, the consensual model of democracy ensures the diversity of parliament as multiple interests are represented and brought to the policy-making process. As noted by Norris, “it is well established that certain social groups are over-represented in elected office, with parliamentary elites commonly drawn from predominant ethnic groups, men and those of higher occupational status.”³⁸ Overall,

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 74.

³⁵ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 33.

³⁶ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 75.

³⁷ Andre Blais and Agnieszka Dobrzynska, “Turnout in electoral democracies,” *European Journal of Political Research* 33, no. 2, (1998): 239-261.

³⁸ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 75.

the consensus model of democracy “maximizes the number of “winners” in elections”³⁹ as this promotes inclusiveness, representation and participation in politics.

Criticism of the consensus model of democracy are based on the fact that they create weak coalition governments and adapt specifically to heterogeneous societies that have deep ideological, ethnic or religious divisions. Norris notes that critics argue that “these electoral systems are prone to generate indecisive electoral results and weak, ineffective, and unstable governing coalitions where it is difficult for voters to assign responsibility.”⁴⁰ Similarly, they argue that the consensual model “creates institutional checks and balances characterized by policy stalemate, administrative paralysis and legislative gridlock; fosters cautious, slow and incremental decision-making and limits the ability of policy makers to respond in timely and coherent fashion to sudden crisis.”⁴¹ The main concern with the consensus democratic model in relation to this research and its application to Jamaica is that it is conceptualized to adapt to heterogeneous societies that have distinct social groups, with representative parties with different ideological bases as well as to a decentralized state. The basis of the consensus model is the inclusiveness of minority groups in decision-making in an effort to allow power-sharing and reduce the dominance and power of a government that represents one social group’s interests over another. Notably, Israel can be considered a heterogeneous society with 75% Jews (further divided into specific ethnicities), 20.7% Arabic and 4.3% other ethnicities⁴², but Jamaica is noted to be mostly homogenous, with 92.1% black, 6.1% mixed and 1.8%

³⁹ Arend Lijphart, “Democracies- forms, performance, and constitutional engineering,” *European Journal of Political Research* 25, no. 1 (1994): 1-17.

⁴⁰ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 76.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Israel demographic Index profile 2016,” *Index Mundi*. Accessed on March 20, 2017. http://www.indexmundi.com/israel/demographics_profile.html

other⁴³. While the elements of the consensus model prove suitable in correcting the issues of the majoritarian system, in its exact state, it is not fully applicable to both Jamaica and Israel. Notably, there is much more theoretical foundation in the centripetal political system that is based in the consensual democratic theory. Gerring and Thacker, who postulated the centripetal model note that “consensus democracy is the heart of the idea of centripetalism.”⁴⁴ Indeed, this political model is attractive as it follows Lijphart’s consensual democratic model but calls for inclusive and authoritative unitary governments with broad participation and power-sharing, instead of diffusion of power and limited government action.

Centripetal Democracy

Centripetalism or the Centripetal Political System is a model that allows political energies to be pooled to the centre in an effort to foster good governance. To put it simply, centripetal democracies allow power to be centralized to some extent as government is by simple majority rule, and the political system has many parties, national rather than local competition, coalition governments, and thus more broad-based national policies.⁴⁵ First presented by Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, the centripetal theory argues that “the key to good governance is not monopolization of power at the centre but rather a flow of power from diverse sources towards the centre, where power is exercised

⁴³“Jamaica demographic Index profile 2016,” *Index Mundi*. Accessed on March 20, 2017. http://www.indexmundi.com/jamaica/demographics_profile.html

⁴⁴ John Gerring and Strom Thacker, *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 189.

⁴⁵ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 223.

collectively.”⁴⁶ It differs from the adversarial model and majoritarian system as it does not propose a single-party government, but instead, a coalition government that pools its power to allow for better governability through more concentrated power in the government. It is a mixture of the accountability and governance of majoritarian systems, with the inclusiveness of proportional models. This model calls for Unitarism, which is where “sovereignty is vested in the central (national) government”, noting too that it “does not mean that all, or even most, decision making occurs at the center; considerable power may be delegated.”⁴⁷ This is crucial in electoral engineering for small states as while decentralist models can be applied to larger territories that have vast divisions, the unitarism in centripetal models fit perfectly to the small states like Jamaica and Israel, especially when the state has a homogenous population like Jamaica. Additionally, centripetal democracies call for parliamentary rather than presidential models. There should be “a system of government in which the executive (the prime minister and cabinet: collectively, “the government”) is chosen by, and responsible to, an elective body (the legislature), thus creating a single locus of sovereignty at the national level.”⁴⁸ This factor is crucial for the existing political institutions that are present in Jamaica and Israel that adopted the parliamentary system. This aspect of the centripetal model allows for there to be reform in the political system without changing the deeply embedded political institutions and culture created by the parliamentary model. In terms of electoral rules, the centripetal system calls for closed-list proportional representation. This contrasts the first-past-the-post, winner take all system, by allowing for multimember districts where each

⁴⁶ John Gerring, Strom Thacker and Carola Moreno, “Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry”, *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (2005): 569.

⁴⁷ Gerring and Thacker, *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance*, 21.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

party nominates a slate of candidates (the list) and parties control the nomination process (the list is “closed”).⁴⁹ This allows for increased competition in each district and increases the chances of smaller parties and interests to be able to make it into government. It goes without saying then, that the centripetal model follows proportional electoral rules rather than plurality led rules. Lastly, centripetal democracies tend to have multi-party systems and coalition governments due to the proportional rules. These elements are of great interest to promoting good governance as “they yield a more diverse parliament, one that includes many parties, representing many points of view and more women deputies.”⁵⁰

Gerring et al. argue that political institutions in their very definition must be inclusive and authoritative to allow for successful policy outcomes.⁵¹ In opposition to the barriers in the majoritarian system against minor parties, Gerring, Thacker and Moreno note that political institutions must first foster broad-based inclusion, “they must reach out to all interests, ideas and identities, (at least in so far that they are relevant to the issue at hand).”⁵² Therefore, while the model allows for the inclusion of all interests, it ensures efficiency by focusing on an efficient policy-making process. Similarly, centripetalism allows for the decisiveness and responsiveness that majoritarian systems provide as the political institutions must also have some centralized authority: “they must provide an effective mechanism for reaching agreement and implementing that agreement.”⁵³ The focus here is not on the social divisions of the state, but rather on “centripetal institutions” which maximize both representation and authority by focusing political energy and actors

⁴⁹ Gerring and Thacker, *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance*, 21.

⁵⁰ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 222.

⁵¹ Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, “Centripetal Democratic Governance”, 568.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, “Centripetal Democratic Governance”, 569.

towards the center of the polity. As Hellwig notes, “at the centre of Gerring and Thacker’s theory are the concepts of inclusion and authority. Political institutions they maintain, should be designed to achieve two goals. The polity must be inclusive enough to incorporate diverse interests, ideas, and identities into the political process. At the same time, the central state apparatus must have a degree of authority needed to ensure the execution and legitimacy of policy outcomes.”⁵⁴ Perfect for this thesis, the authors of the centripetal model focus on good governance as the outcome for the theory.

The basis of this chapter was to highlight the different forms of democratic political systems. It is highlighted that democracy is best promoted through proportional electoral systems in specific states like Jamaica as it facilitates multi-party systems and coalition governments promoted through proportional electoral rules. This is due to the fact that they promote inclusiveness, participation and contestation through the ‘consensual democratic model.’ This theory of democracy stands on the representation of all interests of the populace in decision-making that is deliberative and inclusive, where no single-party dominates the government and its agenda. Following the consensual democratic theory, it is seen that the centripetal political model is best for the promotion of good governance and reducing polarization, corruption and political violence in developing states like Jamaica. It is a good fit with the existing political institutions as well as its homogenous demography. This model avoids the majoritarian and plurality rules, and therefore should not see the dominance of a single-party government, a highly

⁵⁴ Timothy Hellwig, “Book review: Gerring, J & Thacker, S. C. (2008). A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance,” *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 7 (June 2009): 999.

competitive two-party system with clear polarization, the marginalization of the opposition, high voter apathy, political violence or the disregard of constituent interests.

To be more critical of the centripetal model of democracy, certain tenets must be explained. Importantly, Jamaica has a homogenous population which works better with the centripetal model of democracy rather than other consensual theories. Homogeneity allows for unitarism to be better applied than federalism which is effective in geographically-concentrated heterogenous states. Similarly, while the vast ideological differences in Jamaican politics have died down, the centripetal model and proportional rules could see broader ideological choices for voters. Additionally, the centripetal model finds it ideal for there to be a closed party-list system in place where parties have full control over candidate selection. In Jamaica's case, a closed list could exacerbate the existing corruption, where senior members will retain their position on the list not because of qualification, but because of service. In contrast, the mixed-member proportional system (MMP) with an open-list system would be better for Jamaica as it will give the population a chance to elect those they deem qualified or best to fill government and constituency. Based on the tenets of the theory, it can be concluded that there is a good relationship between the centripetal democratic model and good governance and ultimately development. To further define this relationship, the research will provide a comparative analysis of the majoritarian political system in Jamaica and the existing centripetal model in Israel.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis centres largely on how exactly democracy is defined and how this can be applied to the political system of developing countries like Jamaica. Therefore, this chapter shall clarify and explain specific inherent differences between the majoritarian system in Jamaica and the centripetal democracy that exists in Israel. The discussion will focus solely on electoral conceptions of democracy, looking at the specific differences in the electoral systems and rules, as well as party-systems and government. For the thesis, the conceptual framework serves to define particular mechanisms of democracy and political systems in an effort to clarify the issues with the political system of Jamaica before moving into the basis of the actual study. In order to do this, there must be a clear conceptualization of the term “democracy”, then a presentation of the many elements that make a democratic political system and differentiates one type from another.

Defining Democracy

For this thesis therefore, we shall conceptualize democracy using both Dahl and Schumpeter’s definitions. Joseph Schumpeter is credited for his minimalist or ‘electoralist’ definition of democracy that he provided as criticism of the classical definition of democracy. He argues that democracy is first and foremost centred on the people, “the role of the people is to produce a government...the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire

the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."⁵⁵ Beyond the involvement of the populace, this definition provides for political representation and competition for political power. Similarly, Robert Dahl argues that democracy has two main dimensions, contestation and inclusiveness.⁵⁶ Firstly, defining democracy as set in contestation means that the democratic procedure focuses predominantly on the expression of political preference exemplified by competition between political parties for seats.⁵⁷ Siaroff also agrees with this definition of democracy, stating that it is "a political regime that involves, at a minimum, the competition of political elites for public support..."⁵⁸ Indeed, one of the distinguishing factors of democracies is that the democratic method is based on a competitive procedure to acquire public support and get votes to be elected. All democratic elections must present competition between two or more factions for public office. Schumpeter notes that "in political life, there is always some competition, though perhaps only a potential one, for the allegiance of the people. To simplify matters we have restricted the kind of competition for leadership which is to define democracy, to free competition for a free vote."⁵⁹ Notably, "there is a widespread consensus that the presence of competitive elections, more than any other feature, identifies a contemporary nation-state as a democratic political system."⁶⁰ Huntington too agrees, that "competitive elections for effective power is the essence of democracy."⁶¹ Schumpeter also provides for representation of the people's interests, which Dahl

⁵⁵ Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1943), 269.

⁵⁶ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 288.

⁵⁹ Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 271.

⁶⁰ G. Bingham Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 4.

⁶¹ Samuel Huntington, "The modest meaning of Democracy", *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum*, ed. Robert Pastor (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), 15.

postulates as “inclusiveness.” This dimension is illustrated by participation, representation and proportionality within the electoral system. Many scholars have argued that the democratic electoral system must foster representation through plurality, where the range of interests in the society come together to help form government. Though this dimension finds little importance in a homogenous society like Jamaica, inclusiveness can be ascribed to the inclusion of all political parties within the electoral system. Inclusiveness would then mean the inclusion of losing parties in policy formation, as though they may not represent distinct ethnic or religious groups in the state, they represent different ideas within the population. In its basic sense, a state must conduct competitive elections between political factions that represent aspects of the population to be classified or considered democratic.

Critically, some scholars argue that a “competitive election is a necessary but not sufficient condition for representative democracy; competitive election must also be conducted rightly and tend toward the common good.”⁶² Many scholars also forward the concept of the “fallacy of electoralism,” defined as “the flawed conception that democracy privilege selections over other dimensions of democracy and ignore the degree to which multiparty elections (even if they are competitive and uncertain in outcome) may exclude significant portions of the population from contesting for power or advancing an defending their interests.”⁶³ Although Schumpeter fails to truly consider the need for fair competition, Dahl’s dimension of inclusiveness alludes to the necessity of

⁶² Gerry Mackie, “Schumpeter’s Leadership Democracy” *Political Theory* 37, no. 1 (2009). Accessed on December 12, 2017. <http://pages.ucsd.edu/~gmackie/documents/SchumepetersLeadershipDemocrac.pdf>

⁶³ Terry Lynn Karl, “Imposing consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador,” *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985*, eds. Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, 1986), 34.

fairness in the electoral system for there to be democracy. This inclusiveness ensures that all factions are included not only in the electoral procedure, but also in policy-making through representation and proportionality. Therefore, democracy for Dahl, and this thesis, goes beyond the mere electoral procedure, but to the extent that policies are effective and representative of the needs and interests of the populace. The ultimate stance then, is that the basis of democracy is competitive elections that see free and fair competition between two or more representative parties, independent state institutions, and respectable partisan relationships based in legitimacy. Definitively, democracy in contemporary scholarship can be seen as “a regime in which government offices are filled as a consequence of elections with the proviso that real contestation requires an opposition with some nontrivial chance of winning office and participating in decision-making, and that the chief executive office and legislative seats are filled by contested elections.”⁶⁴

Electoral Democracies

The thesis will focus predominantly on electoral democracy with particular elements of liberal democracy, specifically as it relates to the rule of law. That being said, it would be remiss to not adopt four of Siaroff’s five elements of a liberal democracy as crucial for defining a democratic state. Firstly, he outlines that a democratic state is characterized by responsible government. This means that the government is fully

⁶⁴ Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, “What makes democracies endure?”, *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996): 50-51.

accountable to the people that elected them and not accountable to any other political actor that maybe “string pullers, perhaps behind the scenes.”⁶⁵ Siaroff adds, that for a responsible government, “political decisions are taken in a reasonably transparent way by elected officials (or those under their authority) who are thus directly accountable to the electorate, or, ultimately, accountable via elected parliament, and are not accountable to a tutelary monarch or military.”⁶⁶ Within a democracy then, the citizens and their elected officials who are accountable to them must never be deposed by non-constitutional means or be persuaded by any other party or interests outside of that of the public good. That being said, Collier and Levitsky add that, “in response to claims that because [countries] have held elections they are “democratic,” some scholars have modified the procedural minimum definition of democracy by specifying as an explicit criterion that the elected government must to a reasonable degree have effective power to rule.”⁶⁷ Similarly, Siaroff notes that within a democracy, there must be free and fair competition for political office. He notes that within a democracy, elected representatives should be chosen and removed by peaceful means within free, fair and regular elections where there is little to no coercion of voters and where the political system allows political parties to freely form and fairly compete in elections.⁶⁸ To clarify, Siaroff notes that “free” refers to the ability and opportunities for individuals and groups to participate in the political process.⁶⁹ “Fair” refers to “the electoral process, which must be unbiased with regard to the various candidates and parties and transparent in its procedures. Harassment of opposition

⁶⁵ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 82.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 83.

⁶⁷ David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative research,” *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 443.

⁶⁸ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 83.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 85.

candidates; bribery, vote buying, or alternatively, coercion and intimidation of voters; obstruction of opposition supporters' access to polls...⁷⁰ This focus on the freeness and fairness of elections have caused many scholars to consider electoral integrity as a key part of democracy. That is, elections working well to “select officeholders and governments, determine policy priorities, link citizens (as principals) with representatives (as agents), generate inclusive legislatures, confer legitimacy on elected authorities, hold leaders to account, and provide the main opportunity for most ordinary people to participate in politics.”⁷¹ Similarly, Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General stressed in his speech when he launched the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security that, “building democracy is a complex process. Elections, are a starting point, but if their integrity is compromised, so is the legitimacy of democracy...”⁷² Electoral integrity, where there are free and fair elections ensures that the democratic process itself is legitimate.

Additionally, democracy is also dependent on the full and equal rights of political participation for citizens. Siaroff notes that this means “having universal adult suffrage, as opposed to excluding women, the poor, the illiterate, aboriginals, and so on, all of whom have been excluded historically throughout the world.”⁷³ Similarly, equal political participation refers to each and every voter having one vote, or the same number of votes.⁷⁴ Lastly, a democracy is characterized by a legally based, well-functioning state,

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, 5.

⁷² Kofi Annan, “Supporting Democracy and Elections with Integrity,” *Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security*, (June 2014). Accessed on July 20, 2017. www.kofiannanfoundations.org/supporting-democracy-and-elections-with-integrity/global-commission-on-elections-democracy-security-2/

⁷³ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 87.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

with effective and fair governance according to Siaroff. It is important to add this element of liberal democracy as it deals specifically with governance and policy formation. Notably, “the state, that is, the political-bureaucratic system, penetrates effectively and more or less evenly throughout the country. The rule of law clearly exists and is upheld by an independent, unbiased judiciary. Political and bureaucratic corruption is minimal or, ideally, non-existent.”⁷⁵ Important to this thesis and the delineation of democracy, is that “it is not just elections that must be fair, but the whole determination and implementation of government policies. A liberal democracy cannot be said to exist if politicians or bureaucrats exhibit endemic corruption.”⁷⁶ This being said, both Jamaica and Israel are considered to be electoral democracies and not liberal democracies, as a liberal democracy cannot be said to exist where there is a lack of civil liberties for minority groups as is the case in each. Additionally, there cannot be a liberal democracy where the rule of law is weak or there is rampant corruption. The thesis shall focus on the issue of corruption, as this is a pervasive issue in Jamaica and one that relates clearly to party politics. As Freedom House notes, “Corruption remains a serious problem in Jamaica. Long-standing relationships between officials and organized crime figures are thought to persist.”⁷⁷ It is therefore important to consider how the political system impacts the elements of democracy within developing states. Seemingly, by virtue of adopting a majoritarian system, Jamaica has opened itself to issues of responsible government, freeness and fairness of elections as well effective governance. As noted above, the majoritarian political system has allowed for the dominance of only two major

⁷⁵ Ibid, 83.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 89.

⁷⁷ Freedom House, “Jamaica,” *Freedom in the World*, (2016). Accessed on May 20, 2018. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/jamaica>

political parties and has facilitated unfair competition, the sidelining of opposition and political violence as well as corruption in the state. Israel on the other hand has seen the existence of multiparty competition, unified coalition government and little to no political violence in regard to domestic politics. This being said, it is crucial to understand the importance of electoral rules and party systems in relations to government formation and inclusiveness.

Electoral Systems, Rules and Party Systems

The key to the politics of any country is the electoral system, which governs the political process and ensures the continuance of democracy within the state. To borrow from Farrell, “Metaphorically, electoral systems are the cogs that keep the wheels of democracy properly functioning.”⁷⁸ In reality, the electoral system presents the guidelines for how the political institutions and actors arrange themselves and operate, and therefore to change the political operation of the state, one must seek to analyze and edit the rules that govern the electoral system. Lijphart defines the electoral system as “a set of essential election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted in a particular democracy.”⁷⁹ Therefore, for the electoral system to be effective in promoting democracy, it must have set rules on how elections are run, and power is allocated to the government. Importantly, the electoral system and its rules must enforce the elements and characteristics of a democratic state, that is, the principles of legitimacy,

⁷⁸ David Farrell, *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 3.

⁷⁹ Arend Lijphart. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems - A Study of twenty-seven Democracies, 1945-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 13.

rule of law, participation, representation, free and fair elections and so on. The electoral system therefore cannot be arbitrary or occur sporadically but must enforce democratic principles through specific planning and what some scholars call 'electoral engineering' which describes the attempt to modify the electoral rules and arrangements of a country to ensure certain democratic consequences such as democratic accountability or parliamentary diversity.⁸⁰ These rules however must be tested over time and seen to yield legitimate results. As Lijphart notes, an electoral system must be tried and true as a state may go through reform in its electoral process before settling at a single electoral system in an effort to keep democracy and freedoms alive. The state itself must be democratic and the elections must be accepted, and its outcomes legitimate for there to be an effective electoral system in place.

Definitively, the electoral system and its rules can be set on two main points, the participation and representation of the interest of the populace as well as the competition between groups for votes. Siaroff states that the electoral system is "the process for voting (e.g. the ballot structure) and then for translating votes into seats in the context of an election, thereby determining the partisan composition of the legislature but not specifically the government."⁸¹ As pointed out above, the main definition of democracy is the conduction of elections to ensure that citizens participate by voting and that these votes are subsequently calculated and turned into representation. Participation is therefore a definitive part of the electoral system, it is the effective presentation of the freedom of people in choosing who they want to represent and govern them. The rules should

⁸⁰ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 5.

⁸¹ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 290.

therefore ensure that their interests and desires are reflected in the legislature. Siaroff also points to another major part of any democratic state, that is, the notion of competition. This establishes party systems as a substantial part of electoral systems as electoral systems determine partisan make-up of the legislature. Elections must present some form of competition for true democracy to take hold. For there to be democratic representation and/or competition, there must be some form of a party system in place within the electoral system and the electoral rules must ensure the free and fair contestation for government.

Clearly, the electoral system and its rules must reflect the democratic principles of participation, contestation and inclusion that has been argued for the most of this literature review. These electoral rules, according to Lijphart, are the electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure. Firstly, the electoral formula is electoral rules that determine who win seats within the legislature. Johnston highlights that there are three main options; that of plurality where “the candidate receives at least one more vote than any other candidate”, majority “the successful candidate receives at least one more vote than all of the other candidates (50%+1)” and proportionality where “allocation of seats among the candidates in proportion to their shares of the vote.”⁸² It is argued that a proportional electoral formula is more democratic as it is more representative of the voter’s actual ballots. Secondly, district magnitude is seen as “the number of members elected in each electoral district (constituency or riding)”⁸³ or as Lijphart puts it, “the

⁸² Larry Johnston, *From Votes to Seats: Four Families of Electoral Systems* (Toronto: Toronto: Citizen's Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2007) 2. Accessed on July 20, 2017. <http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/assets/From%20Votes%20to%20Seats.pdf>

⁸³ Ibid.

number of representatives elected in a district”.⁸⁴ The district magnitude can be classified as single member districts (one representative post per constituency), multi-member districts (more than a single representative post and mixed systems where citizens may vote in a single-member district and a national or regional multi-member district.⁸⁵

Lijphart contends that the electoral formula and district magnitude are the two most important aspects and dimensions of electoral systems as they affect both the outcomes of elections as well as how parties organize themselves to form the party system.

Additionally, some scholars argue that the ballot type or structure is crucial to the electoral system as it describes how parties present their options to the populace and how the voters decide between them. Johnston differentiates between the categorical or exclusive ballot (voters can choose only one candidate), the ordinal or preferential ballot (ran candidates in order of preference) and the mixed systems where both are used.⁸⁶

Similarly, Norris and Lijphart have also recently argued that the electoral system must have an electoral threshold⁸⁷, which is the “minimum amount of support that a party needs to gain representation.”⁸⁸ It is noted that an electoral threshold may exclude some minor parties from the legislature altogether if they don’t meet the threshold, but may also allow historically excluded groups to gain representation when they normally could not have due to majoritarian rules. Important too, is assembly size as argued by Siaroff and Lijphart. This is the total amount of seats in the legislature which will determine how many persons can be elected. Most developing states tend to have small legislatures and therefore small voting districts, making the number of parties and possible persons being

⁸⁴ Lijphart, *Electoral systems and Party Systems*, 10.

⁸⁵ Johnston, *From votes to Seats*, 2.

⁸⁶ Johnston, *From votes to Seats*, 3.

⁸⁷ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 261.

⁸⁸ Lijphart, *Electoral systems and Party systems*, 11.

elected to office much less. Therefore, to effect any change in the electoral system and politics of a state, there must be changes with the above elements of the electoral system.

As noted continuously throughout this literature review, representation and competition for power is crucial in the democratic process. Utilizing Dahl's definition once more, it is the contestation and inclusiveness of the political system and its rules that defines a state as democratic. These elements are mainly seen through the party system that exist within the state. According to Siaroff, party systems are "the relationship among the various political parties (there must be at least two) in a territory, that is, their total number, relative, size, competitiveness, and so on".⁸⁹ It can be seen as the system of relationships among the political parties within a state that is defined by competition between these groups for the legislature. That being said, Siaroff highlights that "almost every democracy has a party system; the exceptions are six island states in Oceania...which do not have formal political parties for cultural and traditional reasons"⁹⁰ along with "party-like alliances may form in the legislature of these six democracies, but everyone is elected as an independent."⁹¹ Siaroff also outlines the various types of party-systems that exist, notably, the competitive two-party system, the imbalanced two-party system, the moderately multi-party system, the two-and-a-half party system, the highly multi-party system and the one-party predominant system. For the literature review we shall focus on the two-party and multi-party systems. The competitive two-party system is defined by the alternation in power of two relevant parties with reasonable chances of winning in most elections.⁹² In comparison, the

⁸⁹ Siaroff. Comparing Political Regimes, 292.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 182.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid, 184.

imbalanced two-party system also has “only two relevant parties, but one party is in power for a very long time, and the other has very little chance of winning elections.”⁹³ The two-party system by definition, sees the domination of only two large parties and the exclusion of any parties that have minor political strength and no chance of winning elections. Siaroff divided the multi-party systems into the moderately multi-party system, the two-and-a-half-party system and the highly multi-party system. The moderately multi-party system is a fairly deconcentrated system with anywhere from three to six relevant parties. The top two parties in an election typically have less than 80 per cent of the seats and a coalition government is the norm as no one party can win an outright majority of the seats.⁹⁴ The two-and-a-half-party system is a special multi-party occurrence where there are three to six relevant parties, but there exist two dominant parties that together, win 80 per cent or more of the seats. This leaves smaller ‘half’ parties with some seats or pushed to form government through coalition with one of the larger parties.⁹⁵ Lastly, the highly multi-party system is one that is “very fragmented and has more than six relevant parties...usually medium to small ones.”⁹⁶ It is noted that in these systems, coalition governments are the norm and usually consist of three or more parties.⁹⁷ Many scholars argue that a multi-party system is a characteristic of a developed democracy as it allows for popular support to be divided among different parties and the voters’ interests to be properly translated into government.

⁹³ Ibid, 184-185.

⁹⁴ Siaroff. Comparing Political Regimes, 188.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 189.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

In engineering a democratic electoral system, the best way to allow for inclusiveness and contestation would be through electoral rules that allow for proportionality. Simply, proportionality means how well the elections represent the national interests, that is, the allocation of seats in proportion to the votes casted for each party.⁹⁸ Farrell notes that proportionality is “a representative sample of the population” and the reflection of the ratios of society in the microcosm that is parliament.⁹⁹ Plant further adds that “the representativeness of the populace is accounted for by its proportionality. It is the sociological mirroring of society.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, many scholars have argued that since society itself is made up of different views and interests, the electoral system and its rules should allow for a multi-party system and proportional representation in government. Norris notes that “consensus democracies and PR electoral systems focus on the inclusion of all voices, emphasizing the need for bargaining and compromise within parliament, government, and the policy-making process.”¹⁰¹ Notably, proportional electoral rules encourage the formation of several political parties that generally reflect policy, ideology, or leadership differences within society. Also, minority parties gain easier access to representation.”¹⁰²

Important to this discussion is Duverger’s law. Also known as Duverger’s hypothesis, it states that the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party

⁹⁸ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 50.

⁹⁹ Farrell, *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*, 11.

¹⁰⁰ Raymond Plant, *The Plant Report: A Working Party on Electoral Reform* (London: Gardiner & Theobald, 1991), 72.

¹⁰¹ Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 50.

¹⁰² ACE Project, *The ACE Encyclopedia: Parties and Candidates*, (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 1998) 82. Accessed on August 2, 2017. <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/onePage>

system¹⁰³ the double ballot majority system and proportional representation tend to favor multipartyism.¹⁰⁴ Sartori clarifies by stating, “plurality-rule elections (such as first past the post) structured within single-member districts tend to favor a two-party system and that “the double ballot majority system and proportional representation tend to favor multipartism”¹⁰⁵ This ‘mechanical’ aspect of Duverger’s law outlines that the district magnitude, electoral formula and other rules within the electoral system will allow for different party systems. It implies that non-proportional systems will exclude smaller parties by the mere fact that they have single-member districts and plurality-based electoral formula. The effect of this according to Duverger’s law is that larger parties tend to dominate and amass more support than smaller parties who do not have the size or even competitiveness to thrive within the political system despite their diversity or representative interest in the population. Lijphart argues then that “all majoritarian systems make it difficult for small parties to gain representation (unless they are geographically concentrated), electoral districts. For this reason, all majoritarian systems tend to systematically favour larger parties, to produce disproportional election outcomes and to discourage multipartism”.¹⁰⁶

In addition to the mechanical aspect of Duverger’s law, there is also an additional psychological effect. Duverger argues that “voters are aware of the fact that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted vote and therefore they are less inclined to bother voting for

¹⁰³ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, 2nd English revised edn. (London: Methuen & Co, 1959) 217.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 25.

¹⁰⁶ Lijphart, *Electoral systems and Party Systems*, 20.

them, thereby further compounding the difficulties the smaller parties face”.¹⁰⁷ It is this occurrence that allows for discussion on the ‘wasted vote’ within majoritarian systems with electoral rules based in plurality. In these systems, the voting populace will not support the smaller parties who they consider have no chance of winning which discourages the smaller parties from contesting elections or even forming at all; there is “volatility in the support for parties in these systems.”¹⁰⁸ It is noted that smaller parties, when estimating how winnable the seats are may decide not to compete or even run at all as they do not have the resources to beat the larger established parties that have been advantaged by the electoral system, whether they represent key national interests or not.

Clearly, the mechanics of non-proportional representation (PR) systems result in fewer parties in parliament as smaller parties are unable to win seats. ¹⁰⁹ It is noted too, that plurality systems can perform a “gatekeeping function” which contributes to the stability of the party system because this limits the entry of new parties or limits their impact.¹¹⁰ This forces the disadvantaged smaller parties then to either breakdown or join forces with the larger parties. By virtue of this, it is easily argued that not all groups will be represented in government and not all views and interests will be considered in policy-making. In his study, Hermens notes that small parties were aided by proportional representation and hindered by single-member district plurality rules.¹¹¹ This corresponds

¹⁰⁷ Andre Blais and R. Kenneth Carty, “The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger’s Elusive Factor,” *British Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 1 (January 1991): 79-93.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Farrell, *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*, 11.

¹¹⁰ Johnston, *From votes to Seats*, 12.

¹¹¹ Ferdinand Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation*, (Notre Dame: The Review of Politics, 1941) 15.

with Norris' findings, that the mean number of parliamentary parties with at least one seat in majoritarian states was 5.22 and in proportional representational states was 9.52.¹¹²

Duverger's laws highlight the impact of electoral rules on the elements of party systems, that is, the competitiveness, perspectives and volatility.¹¹³ The electoral formula and district magnitude can have an adverse effect on smaller parties who cannot compete against more dominant parties. This forces the voting group for smaller parties to become apathetic as they understand that their interests won't be included in policy-making as their particular party has no chance of being in government. As parties evaluate the political scene and realize that there is little chance of survival with the plurality rules, there rises an issue with volatility, as any chance of a multiparty system is subdued by the two dominant parties causing a breakdown in representation and true proportionality of the electorate to the legislature. This eventually leads to disenfranchised groups and political parties who lose faith in the political system causing both low voter-turnouts and participation, as well as no true competition within the electoral system. This is oppositional to the definition of democracy established earlier, as plurality-based rules "limit the diversity of perspectives heard in the legislature and make the system less competitive by giving an advantage to the established parties." Importantly, Lijphart notes in his research that most of his cases (namely, Germany, Israel, Norway and Sweden) saw a decline in disproportionality and an increase in the number of parties when the changed from a majoritarian formula to a more proportional one.¹¹⁴ He notes, "changes are in accordance with the hypothesis that increasing proportionality will

¹¹² Norris, *Electoral Engineering*, 85.

¹¹³ Johnston, *From votes to Seats*, 4.

¹¹⁴ Johnston, *From votes to Seats*, 481.

increase the number of parties and vice versa...”¹¹⁵ Similarly, Farrell notes that his study of Italy and the Netherlands has shown that “the PR system is characterized by a large number of parliamentary parties in consequence, coalition governments are the norm.”¹¹⁶

The hope is that any electoral reform in Jamaica to further democracy should see the move from a system that perpetuates adversarial competition and minimal representation (majoritarian systems) to one that is more representative and inclusive through a multi-party system and proportionality in transferring votes to seats (PR systems). The assumption is that proportional representation as existing in centripetal democracies should allow for the development and participation of smaller parties that represent differing social interests and issues. The hope is that this multiparty political situation will decrease political violence and promote political participation of the populace. Additionally, this increased representation should promote cooperation and therefore more inclusive policies. Similarly, clientelistic behaviors and corruption should decrease due to the fact that smaller parties can now check the more institutionalized parties in Jamaica and seats are allocated based on proportionality minimizing the one-party governments that control state resources and dictate how funds are used.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 82.

¹¹⁶ Farrell, *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*, 92.

CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will outline the empirical base of the thesis, highlighting how it is that the rules of the political system as outlined in the previous chapter fosters good governance and promotes development. The assumption is that multi-party systems with coalition governments and proportional representation, ensures inclusiveness and participation of all sects by bringing the citizenry together to partake in the policy process. This inclusiveness and participation will hopefully reduce the political issues in Jamaica and hopefully allow good governance and the best political decisions for development. In the eyes of the contemporary scholar, the development of any state is truly a composite illustration of its level of human development, economic growth and political development. Prominently, the United Nations Human Development Index defines states as developed based on “a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators.”¹¹⁷ The empirical framework will delve deeper into the mechanics of the comparative analysis by looking at the relationship between politics and development. It will highlight that the thesis is a study of the political systems of Israel and Jamaica by assessing its governance using measures of the quality of democracy. It will illustrate that good governance should be the outcome of a democratic political system, and a good avenue for development. Therefore, it is presented that development can be fostered through democratic political rules which lead to good governance and a high quality of democracy. The chapter will also highlight that the relationship between

¹¹⁷ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1997*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 5.

democracy, politics and development are not decisive as there are many factors that influence and affect the development of states such as history, human capital and even the resources available to the state. The thesis then provides one possibility for development through good governance.

Defining Development

At the turn of the 1970's, the economic definition and nature of development faced heavy criticism as some scholars sought to change the basis of development theory. On one hand, some theorists sought to hold on to the economic base where "the objective is positivist in nature...to measure development through economic statistics and indicators" and on the other "an approach to development in which the objective is to expand what people are able to do and be – what might be called, people's real freedoms."¹¹⁸ Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen became the major proponents of this new definition of development, where it was human capital that was the means and ends to development. Haq was first to postulate the importance of human development over economic development as part of development theory by noting that, "in many societies, GNP can increase while human lives shrivel...We have finally begun to accept the axiom that human welfare; is the true end of development."¹¹⁹ He also highlights the importance of using human development measures and indicators for development, stating, "societies with similar natural resource endowments often have developed very differently because

¹¹⁸ Alkire and Deneulin, "Introducing the Human Development and Capability Approach", 1.

¹¹⁹ Mahbub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1995) 4.

of differences in their human capabilities. The critical difference: human skills and enterprise; and the institutions that produce them.”¹²⁰

The focus on human needs as a critical part of development was then coupled with Amartya Sen’s Capabilities Approach to form human development. Sen was critical of all other forms of development theory and argued that “development is a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy...”¹²¹ Sen argues that development should be measured by the level of freedom citizens have to live the life they truly value. He argues that the greatest indicator and measure of development is “deprivation of capabilities rather than merely low income.”¹²² He adds that this deprivation of basic capabilities is more so reflected in premature mortality, health, unemployment, persistent morbidity and widespread illiteracy rather than economic measurements.¹²³ These dimensions were soon adopted as the major indicators of development as measured by the human development index. While economic growth remains an important objective for all developing states, human development is also important.

While development is easily framed and measured through economic growth or the advancement of human freedoms, there also needs to be definition of the process of development as it relates to politics and state institutions. Development, as is incorporated in political dimensions, is based on growth, equity, democracy, stability and autonomy.¹²⁴ Political development is arguably defined through western scholarship and a reflection of

¹²⁰ Ibid, 3.

¹²¹ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1990) 3.

¹²² Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 21.

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

the politics and socio-economic arrangements of industrialized, western powers, that is, the process of achieving the level of development the western powers had achieved. As Pye illustrates, “economists were quick to point out that political and social conditions could play a decisive role in impeding or facilitating advance in per capita income, and thus it was appropriate to conceive of political development as the state of the polity which might facilitate economic growth.”¹²⁵ Modernization theorists assess development based on the public policy and political system of a state, especially how in line it is with the politics of industrialized western powers. Here, modernization is key to development and is achieved through political avenues.

Political development is argued as a possible avenue to achieve human and socio-economic development. Siaroff highlights both the sequence of political development as well as the possible outcome of democratic consolidation. Political development according to Siaroff is indicated by a national identity that produces national unity, the establishment of legitimate and effective state institutions that penetrate the country, contestation and competition of political office by differing groups, the production of responsible government and the expansion of political rights.¹²⁶ A consolidated democracy with law-abiding citizens and leaders, respectable partisan behavior, and democratic political attitudes of the political elites and citizens are elements of a politically developed state, as these factors reflect the democratic principles of fairness, equality and legitimacy. Development as defined through politics is a western concept based in liberal democratic values and capitalist economic principles where development

¹²⁵ Lucian W. Pye, “The Concept of Political Development” in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358, *New Nations: The Problem of Political Development* (1965), 5.

¹²⁶ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 23.

is measured by the advancement of democratic ideals. A developed country then, is “a country with effective state institutions and good outcomes. Where development stems from political actions and is seen through the improvement of the quality of life of its citizens apart from performing the conventional functions of government.”¹²⁷ For this thesis, ‘development’ as a hopeful outcome will be measured by the level of human development and socio-economic growth of the state. Vivaly, development is not a guaranteed outcome of centripetal democratic rules, but instead a hopeful possibility. The stance, is that political development through good governance, effective state institutions, and democratic consolidation exemplified by good quality of democracy allows for greater possibilities for high human development and socio-economic growth.

Firstly, it is important to note that the thesis cannot focus on all the factors that affect development, as these factors are expansive and largely dependent on the country in question. What the thesis aims to do is highlight the effect of political development on increased socio-economic and human development. The aim is to determine how well good governance can promote democracy. The hope is that by applying centripetal rules, such as proportional representation, development will be promoted through greater representation through multiparty politics and greater inclusion through increased participation. Additionally, the level of socio-economic development of both Jamaica and Israel will not be decisive elements due to the fact that both states have developed on different historical and political paths. The level of development in Israel is important in

¹²⁷ Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Pre-human times to the French Revolution*, (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 14.

providing a hopeful and conditional goal for Jamaica's application of the centripetal model.

Good Governance and the Quality of Democracy

As many developing states aim to achieve higher levels of human development and economic growth, there is an ensuing debate on the role political institution and democracy has to play. Despite the debate however, it is easily stated that for there to be development in any state, there must be some level of political development and good governance present. Hasnat defines good governance as “the quality of governance, which expresses itself through specific elements and dimensions...Just as the dancer cannot be separated from the dance, the organs or actors executing governance in their respective spheres cannot be relegated to the background.”¹²⁸

The important thing about good governance is the fact that it incorporates the activities and participation of the private sector as well as civil society in reaching development. Good governance therefore, provides a good avenue for development to occur as it encompasses various socio-political factors. For the World Bank, good governance also expands beyond political arrangements to the management of socioeconomic policies. They define it as, “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development... the concept of governance is concerned directly with the management of the development process,

¹²⁸ Abdul Hye Hasnat, *Governance: South Asian Perspective* (Bangladesh: The University Press Ltd, 2001), 1.

involving both the public and the private sectors. It encompasses the functioning and capability of the public sector... including accountability for economic and financial performance. In broad terms, then, governance is about the institutional environment in which citizens interact among themselves and with government agencies/officials.”¹²⁹ Collectively then, good governance is the quality of a government to exercise political and socioeconomic authority by managing the cooperative actions of different institutions of the state. It involves strongly, a political system and government that is “characterized by the rule of law, having a democratic political basis (elected by plebiscite), and responsive to the people. Good governance also includes adequately structured state institutions with efficiency and transparency of institutions and procedures and respect by all governmental authorities for the human rights of all persons within the territory of the state. It includes respect by government for rule of law with access by individuals to means for redressing violations of law; accountability of public officials for misconduct, malfeasance, and human rights violations; and a public sector with an active and free civil society, with fairness and equity for all.”¹³⁰ Good governance then is a possible avenue to development and ensuring that the democratic state remains stable and continues to be better.

The level of governance then, provides an assessment for political development based on the quality of democracy. The characteristics of good governance are ideal for a good or better democratic quality within a state. Political science scholarship continues to

¹²⁹ Marc Holzer and Kim Byong-Joon, *Building Good Governance: Reforms in Seoul*, (National Center for Public Productivity, 2002), Preface.

¹³⁰ H. Victor Conde, “Good Governance,” in *Encyclopedia of Human Rights in the United States*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Grey House Publishing, 2011). Accessed on August 14, 2017. http://ezproxy.uleth.ca/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/greyhuman/good_governance/0?institutionId=2649

define what exactly these good democratic qualities are and how exactly does democracy progress in a state. The controversy lies within the factors that should be used to define a good democratic state. Firstly, it is agreed that at the basis of a democratic state there must be participation of the populace and contestation for public Office. This ties in with both Schumpeter and Dahl's definition of democracy. Schumpeter argues that democracy is "the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's votes."¹³¹ This fits perfectly with Dahl's minimalist definition of democracy which sees it as, contestation and inclusiveness,¹³² which involves the competition between groups and the participation and inclusion of the citizens to vote as well as groups to participate in the election. Additionally, both Lauth and Merkel in their writings suggest that the rule of law is crucial to a successful and stable democratic regime. Lauth argues that "rule of law is a defining characteristic of democracy...it allows for equality and fairness across all sectors."¹³³ Merkel's concern is that rule of law within a democracy allows for the balance of power and should work to prevent tyranny in the government or any form of corruption.¹³⁴ Similarly, many authors argue that there must be recurring, free, competitive and fair elections in any definition of democracy. According to Diamond, this is so that any analysis of democracy, or what is considered true democracy "should

¹³¹ Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), 269.

¹³² Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, 2.

¹³³ Hans-Joachim Lauth, *The Matrix of Democracy: A Three-Dimensional Approach to Measuring the Quality of Democracy and Regime Transformations*, (WAPS, 2015) 6. Accessed on July 5, 2017. <https://opus.bibliothek.uni-wuerzburg.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/10966>

¹³⁴ Wolfgang Merkel, "Embedded and Defective Democracies". *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004): 33–58.

exclude hybrid or electoral authoritarianism regimes, which by failing to conduct free and fair elections fall short of an essential requirement for democracy.”¹³⁵

In assessing the quality of democracy, the focus is on the results and characteristics of the democratic process and systems in states according to how effective the democratic elements are and how satisfactory they are to the populace of the state as well as in achieving development. Diamond and Morlino posit that the quality of democracy is,

“One that provides its citizens a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions. A good democracy is thus first a broadly legitimated regime that satisfies citizen expectation of governance (quality in terms of result) ...”¹³⁶

There are a few methods for assessing the quality of democracy, from the basic quality as procedures to quality as societal outcomes.¹³⁷ Roberts notes that quality as procedures focuses on to what degree elections are free and fair and if civil rights are protected.¹³⁸ These procedural dimensions are considered objective and the basic approach in studying the quality of democracy. Diamond and Morlino point out that the procedural dimensions of democracy are the rule of law, participation, competition and accountability (vertical and horizontal).¹³⁹ Roberts also presents that democratic quality can be assessed through societal outcomes. This focuses on the policy outcomes that exist

¹³⁵ Larry Diamond, “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *The Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 21-35.

¹³⁶ Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) xi-xii.

¹³⁷ Andrew Roberts, *The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe: Public Preference and Policy Reform*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Diamond and Morlino, *Assessing the quality of democracy*, xii.

within the democratic state, where citizen satisfaction is linked to the policies and outcomes they produce.¹⁴⁰ Many scholars argue that the opinions and perceptions of citizens must also be added to the assessment of the quality of democracy, considered to be the subjective measure of the quality of democracy. The societal outcome and measure is received through studying the citizens (recording their opinions, level of income and other socio-economic indicators in polls such as the Barometer) and compliments the objective study that is usually done with procedural dimensions. According to Diamond and Morlino, “democracy is more than a procedural procedure. It must include aspects of performance, such as welfare production (social democracy) or sustainability.”¹⁴¹ Adding this measure to the quality of democracy is labelled “‘substantial’ or ‘materialist’ and argues that the quality of democracy should be judged in part by outcomes. In this context, scholars refer to concepts such as ‘good democracy’ and the ‘result dimension’ and ask what democracies actually ‘deliver and produce’ which is usually socio-economic or human development outcomes.”¹⁴² This thesis therefore, shall focus on both objective procedural dimensions as well as subjective dimensions that look at societal outcome as definitive of democratic quality.

Since the underlying intent of the thesis is to explore the politics of Jamaica, Trevor Munroe’s dimensions for assessing good governance and the quality of democracy prove ideal for the comparative analysis. Munroe’s indicators were selected due to their relevance to modern definitions and indices for measuring the quality of democracy as well as the fact that they were formed to be ideal for consolidated democracies and the

¹⁴⁰ Roberts, *The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe*, 29.

¹⁴¹ Diamond and Morlino, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, 25.

¹⁴² Stein Ringen, *What Democracy is for: On Freedom and Moral Government*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) 14.

Jamaican context. Munroe's variables include both procedural dimensions, such as participation and competition, as well as subjective factors such as the attitude of the populace, policy effectiveness and the level of corruption. It is believed that Munroe provides a complete and suitable set of variables to measure the quality of democracy. Munroe originally argued that political science scholarship needs to shift focus from democratic consolidation to issues associated with the quality of democracy in Jamaica. While Jamaica is largely considered to be a consolidated democracy, recent trends has put that belief into question and spurred the necessity for this study. Increasingly concerning is the growth of political dissatisfaction with democracy within developing states like Jamaica, as citizens grow weary of democratic values and institutions. Developing states like Jamaica can easily fall short when compared to consolidated states like Israel on the basis of quality of democracy. Munroe does well in providing rough dimensions for measuring the quality of democracy within states, which include both objective and subjective dimensions to provide a holistic measure for the quality of democracy.

Munroe proposes five dimensions for measuring the quality of democracy within a state. He first proposes measuring the quality of political participation which he defines as “a look at how far political participation takes place through conventional and non-conventional means...”¹⁴³ There must be high levels of voter turnout and a great indication that persons are willing to participate unconventionally. This measure of democratic quality is considered a procedural dimension and widely used in current studies of democratic quality, specifically in the works of Alman and Perez-Linan,

¹⁴³ Trevor Munroe, *Renewing Democracy into the Millennium: The Jamaican Experience in Perspective.* (Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press, 1999) 15.

Beetham et. al., Lijphart, and Diamond and Morlino. Secondly, Munroe suggests another procedural variable, measuring the quality of political contestation or competition which looks at the “balance between partisanship and adversarialism weighed against accommodation and cooperation.”¹⁴⁴ It is an analysis of the political rhetoric, partisan violence as well as on what levels do various parties collaborate for policy outcomes. It looks at the attitude of the political parties towards each other, as well as that of the opposition towards government and vice versa. It measures the level of ‘friendliness’ compared to ‘adversarialism’ within the political sector, noting high competition but ‘friendliness’ and cooperation reflects a high quality of democracy. This dimension is also utilized by Altman and Perez-Linan, Diamond and Morlino, Lijphart and O’Donnell.

Munroe also suggests measuring the quality of democracy by looking at the level of corruption in public and private sectors, also used as a measure by Lijphart in his study of democratic quality, whereas most other scholars focused heavily on the rule of law as a dimension. As postulated by Munroe, the level of corruption as a variable is an analysis of the extent to which there is an abuse of public power for private gain as well as private power for private gain. There is also analysis of “the extent [at which] procurement and allocation systems are influenced by cronyism, partisanship, and clientelism...and how far do formal checks from the justice system (rules of transparency, effectiveness of prosecution and so on) and informal checks from the mass public work in exposing and reducing corruption.”¹⁴⁵ Kitschelt outlines that there is a thin line between corruption and clientelism where officials and parties use public office for private interests.¹⁴⁶ He argues

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Munroe, *Renewing Democracy into the Millennium*, 16.

¹⁴⁶ Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages between citizens and politicians in Democratic regimes,” *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6 (September, 2000): 853.

that some parties within democratic systems avoid programmatic competition and engage in patronage and clientelistic practices that obstruct democratic competition.¹⁴⁷

Considering outcomes as part of a healthy democracy, the quality of socioeconomic outcomes from state policy is also a vital indicator that looks at the contribution of the state in reducing or expanding socioeconomic gaps as well as the empowerment of disadvantaged sectors of the state.¹⁴⁸ It pushes for analysis on the extent to which government and state policy facilitates economic growth and the empowerment of disadvantaged groups like women and the poor. This dimension of societal outcomes was used by Lijphart and O'Donnell and was also the focus of Putman et. al. 1994 study of democratic quality. Lastly, Munroe agrees with Lijphart and proposes measuring the attitude towards the government as a reflection of the political opinion of the populace on the extent to which they trust or distrust the government and support democracy, as well as how satisfied they are with the political system. It highlights the level of support and satisfaction the populace has for democracy and how willing they would be to participate in reforming the political system or in the process of democratic governance.

The researcher assumes that of these dimensions of quality of democracy, the quality of political participation and the support for democracy are deemed to be the ones that would be greatly impacted by centripetal democratic rules and the application of proportional representation in Jamaica. The dimensions such as the quality of political contestation, the level of corruption and the quality of socio-economic outcomes are more conditional. It is assumed, that because proportional representation and other centripetal

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 869.

¹⁴⁸ Munroe, *Renewing Democracy into the Millennium*, 16.

rules will foster multi-party politics, coalition governments and therefore representation and inclusiveness, adversarial contestation should decrease as parties have to collaborate on policy and work together in coalition governments. Similarly, corruption should be reduced over time. Overall, the thesis highlights that socio-economic outcomes should improve from broader policy cooperation and decreased political issues.

Politics, Democracy and Development

As a study of politics and development, the thesis outlines political development as one way for developing states to achieve socio-economic and human development. It looks specifically at if a high quality of democracy (using the above dimensions) relates to high levels of development. Scholars like North postulate that democracy has a great impact on economic growth and human development, as it provides the necessary rules and institutions that facilitate growth. North adds that, “the development of the west was due to the economy founded on political institutions of separation of powers and representative government. The political institutions under which modern economic growth emerged in Europe and its offshoots (especially North America and Australasia) allowed the market system to flourish and the business class to invest and innovate, fairly secure from government predation and social unrest. The regimes also began to supply free public education, which further contributed to economic progress.”¹⁴⁹ An important aspect of a consolidated democracy is that it provides “links between civil society and

¹⁴⁹ D. C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 10.

political parties that translate popular desires into government programs and civil services that can implement these programs.”¹⁵⁰ Arguably, democracy provides fundamental factors that promote development. Firstly, civil liberties, political participation and contestation allows for “the consideration of all preferences and interests, political or economic, in the policymaking process.”¹⁵¹ Democracies tend to have minimal barriers to entry into the decision-making process, leading to more intense competition of interests. According to Becker’s model of political competition, “this provides more balanced public policies in democracies, because small, powerful, and unopposed interest groups in autocracies can easily articulate and impose their particular interest as public policy.”¹⁵²

Regular elections, accountability and rule of law are also factors of a strong democracy that promote development. Regular, free and fair elections whose results are accepted by all parties, and peaceful transition of power reduce uncertainty for political actors and public policies that they pursue translates into greater certainty of economic institutions that establish the framework for the business environment.¹⁵³ Accountability within a strong democracy also allows “the public to help to establish constraints on government actions, [contributing] to balanced public policies, and builds credibility, thus reducing uncertainty...When government is not accountable, it is not constrained and its policy pronouncements are not credible.”¹⁵⁴ Rule of law provides safety for public and

¹⁵⁰ Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin, *The Democratic Century* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004) 24.

¹⁵¹ Boris Begovic, “Democracy and Economic Growth: Some Regularities” in *Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law Working Papers 148* (July, 2013), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1114.2567.

¹⁵² Gary Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Groups of Political influence” in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98, no. 3 (August, 1983): 371-400.

¹⁵³ Begovic, Democracy and Economic Growth, 10.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 12.

private interests by allowing democracies to be rule based systems of government. Similarly, a strong democracy allows for the enhancement of human freedoms and capabilities thus ensuring development through the enhancement of human capital through education, health and productivity.

It is clear that a strong democracy has the right elements to allow for increased development therefore in theory, there is a positive relationship between democracy and development. This is exemplified by the fact that of the top twenty-five most developed countries as listed by the human development index, all are democracies except Singapore.¹⁵⁵ All these countries are also reflected in the democracy index as having above a 6.0 measure out of 10 indicating a full democracy or a democracy in need of some improvement, except Liechtenstein which is not included in the list of countries provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit.¹⁵⁶ Many scholars have pointed out that the East Asian Tigers have all achieved high levels of economic growth and development without instituting democratic political systems. While this is true, these states also have varied levels of human development and have human resources that facilitate their drastic economic growth that many developing countries like Jamaica and Israel don't have. The truth is that centripetal rules cannot facilitate development alone but provides a positive socio-political environment to foster growth and development. The centripetal rules should hopefully lead to broader cooperation and less adversarialism and therefore broader and more inclusive policies.

¹⁵⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2016- "Human Development for Everyone"* (Human Development Report Office, 2016) Accessed on July 1, 2017.
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf

¹⁵⁶ The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the "deplorables", (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). Accessed on July 1, 2017.

Since Jamaica is a democracy, it is important to look specifically at the quality of democracy and how it impacts development. Levine and Molina have studied this topic by taking a multidimensional analysis of democracy in Latin America by looking at variables such as corruption, participation, politicization, political violence, accountability, and sovereignty.¹⁵⁷ They note that this approach to political development is necessary as many of these Latin American states tend to have basic democratic qualities such as free and fair elections, alteration in power, engaged citizenries and so on, but they lack deep democratic values as there are many avenues to undermine democracy and development. Levine and this assessment can also be applied to the democratic states of the Caribbean such as Jamaica in comparison to states like Israel which have higher levels of development.

¹⁵⁷ Daniel Levine and Enrique Molina, *The Quality of Democracy in Latin America*, (USA: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2011) 3.

CHAPTER FOUR: JAMAICA AS A MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

This chapter will provide a substantial background of Jamaica since its independence in 1962 until the present day. It will discuss the political landscape of the country by first defining its political framework. There will be specific discussion on the make-up of parliament and the roles of the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. The chapter will then move into an outline of the institutionalized two-party system in Jamaica as part of the country's electoral system. It will discuss the duopoly of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP) in what is a dysfunctional two-party system. The following discussion will outline the political history of Jamaica from the development of the labour movements and political activism in the 1930's to the current political landscape of Jamaica. This section will illustrate major milestones in the development of Jamaica's political system. Following this will be an in-depth analysis of the development of the political parties in Jamaica as well as how they transformed the political system into an institutionalized two-party system. This section on party politics will highlight the relationship of the political parties with the populace and how it is they organized themselves in their effort to win elections. The latter part of this chapter will focus on the political issues that are prevalent in Jamaica. There will be an analysis and discussion about political patronage in Jamaica by looking at how hand-outs and polarization influenced political violence and the political culture. There will be a focus on specific time periods in Jamaica's history, presenting commentary on some of the worst times in Jamaican politics. Similarly, there will also be a brief look at the

disrespect between both parties as well as the effects of party politics on the political and socio-economic development of the state. Statistics will be provided on Jamaica's current socio-economic and human development. In the end, this chapter will highlight how despite Jamaica's electoral strength, it is indeed a flawed democracy plagued by aggressive polarization and political violence.

Overview of the Political System

The politics of Jamaica takes place within the framework of a constitutional monarchy with a representational parliamentary democracy. As an independent state since 1962, the island of Jamaica established a parliamentary system that closely matches the Westminster system of Great Britain. As a ceremonial leader, Queen Elizabeth II is the head of state of the country, who, on advice by the Prime Minister, appoints a Governor General as her representative. Jamaica's constitution is based on a bicameral legislature, where executive power is vested in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet which form the government, and legislative power is given to the government and the parliament of Jamaica. Considered the "principal instrument of policy"¹⁵⁸, the Cabinet is responsible to the House of Representatives and usually has thirteen to fifteen members heading various ministries, overall directed by the Prime Minister. Jamaica's parliament is the supreme legislative body in the country. It is made up of an elected House of Representatives (the lower house) and an appointed Senate (the upper house).

¹⁵⁸ The Central Intelligence Unit, "Central America and the Caribbean," *The World Factbook*, (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Accessed on September 1, 2017. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>

The sixty-three House members (formerly fifty-three then sixty) are elected by universal adult suffrage for five years in elections held in the sixty-three constituencies across the country. The Governor General nominates twenty-one members of the senate: thirteen on the advice of the Prime Minister and eight on the advice of the opposition leader. The Prime Minister is the most important member of the cabinet, selected by the Governor General as the acknowledged leader of the majority party and favored by the majority of the House members. The Prime Minister selects other cabinet members from Parliament, directs the arrangement and conduct of cabinet business, and acts as the government's chief spokesperson at home and abroad, with control over foreign policy. Importantly, the Opposition leader in Jamaican politics is a constitutionally entrenched position exercising consultative functions, especially on appointments to public offices. The Opposition leader is appointed by the Governor General and is either the one who is "best able to command the support of the majority of those who do not support the government,"¹⁵⁹ or the leader of the largest single group in opposition. The opposition leader is expected to challenge the government and provide an ever-ready alternative for Parliament and the public. The institutionalized role of the opposition leader and Jamaica's democratic tradition give the opposition considerable freedom to criticize the government.¹⁶⁰ Jamaica has clearly maintained its strong British legacy, which is engrained in its socio-political system. Electorally, the Jamaican political system follows majoritarian disproportional rules, as the state employs the single-member plurality system (first-past-the-post or winner-take-all system). Notably, all elections in Jamaican history have followed these rules, which have elevated electoral disproportionality. Important to highlight is the fact

¹⁵⁹ The World Factbook, "Central America and the Caribbean: Jamaica, 2017"

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

that even though Jamaica has very close election results, there has been no manufactured majority since independence in 1962. The only occurrence of a manufactured majority was in 1949 when the JLP won the election with a majority of the seats but with fewer votes, having a spurious majority.

The politics of Jamaica started with the nationalist movements that emerged with the wide labour unrests in the 1930's. The rebellions that terrorized much of western Jamaica and the sugar industry forced the British to "initiate the process of decolonization which began with the first election with universal adult suffrage in 1944 and continued with the gradual introduction of self-government in the 1940's and 1950's."¹⁶¹ Jamaica's political system is definitive of an institutionalized two-party system where the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP) are the two major parties in the country. As noted by Morris, elections in Jamaica and its entire political system hinges on the competition between the JLP and PNP who have been the only two parties to ever win seats and alternate power.¹⁶² The table below highlights the vote and seat share for the two major political parties in Jamaica, as well as votes and seats for independent candidates and third parties. The table is important in highlighting the strict competition between the JLP and PNP, and their alteration in power for near sixty-seven years. While Jamaica's politics is noted as a competitive two-party system, many independents and third parties do contest the Jamaican elections, but often never win seats. Notably, in the 2016 elections, the Marcus Garvey People's Progressive Party received 260 votes, the National Democratic Movement received 223 votes, the People's Progressive Party

¹⁶¹ John Stephens and Evelyne Stephens, "Jamaica," in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. Joel Krieger, Margaret Crahan, Lawrence Jacobs, William Joseph, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja and James Paul, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 447.

¹⁶² Margaret Morris, *Tour Jamaica*, (Kingston: The Gleaner Company, 1985), 25.

received 91 votes and two independent candidates received 1,233 votes in total.¹⁶³ Morris provides somewhat of an explanation of this political situation by noting, “new parties frequently emerge, such as the New Beginning Movement in 1992 against a background of widespread disillusionment with the two major parties and politics in general, but whose drive soon fizzled out. So far, none has attracted significant support and no independent candidate has ever been elected since independence.”¹⁶⁴ Factually, no independent candidate or third party has won a seat in parliament since 1949 (see table below). One can easily explain the election of independent and third parties in the pre-independence period by realizing that there was no true struggle for power as the state was still controlled by Great Britain, therefore, there was more scope for independent candidates to run for office and win.

While there is no complete list of the amount of political parties in Jamaica, historians note that there have been near fifty political parties in Jamaica’s history.¹⁶⁵ It is noted that the PNP and JLP are the longest standing political parties, with very few parties holding the course and still being considered political parties.¹⁶⁶ As previous literature suggests, the presence of a dominant two-party system and the inability of smaller parties to get ahead is definitive of the majoritarian political system that Jamaica adopted through the Westminster System.

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Morris, *Tour Jamaica*, 25.

¹⁶⁵ Anastasia Cunningham, “Nearly 50 political movements in Jamaica’s history”, *The Gleaner* (November 14, 2011). Accessed on January 8, 2018. www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111114/lead/lead91.html

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

Table 1. Election Results in Jamaica, 1944-2016.

YEAR	VOTER TURNOUT (%)	JLP VOTES (%)	JLP SEATS	PNP VOTES (%)	PNP SEATS	OTHER PARTIES AND INDEPENDENTS VOTES (%)	OTHER PARTIES AND INDEPENDENTS SEATS	TOTAL SEATS
1944	58.7	41.4	22	23.5	5	35.1	5	32
1949	65.2	42.7	17	43.5	13	13.8	2	32
1955	65.1	39	14	50.5	18	10.4	0	32
1959	66.1	44.3	16	54.8	29	0.8	0	45
1962	72.3	50	26	48.6	19	1.4	0	45
1967	81.5	50.7	33	49.1	20	0.2	0	53
1972	78.2	43.4	16	56.4	37	0.2	0	53
1976	84.5	43.2	13	56.8	47	-	-	60
1980	86.1	58.9	51	41.1	9	-	-	60
1983	28.9	89.7	60	(Boycotted)	(Boycotted)	0.6	0	60
1989	77.6	43.3	15	56.6	45	0.1	0	60
1993	66.7	39.4	8	60	52	-	-	60
1997	65.2	38.9	10	56.2	50	0.1	0	60
2002	59.1	47.4	26	52.1	34	0.6	0	60
2007	61.5	50.3	32	49.6	28	0.9	0	60
2011	53.2	46.3	21	52.9	42	1.2	0	63
2016	47.7	50.1	32	49.7	31	0.2	0	63

Source: Dieter Nohlen, *Elections in America a Data Handbook Vol. 1*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and The Electoral Commission of Jamaica

Evolution of Party Politics in Jamaica

The island's two major parties grew out of the break between the PNP, led by Norman Manley, and the major trade union, whose leader, Alexander Bustamante, formed his own party, the JLP, in 1943, set the pattern of modern politics.¹⁶⁷ A highly competitive two-party system soon developed with each party having “a union base and cross-class electoral support.”¹⁶⁸ The People's National Party was formed in 1938 by barrister Norman Manley. Heralded as the promoters of “democratic socialism” in the 1970's, they have been attributed the strengthening of the free market system. The Jamaica Labour

¹⁶⁷ Trevor Munroe, *The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization: Jamaica, 1944-1962*, (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972), 12.

¹⁶⁸ Morris, *Tour Jamaica*, 30.

Party emerged in 1943 under the leadership of Alexander Bustamante, a business and labour leader. Both parties cemented their dominance of the political system as well as the perseverance of the Westminster political system around the time of independence when they represented class differences and needs, but also bound an allegiance to the British Empire.¹⁶⁹ As Kaufman notes, “from the start, the socialism of the PNP was bound by an allegiance to the British empire, to traditions of Westminster government, and to many of the existing economic and political relations of Jamaica.”¹⁷⁰ Eaton notes Norman Manley who founded the PNP saying, “however much we differ from the people of Britain in other ways, all our ideas about politics came from Britain.”¹⁷¹ Munroe also notes Florezel Glasspole, Governor General of Jamaica and leading member of the PNP saying, “we are deeply anxious...that the ministers carry out their duty in such a way...that Great Britain will be impressed.”¹⁷² It is on this basis that the Westminster system of government is the backbone of the Jamaican political tradition.

It was not until 1942 however, that party politics would develop in Jamaica as a result of the ideological differences within the PNP and Bustamante’s political ambitions. The JLP was then formed and defined by “unrestrained [working] class militancy...curiously mixed with ideological conservatism and belief in the free enterprise system, [including supporting big businesses], the symbol of empire, British political over lordship and the need to maintain existing system of social relations but with necessary economic and

¹⁶⁹ Michael Kaufman, *Jamaica under Manley*, (Toronto, ON: Between the Lines, 1985) 49.

¹⁷⁰ Kaufman, *Jamaica under Manley*, 49.

¹⁷¹ George Eaton, *Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica*, (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publisher’s Ltd, 1975), 132.

¹⁷² Trevor Munroe, *The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization*, 53.

social reforms.”¹⁷³ They were elected in the first election with universal adult suffrage under the 1944 constitution and considered to be “traditional and conservative, while being vehemently anti-communist and pro-USA.”¹⁷⁴ However, party politics continued along practically convergent lines until the 1970’s, when Michael Manley’s democratic socialism “led to a class realignment in 1976 elections, won by the PNP, with the upper and middle classes moving toward the JLP and the lower classes toward the PNP.”¹⁷⁵ This soon gave both parties concrete ideological leanings and set areas of support. The JLP was seen as the conservative party, while the PNP was considered the “poor-people party.” Stephens and Stephens note, “ideologically, both parties differed in the beginning with the PNP having a “Fabian socialist position and the JLP having a populist one.”¹⁷⁶ “The PNP had a strong base in the middle classes and the JLP in the lower classes. These differences gave way to both ideological and sociological convergence of the parties in the 1950’s.”¹⁷⁷ Correspondingly, the 1989 elections saw the PNP shifting to the centre and pursuing different policies from previous PNP administrations by accelerating divestment of state enterprises and deregulation of the economy with very conservative fiscal management.¹⁷⁸

Notably, one would assume that after the PNP shifted to the centre, a new party would take over their previous socialist stance. A few new parties did develop in Jamaica after

¹⁷³ Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 112.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Anthony Payne, *Politics in Jamaica*, (Boston, MA: Palgrave MacMillan, 1994), 30.

¹⁷⁶ Stephens and Stephens, “Jamaica”, 448.

¹⁷⁷ Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: The Political Movement and Social Transformation in Dependent Capitalism*, (Princeton, NJ: Palgrave MacMillan, 1986) 25.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

the ideological convergence of the two major parties. The Communist Party of Jamaica and the Workers' Party of Jamaica were short-lived parties that developed in 1975 and 1978 respectively.¹⁷⁹ They sought to push for workers' rights and pushed for Marxist-Leninist approaches to socio-economic policy in the country.¹⁸⁰ Noting there was no way of participating in government, or even winning a seat, both parties acted more of influencers than actual political parties and supported the PNP rather than run in elections. Similarly, the National Democratic Movement developed as a breakaway party from the JLP in 1995 as a nationalist political party. Their 1997 manifesto promoted their interests in major socio-economic reform in an effort to give the Jamaican people a more stable and equitable society, saving them from the economic stagnancy and rapid population growth that developed after independence.¹⁸¹ Their core goals involve the promotion of democratic values, namely, the sovereignty of the citizens and protection of human rights, strict separation of powers, limitation of the term of the Prime Minister to no more than two terms, and MP's and Senators to no more than four terms, a fixed election date, dismantling political garrisons¹⁸², establishing constituency assemblies, securing the

¹⁷⁹ Charles Ameringer, "Political Parties of the Americas, 1980s to 1990s: Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies," *The Greenwood Historical encyclopedia of the world's political parties*, (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1992), 388.

¹⁸⁰ Robert Alexander and Eldon Parker, *A History of Organized Labor in the English-Speaking West Indies*, (Westport, CN: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 56–57.

¹⁸¹ The National Democratic Movement, "History," *The National Democratic Movement*. Accessed March 12, 2018.

¹⁸² Political Garrisons are inner-city communities that JLP under Seaga and PNP under Manley used political patronage and handouts to secure votes. The political parties armed local political bosses to enforce control over the communities, along with handouts of jobs, housing and money. Through threats, intimidation and patronage, the bosses delivered an entire neighbourhood's vote -- 100 per cent -- to the sponsoring party. Dissenters were driven from their homes and supporters moved in. Over the years, these teeming communities became vote-rich party strongholds. Jim Loney, "Jamaica election at mercy of Garrison Politics," *The Globe and Mail*, (March 29, 2017). Accessed on April 5, 2018.

safety of the people and an effective justice system, taking politics out of the police force, establishing a real local government, transparency for funding of political parties, and greater public participation on decisions sensitive to the national interest.¹⁸³ The National democratic Movement (NDM) formed a partnership with the New Nation Coalition (NNC; a nationalist and social democratic party) prior to the 2011 elections, but the NNC boycotted due to the elections being held during the Christmas season. The NDM, however, contested the elections and received 265 votes of the 876,310 votes cast that year; the party won no seats.¹⁸⁴ Though the party has goals that will work for the betterment of Jamaica's socio-economic and political drawbacks, due to the political makeup of Jamaica, the party is noted to be "a medium for discussion than as a threat to the two major political parties of Jamaica."¹⁸⁵

Major political development in Jamaica started when the PNP acquired power in 1972 under the leadership of Michael Manley. They strengthened their commitment to democratic socialism and engaged in widespread reformation that included expanding state control over crucial sectors of the economy, improving health and education services, improving income for the lower classes, political mobilization and non-alignment in its foreign policy.¹⁸⁶ When popular living standards began to deteriorate after the PNP was forced to accept strict monetary agreements by the International

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/jamaican-election-at-mercy-of-garrison-politics/article414263>

¹⁸³ Jim Loney, "Jamaica election at mercy of Garrison Politics," *The Globe and Mail*, (March 29, 2017). Accessed on April 5, 2018. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/jamaican-election-at-mercy-of-garrison-politics/article414263>

¹⁸⁴ The National Democratic Movement, "Core Values," *The National Democratic Movement*. Accessed March 12, 2018.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Kaufman, *Jamaica under Manley*, 2-3.

Monetary Funds in 1977 and 1978, they lost the subsequent election to the JLP in 1980. The PNP's decision to boycott the 1983 elections saw Edward Seaga of the JLP choosing non-PNP independent individuals, and the JLP successfully excluded the PNP from government and Jamaica found itself with an unprecedented one-party Parliament and no official leader of the opposition. However, as the JLP lost popular support due to harsh socio-economic conditions, the PNP were victorious in the 1989 elections. Since then, the PNP, led by P.J. Patterson, won every election until a close defeat by the JLP in 2007 where the JLP leader, Bruce Golding, led the party to a victory over Porta Simpson-Miller. In 2011 however, the PNP, under Simpson-Miller, once again formed government with a two-thirds majority in Parliament over the Andrew Holness led JLP. The latest election in 2016 saw another transfer in power when the JLP won one of the country's narrowest victories, where it won thirty-two of the sixty-three seats with fifty percent of the popular vote.¹⁸⁷

Political Issues in Jamaica

While Jamaica's political system is fairly democratic and seems to work well in regard to the basic democratic characteristics of competition, representation and alteration in government, it has some flaws. The major issues with Jamaica's political system stand firstly with the engrained political patronage and clientelism that seems to propel the political system. It defines the relationship between political officials and citizens, as well

¹⁸⁷ Gary Spaulding, "Ja goes green- JLP prosperity message trumps ruling party," *Jamaica Gleaner*, (February 26, 2016). Accessed on January 8, 2018. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20160226/ja-goes-green-jlp-prosperity-message-trumps-ruling-party>

as remains a major decisive factor in whether or not citizens choose to vote. This undemocratic part of Jamaica's political system induces adversarial relationships between both parties as well as their supporters. It incites deep rooted partisanship, as well as contributes to voter apathy and political violence. It is noted that "since 1993, the percentage of eligible voters casting ballots has declined at each election, except in 2007, when there was a marginal increase."¹⁸⁸ Similarly, "at 47.72%, the 2016 election recorded the lowest percentage voter turnout in Jamaica's history since independence, with the exception of the 1983 election that was boycotted by the PNP."¹⁸⁹ Similarly, the patronage and aggressive partisanship in Jamaican politics has been perpetuated by the two parties and has led to many instances of political violence and upheaval from the 1930's to 1980's. This has all created a political culture of dependency on hand-outs to vote, a culture of political tribalism coupled with political disrespect and shaming and violent crimes. The historical foundations of Jamaican politics, especially its two-party system, majoritarian rules and disproportionality allows for the growth in patronage, voter apathy, adversarial and dependent political culture, low inclusiveness and political violence. As of 2017, the Democracy Index has ranked Jamaica as a flawed democracy with a score of 7.29 out of 10. Jamaica received scores below 7 in political culture and political participation.¹⁹⁰ Similarly, Transparency International; ranks Jamaica 83rd out of 176 countries, with a score of 39 out of 100 in their perception of corruption index, noting

¹⁸⁸ "Election turnout by Percentage: 1962-2016," February, 2016). Accessed on July 10, 2017. <http://digjamaica.com/blog/2016/02/25/election-turnout-by-percentage-1962-2016/>

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2017 Free speech under attack," *The Economist* (2017). Accessed on January 3, 2018. http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2017.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2017

that 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.¹⁹¹ Freedom House gives Jamaica a 13 out of 16 for political pluralism and participation, noting, “powerful criminal gangs in some urban neighborhoods maintain influence over voter turnout in return for political favors, which has called into question the legitimacy of election results in those areas.”¹⁹² They also give Jamaica a 7 out of 16 for rule of law due to the prevalence of corruption, extra-judicial killings, gang violence and the lack of rights and violence against the LGBTQ community.¹⁹³

Party-based clientelism and patronage has long been a major part of Jamaican politics (Election turnout by Percentage: 1962-2016 2016) and stands as one of the greatest threats to its democratic development. Roniger and Gunes-Ayata note that,

“In the political realm, clientelism is associated with the particularistic use of public resources and with the electoral arena. It entails votes and support given in exchange for jobs and other benefits. It can become a useful strategy for winning elections and building support through selective release of public funds to supporting politicians and associates or the acceptance of political nominees as personnel in state-related agencies.”¹⁹⁴

According to Legister, clientelism in Jamaica “has earlier roots, but its present-day form arises from the partisan conflicts and the pre-independence period.”¹⁹⁵ One of the premier writers on clientelism in Jamaica, Carl Stone, notes that the structure of power in Jamaica is made up of patron-broker-client networks, personalized authority, [and] feudal

¹⁹¹ Transparency International, “Jamaica”, Accessed on March 1, 2017.

¹⁹² Freedom House, “Jamaica,” *Freedom in the World*

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Luis Roniger, “Favors, ‘Merit Ribbons,’ and Services: Analyzing the fragile resilience of Clientelism” in *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*, ed T. Hilgers (USA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012) 354.

¹⁹⁵ F.S. Legister, *Class Alliances and the Liberal Authoritarian State: The Roots of Post-Colonial Democracy in Jamaica*, (Princeton: Palgrave MacMillan, 1998)

86.

political overlord.¹⁹⁶ He adds that “the very idea of politics is, for most members of the mass public, synonymous with party politics. Power is seen as ‘party determined’. Access to material benefits and opportunities by the masses (denied by the unequal and rigid social structures) are seen as opened up through party connections and party patronage.”¹⁹⁷ LaGuerre defends Stone’s stance by stating that the intense involvement of Jamaican citizens in mass politics feeds and grows the point that political support is being exchanged for material benefits delivered by the party leaders in the long or short term.¹⁹⁸ He argued that the Jamaican state is “far from creating the ‘good life’ or ‘creating society’ or making men ‘moral’, is, in fact, a lottery system, based on choosing the right side. Hence, the cycle of government and opposition between the JLP and the PNP...”¹⁹⁹ Stone postulates that Jamaica is a “subtype of electoral democracy,” where clientelism emerges when “the force of nationalism has been exhausted, when charismatic leaders have lost their hold and when class and ethnic loyalties are weak.”²⁰⁰ This patronage and clientelism in Jamaica continuously survive even when material inducements shrink due to the deep socialization and somehow ritualistic ties with party politics. Stone notes, “the machine politics is reinforced and supported by symbolic ties of loyalty based on powerful forces of socialization.”²⁰¹ It was Manley who wrote,

“Our competitive two-party system was the instrument least likely to achieve such a situation. We wrestled with this contradiction between our needs and our political instruments struck us, as it had others before, that a way had to be found to detribalize politics. With nothing to which a political commitment could be made in earlier times, people tended to form blind attachments to

¹⁹⁶ Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica*, 81.

¹⁹⁷ Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica*, 81.

¹⁹⁸ John Gaffar LaGuerre, *Issues in the Government and Politics of the West Indies*, (St. Augustine, Trinidad: University of the West Indies School of Continuing Studies, 1997), 147.

¹⁹⁹ LaGuerre, *Issues in the Government and Politics of the West Indies*, 147.

²⁰⁰ Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica*, 93.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

one or other party. It became 'my party' right or wrong. People were literally happy if things went badly for the country under the 'other' party since that indicated a victory for 'their' party at the next election. This pattern was further entrenched with a spoils system. On both sides, scarce benefits like relief jobs and houses would go to strong party supporters. The ties of loyalty were thus drawn tighter by clientelism.”²⁰²

There is indeed a close relationship between the dominant two-party system and the pervasive clientelism in Jamaican politics. Both work hand in hand to boost temporary inclusiveness for the masses in politics as well as fueling competitive party politics that is entrenched through socialization. Therefore, party competition and votes are derived from norms and long-lasting support, rather than policy issues. LaGuerre adds that, “for Manley, the competitive two-party system not only divided the country but the spoils system that went with it transformed normal political rivalry into ‘tribalism’.”²⁰³ Sives adds, “these experiences of political participation formed through violence on the streets and hand-outs, whether political party or trade union-inspired, helped to define the way in which relationships developed between individuals, their parties and their government.”²⁰⁴

In fact, Jamaica’s clientelism bubbled over in various forms of handouts and gifts to party supporters and loyalists. These handouts stemming from officials of both parties are used to rally and secure support during election times, as well as to maintain loyalty of the populace. These handouts range from monetary gifts, to grocery vouchers, school

²⁰² Michael Manley, *Jamaica, struggle in the Periphery*, (Texas, USA: Third World Media, 1982), 50.

²⁰³ LaGuerre, *Issues in the Government and Politics of the West Indies*, 150.

²⁰⁴ Amanda Sives, “The Historical roots of violence in Jamaica: The Hearne Report, 1949” in *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges of Public Policy*, ed. Anthony Harriot, (Kingston, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies Press, 2003), 51.

tuition payments, houses and even jobs through promise contractual work or direct employment. As Gray writes,

“In Jamaica’s winner-take-all politics, access to political power for the poor was inextricably linked to party membership. For the rank and file of both parties, this membership established customary rights to the enjoyment or denial of scarce benefits. This membership and partisan access to power also conferred distinctive social identities on JLP and PNP loyalists in the slums...”²⁰⁵

The major issues with these handouts is the creation of dependency within the popular voter. Elections and the government are no longer seen as mechanisms of change or the promotion of general development but seen as temporary or long-term patrons. A level of dependency is created between the party and the citizens. Indeed, any politicians have lost their seats and vigour in Jamaican politics because of their refusal to participate in hand-out politics. Politicians such as Lloyd B. Smith, MP for Central St James, Danny Melville, MP for North East St Ann, Francis Tulloch of North West St James and Damion Crawford of East Rural St Andrew all either lost their seats or defected due to their refusal to participate in the ‘politics of spoils’. Similarly, the dominance of political hand-outs in Jamaica has also changed the political dynamics in much of the urban slums, where the elected political official loses his power to the ‘don’ who delivers the tokens to the citizens. Gray goes on to identify the development of political violence and criminality in Jamaica as rooted somehow in the politics of spoils and hand-outs. He explains,

“By the late 1970s, criminal gangs had increased their ability to disburse patronage, just like the politician. Handouts to the poor contributed to gunmen’s social power and growing popularity while their open defiance of the law gave them an aura of invincibility. The gangs’ social power drew on patronage

²⁰⁵ Obika Gray, *Demeaned but Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies Press, 2004), 196.

and community support and the protection they provided. In the corrupted social and political system of the day, criminal gunmen and gangs were effectively insulated from the law by the active complicity of their neighbours. What has been written about the “don” – a moniker for the criminal gunman in the 1980s – is an apt description of the status of the famous “generals” who ran criminal enterprises in the ghetto in the late 1970s: It is this social power which allows the Don to dictate to politicians, to chuck badness in the community, to demand protection money from private sector companies, to organize . . . hard drugs networks without fear of being caught, to break the law without any fear of being dealt with and to kill people without any fear of being found guilty of murder.”²⁰⁶

Political patronage and hand-outs have now become a political norm in Jamaican politics. So much so, that persons will refuse to vote if they have not received some form of hand-out or promise. Jamaica’s political culture rallies around two undemocratic stances. Firstly, citizens choose to vote based on what it is that they may receive or have received through patronage, or secondly, because they have been socialized into being life-long supporters of a specific party.

It is hard to avoid the fact that tribalism and political violence are as institutionalized as the two-party system in Jamaica. The use of violence in Jamaica is noted by many as a derivative of the patronage and party competition in the state, and not just a fight over handouts. When it comes to patronage and political violence, Legister best describes the basis of it by saying, “Jamaican politics is sometimes quite deadly-potential losses or gains in patronage are life and death matters.”²⁰⁷ Due to the clientelistic relationship of Jamaican politics, partisanship and adversarial politics are very high. “The party leader becomes the ‘messiah’ or a ‘Joshua’, surrounds himself with

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Legister, *Class Alliances and the Liberal Authoritarian State*, 87.

an informal ‘party militia’ and ‘street gangs’, particularly in those areas where poverty, urban ghetto conditions, careful placement of party hard-core members through government placement schemes...”²⁰⁸ On this matter, Stone adds that “interparty violence is an integral part of the syndrome of clientelism as is the allocation of party patronage. Indeed, the propensity to such violence seems to increase as more patronage benefits are allocated to these community residents.”²⁰⁹ To clarify, this occurs within the confines of legal rules and constitutional restraints. It is an undercover operation, where “in sensitive areas, [rules] are swept aside by the political bosses, especially since those institutions which normally provide checks and balances are themselves ensnared in the web of clientelism.”²¹⁰ When it comes to maintaining the competitive party system, and utilizing violence to ensure victory, Gray notes, “the use of violence as a political tactic to win elections, defend political territory against rivals, and secure representation of workers in the trade union... Thus, from the moment Jamaicans won the right to vote, and native politicians got the opportunity to become incumbents of state power, political violence became an organizing feature of Jamaican politics.”²¹¹ Sives agrees that political violence started long before independence, “by 1949, (the year of the first commission of enquiry into political violence in Jamaica) both political parties were engaged in violence to achieve political goals... organized violence and the links with criminal elements were features of the political system during this periods.”²¹² Harriot adds that, we must

“Raise the issue of the political parties being criminal organisations, because, while both parties have a record of developmental achievements, the resort to

²⁰⁸ LaGuerre, *Issues in the Government and Politics of the West Indies*, 151.

²⁰⁹ Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica*, 100.

²¹⁰ LaGuerre, *Issues in the Government and Politics of the West Indies*, 151.

²¹¹ Gray, *Demeaned but Empowered*, 49.

²¹² Amanda Sives, *Elections, Violence and the Democratic Process in Jamaica 1944-2007*, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2010), 51.

criminal means of gaining office, and the alliances with criminals that are used for this purpose, give criminal networks considerable leverage on the parties, and lead to the use of criminal means to systematically plunder the resources of the state once office is acquired. These activities of the political elite have profound implications for ordinary criminality, especially the normalisation of crime.”²¹³

Many scholars agree that politicians of the two leading political parties paved the way for political violence through their creation of garrison communities in the urban areas. These garrison communities soon became political strongholds for the parties and were ruthlessly defended by gangs and warlords, led by the community ‘don.’ Arias presents a snapshot of this occurrence, he states,

“In the two decades after independence in 1962, both parties armed supporters and used housing policy to create partisan “garrison” neighborhoods and establish hegemony over certain seats in parliament. Conditions of armed dominance affect elections in twelve of the country’s sixty parliamentary constituencies. In 25 of the 49 years since independence, Prime Ministers representing seats characterized by high levels of armed dominance have governed the country.”²¹⁴

There have been many instances of large scale political violence in Jamaica, partially due to the growing polarization due to ideological differences and the rise of politically affiliated gangs in garrison communities. Similarly, the increase importation of guns and the growth of the drug trade saw political discrepancies growing into violent crime and overall warfare. As Gray notes, “while just 10 per cent of all crimes were violent in 1974, that figure had quadrupled to 41 per cent in 1984.6 Indeed, reported

²¹³ Anthony Harriot, *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges of Public Policy*, (Kingston, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies Press, 2003), xii-xiii.

²¹⁴ Enrique Desmond Arias, “Towards a less violent Democracy,” *Harvard Review of Latin America*, (2010) Accessed on January 15, 2018.

violent crimes went from 15,893 in 1977 to 22,279 in 1981 (the rate increased from 757.9 per 100,000 to 1,009.8 over that period).²¹⁵ He notes that this happened because “political opponents killed each other in unprecedented numbers in the ghettos because politics had become an overheated zero-sum game that triggered powerfully felt consummatory values held by opposing adherents.”²¹⁶ Incidents of political violence in the country can be traced back to the 1940’s at the rise of the two major political parties.

During election years, campaigns can get quite adversarial for party members, officials and supporters. Along with the coloured flags that line the streets, party meetings continue the long tradition of disrespecting the opposing side’s leader and members, as well as utilizing campaign footage that humiliates or degrades the other party. Former Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller was continually referred to as unqualified, stupid and aggressive by the opposition party JLP, while in office, as well as portrayed as unprofessional and aggressive by their campaigns. On many occasions, members of both parties have walked out in the midst of the Parliamentary sitting due to blatant disrespect of a colleague or the party on a whole. In articulating one such instance, the Jamaican Gleaner dated October 6, 2015, highlights the walking out of the then opposition party, JLP out of Parliament. The article, titled, “Audio: Opposition Members Walk out of Parliament in heated Prison talks” notes then Minister of National Security, Peter Bunting stating, “Mr. Speaker, I think the Leader of the Opposition is being delusional. He obviously believes that for the brief period for which he was Prime Minister he can still continue to give instructions to Cabinet Minister. He is not in that position anymore and I

²¹⁵ Gray, *Demeaned but Empowered*, 196.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

am not taking any instruction from him and that's final!" While this statement is meant to demean the then Opposition leader, it also highlights the level of adversarialism in the Jamaican democratic system, as well as the lack of power of the opposition.

The leader of the opposition and the opposition party has vested responsibility to criticize and make suggestion to government policy, however, this is never truly followed in practice or respect for the post. As noted above, the adversarial nature of Jamaican politics sees any opposition or criticism by an opposition party to government as disrespectful and 'out of place.' Many have noted that the only time the opposition party has any true chance of influencing national policy is if they win the next election, or spark debate by walking out of Parliament. The opposition party is relegated to a role of strict opposition, instead of accountability and ensuring the development of policy. This is a constant issue with democracy in the Westminster System with the first-past-the-post electoral rules, that is, the government leads policy based on their own agenda and the opposition is left with little input and in the position of "Oppose! Oppose! Oppose!"²¹⁷ The tradition of Jamaica's adversarial politics stemming from the institutionalized two-party system and the majoritarian electoral rules leaves the opposition party and its members in a stalemate state. That is, while the opposition party forms a shadow cabinet, they are indeed that, the shadow of the actual government, left with nothing but publicly criticizing the government. Interestingly, one would believe that since both parties are converged ideologically, making a mutually agreed policy would be easy. The truth is quite the opposite, because of the long-standing rivalry between parties, even the simplest

²¹⁷ Don Brash, "The Role of the Opposition Leader", *How Government Works*, (November 22, 2005.) Accessed on January 10, 2018. <http://decisionmaker.co.nz/guide2003/hgw/oppose.html>

policy must be criticized and will be strongly opposed until the end, only to be implemented by the opposition party once they gain power.²¹⁸ The opposition's role then, is not to hold the government accountable and ensure inclusive policy as hoped for in theory, it is in practice, an opposing force aimed at criticizing the government, fighting proposed policies at all cost and ensuring that they prove a better option for the next election.

Politics and Development in Jamaica

Jamaica has long been heralded for its awesome democratic growth by many scholars, lauded for its peaceful transition to democracy after independence, and continuous alteration in government between its two leading parties, the JLP and PNP. However, beyond the country's veil of democratic progress, stands continuous patronage, political violence, partisanship, voter apathy, and disrespect. As Gray notes so poetically, "it is not so much that Jamaican democracy survives and flourishes, but rather that a predatory state, which increasingly corrupts and violates existing democratic attributes, has flowered into maturity, particularly after 1972."²¹⁹ He adds, "Evidence from the past fifty years confirms erosion of democratic practices in Jamaica as the state has increasingly resorted to political victimization of the poor, excessive use of violence and misuse of public funds. More recently, public outcry against extravagant salaries paid to public sector executives seemed only to confirm public perception of corruption and

²¹⁸ Stephens and Stephens, "Jamaica", 448.

²¹⁹ Gray, *Demeaned but Empowered*, 6.

featherbedding at the highest levels of the state.”²²⁰ In fact, many blame Jamaica’s slow development and economic ill on the politics of the state. On one hand, some scholars argue that patronage and political corruption left the poor in a state of dependency, where their financial security was tied to the political party they were affiliated to. As noted above, social benefits such as education, food, access to jobs and housing were tied to the party in power and the clientelist benefits to be received if one’s party was in power, or the loss of it if one’s party lost. Patronage, corruption, apathy and violence all work hand-in-hand to affect both the democratic state and the development of Jamaica.

For political development, partisanship politics has created an enormous amount of external debt for Jamaica, specifically with multinational loaning agencies. Stone writes,

“It sustains an agenda of issue debate controlled by the dominant political bosses and retards the development of a civic sense of a national interest independent of party political interests. It presents intimidating obstacles that stifle the free flow of public debate and discourages independent individual and group participation in public life. Public opinion only comes alive when the ascendant patron-broker-client coalition begins to weaken and the anti-government positions and posturing of dissident opinions tend to be swallowed in the wave of an opposition party challenge.”²²¹

While patronage politics erodes the political culture and development of the state, the adversarial two-party system has greatly affected the socioeconomic power of Jamaica as well. Many have pointed to the early ideological differences and competitive nature of politics of Jamaica as the backbone to its current financial debt and close ties with

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica*, 109.

international monetary organizations. Levitt argues that in spite of the JLP promoting partisan politics in the 1970's and putting the blame on the PNP for Jamaica's woes, both the PNP and the JLP share the responsibility of Jamaica's enormous external debt, which was incurred in the last five years of the Manley's power for the PNP (1975-1980) and the first five years of Seaga's power under the JLP (1980-1985).²²² Levitt goes on to note,

“As a result of the high levels of Jamaica's indebtedness, neither the state or the private sector is today playing the 'leading role' in the economic life of the country: their role is privileged to the international financial institutions (IFI's) which are now in charge of the economic management of the country. Meanwhile, a silent and growing emigration of skilled and educated workers and professionals is eroding the capacity of the country to effect meaningful adjustments...”²²³

Statistically, the World Bank notes that “over the last 30 years, real per capita GDP increased at an average of just one percent per year, making Jamaica one of the slowest growing developing countries in the world. By 2012 Jamaica had accumulated debt equal to 145 percent of GDP.”²²⁴ They go on to note that “corruption and crime and violence levels remain high. Youth unemployment is a persistent problem. Unemployment in April 2017 was about 12.2 percent, while 26.2 percent of those between 20 and 24 years of age were unemployed...”²²⁵ Similarly, the Heritage Foundation adds that “the inefficient legal system weakens the security of property rights and the rule of law. Long-standing ties between elected representatives and organized criminals allow some gangs to operate

²²² Kari Levitt, *Reclaiming Development: Independent Thought and Caribbean Community*, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005), 109.

²²³ Levitt, *Reclaiming Development*, 109.

²²⁴ The World Bank, “The World Bank in Jamaica: Overview”, (September 29, 2017), Accessed on January 22, 2018.

²²⁵ Ibid.

with impunity, contributing to high levels of corruption and crime.”²²⁶ Beyond corruption and crime, Jamaica is plagued by high levels of unemployment and poverty. According to STATIN, for net enrolment in primary and secondary education in 2015, 93.2 percent of children were enrolled in primary education, 82.1 percent in lower secondary education and only 66.2 per cent in upper secondary education.²²⁷ The primary completion rate for children 6-11 years old in 2015 was 99.6 per cent for males and 99.9 per cent for females.²²⁸ As for health, STATIN notes that the infant mortality rate in 2015 was 22.2 per cent, 23.3 per cent for under-five mortality and 55.4 per cent for maternal mortality.²²⁹ Additionally, in 2013, there were 36,746 births, 15, 427 deaths and migration was - 14,744.²³⁰ The UNDP classifies Jamaica as having high levels of human development, ranking them at 99 with a score of 0.719 in the human development index.²³¹ Though this is true according to their rankings, comparatively, Jamaica is a flawed democratic system with high levels of partisanship, corruption and violence, which seep into the bedrock of the society. It is easy to argue, that there is a relationship between the political system and the socio-economic development of the state. Therefore, one can conclude that a change in the political system will help in changing the socio-economic system as well.

²²⁶ The World Bank, “The World Bank in Jamaica: Overview.”

²²⁷ STATIN, “Education Statistics: Primary and Secondary Net Enrolment Rates,” *Statistical Institute of Jamaica*, (2017). Accessed on January 29, 2018.

²²⁸ STATIN, “Education Statistics: Primary Completion rates (6-11 years old),” *Statistical Institute of Jamaica* (2017), Accessed on January 29, 2018. http://statinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/Education.aspx

²²⁹ STATIN, “Health Statistics: Infant Mortality Rate, Under five Mortality Rate and maternal Mortality Rate,” *Statistical Institute of Jamaica* (2017). Accessed on January 29, 2018. http://statinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/Health.aspx

²³⁰ STATIN, “Births, Deaths and Migration,” *Statistical Institute of Jamaica*, (2017), Accessed on January 29, 2018. http://statinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/newbirthdeathmarriage.aspx

²³¹ United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2015 – “Rethinking Work for Human Development”, Accessed on March 1, 2017. Retrieved from, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf

CHAPTER FIVE: ISRAEL AS A CENTRIPETAL DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

This chapter will discuss the centripetal politics of Israel, as well as highlight the relationship between its political system and development. The chapter will pay specific attention to the electoral system and electoral rules of Israel as governed by centripetal rules, particularly as it relates to its multiparty politics, coalition governments and proportional rules. In an effort to make a deeper comparison with the overview of Jamaica provided, the chapter will start with an overview of the political system of Israel. It will discuss the role of Israel's written laws which act in place of a written constitution, as well as the operation of Israel's political system through its structure and electoral procedures. This section looks specifically into the make-up of the government, the role of the political leaders, the electoral process and the party system with an illustration of the latest election and government. To ensure a succinct discussion of the politics of Israel, the next section will provide information on the political history of the country. It will provide insight on Israel's development as a nation state and to Israel's independence on May 14, 1948. Following this will be a discussion of the party politics, looking specifically at the multi-party set-up of the state, the ideologies that govern different political movements, party organization and competition and their relationship with political culture and socialization in the state. This section will go further in depth in the practicalities of centripetalism as is highlighted in Israel. It provides clear distinction between the varying ideologies within Israeli politics, how parties are organized and formed as well as the party's role in ensuring representation and inclusion for all citizens.

Overall, the chapter will discuss Israel's political development over time, noting too, the relationship between policy and political development which result from the centripetal political system. The chapter also provides a critical analysis of Israel's unique political system, specifically as it relates the instability in government and issues with liberal democratic principles. In the end, the chapter highlights that though Israel faces issues in its political sphere, the state still stands as a beacon of electoral democracy and centripetalism with high socio-economic standards and human development; better than Jamaica. There will be discussion of Israel's renowned development and democratic traits up to the 1980's. In fact, this chapter proves why Israel was chosen as the best comparative country for this study.

Overview of the Political System

The Middle Eastern state of Israel was officially declared as independent on May 14, 1948 after the signing of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. The state was however officially recognized by the United Nations in 1949. Israel's political system reflects the tenets of centripetal democratic theory as presented by Gerring, Thacker and Moreno. That is, it reflects,

“Unitary (rather than federal) sovereignty, unicameralism or weak bicameralism (i.e., a bicameral system with asymmetrical powers or congruent representation between the two houses), parliamentarism (rather than presidentialism), and a party-list proportional electoral system (rather than single-member districts or preferential vote systems). In addition, the centripetal polity should be characterized by a strong cabinet...multiparty (rather than two-party) competition...Each of these institutional features serves to maximize, and if possible to reconcile, the twin goals of inclusion and authority, thus focusing

power toward the center and gathering together diverse elements into a single policy stream.”²³²

Israel’s political system, like the centripetal theory postulations, occurs within a parliamentary democracy where executive power is vested in the government, headed by the Prime Minister and legislative authority vested in the Knesset (House of Representatives). While many argue that the parliamentary model across the world is based in the legacy of the British political system, Israel’s parliamentary system presents a very interesting political set-up. As Wolf-Phillips notes, “although many aspects of Israel’s parliamentary system do bear some resemblance to the British model, many structures are also significantly different.”²³³ Firstly, it is important to note the fact that much like the United Kingdom, Israel does not have a written constitution but bases its political system and main principles on the eleven Basic Laws of Israel that outlines the state’s political structure. Many ascribe Israel’s lack of a written constitution as based in the continuous debates between religious and non-religious groups on the extent to which religious principles should be entrenched in law. According to Mahler, “eleven chapters of an Israeli constitution have been written, each of which is called a fundamental law. These laws are acts of the Knesset which have been passed by a simple regular majority (a majority of those present and voting), not an absolute majority (more than 50 percent of the 120 members of the Knesset, or 61 votes). Fundamental laws are endowed with a special position when compared to regular legislation.”²³⁴

²³² Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno, “Centripetal democratic Governance,” 569.

²³³ Leslie Wolf-Phillips, “The Westminster Model in Israel?” *Parliamentary Affairs* 26 (1973): 415-439.

²³⁴ Gregory Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State 3rd Ed.*, (Lanham, Ma: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2016), 141.

As Mahler notes, “Israel can be considered to be a parliamentary political system but is certainly not a clone of Britain. Israel is a good model of a constitutional, parliamentary political system, but it does not have its idiosyncratic characteristics.”²³⁵ The political system is made up of the President, the Prime Minister, the Executive or Government and the Knesset which is the legislative body. In what is only a symbolic position, the President of Israel was originally elected by the Knesset as the Head of State for a five-year term and could be re-elected once beyond this, but now, the President can only serve a single seven-year term.²³⁶ The President is responsible only to the Knesset, and it alone has the power to remove someone from the post.²³⁷ The President has a legal responsibility to sign any legislation and treaties negotiated with foreign countries that come from the Knesset and has no veto power. According to the fundamental laws, the President has a duty “to entrust to one of the members the Knesset the duty of forming a government.”²³⁸ They also make a number of appointments such as judicial and diplomatic positions, the state comptroller, the governor of the Bank of Israel, which are made on the advice of government.

Israel is a unitary political state that exercises power through the Prime Minister and the Cabinet which is composed of about twenty-eight ministers who head government departments. Cabinet ministers are appointed based on the distribution of votes to political parties by the Prime Minister and approved by the by the Knesset. The Government of Israel, through the fundamental laws have gone through a few changes over the years since independence in 1948. Until 1992, Israel operated as a normal

²³⁵ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 155.

²³⁶ Ibid, 144

²³⁷ Ibid, 143

²³⁸ Ibid.

parliamentary system following Westminster rules, where the prime minister and cabinet derive their authority and power from the parliament.²³⁹ From 1992 to 2001 however, Israel altered their political system to allow for the prime minister to be directly elected by the electorate rather than chosen by the President from the members of the Knesset. “The main purpose in changing the law, according to the proposals, was to strengthen the position of the prime minister and avoid the need for political horse-trading in order to form the coalition and Government.”²⁴⁰ Though it seemed good theoretically, the idea proved unstable for Israeli politics. It is interesting to note that this “presidentialized” parliamentary system, saw the direct election of the prime minister based on 50 percent of the valid public votes cast simultaneously with Knesset elections. This was first conducted in the 1996 elections between Netanyahu and Peres, where Netanyahu won by 50.49 per cent of the votes.²⁴¹ According to Mahler, “this new method of direct elections caused a significant drop in the political power of the two largest parties. Likud and Labor, which had a total of eighty-four Knesset seats in the Thirteenth Knesset and only sixty-six seats in the Fourteenth. At the same time the number of midsized parliamentary groups (those holding five to ten seats) increased.”²⁴² This was reverted in March 2001 back to allowing voters to cast a single ballot for a political party to represent the Knesset and in which the prime minister would be chosen by the president from among the members of the Knesset.²⁴³ The reason for reverting in 2001 was that the direct election

²³⁹ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 157-158.

²⁴⁰ Gregory Mahler, “Israel’s New Electoral System: Effects on Policy and Politics,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 1, no. 2 (1997). Accessed on March 30, 2018. <http://www.rubincenter.org/1997/07/mahler-1997-07-02/>

²⁴¹ Abraham Brichta, “The New Premier-Parliamentary System in Israel,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555 (January 1998), 180-192.

²⁴² Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 161.

²⁴³ Gideon Rahat, *The Politics of Regime Structure reform in Democracies: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective*, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008), 25.

of the prime minister was cited as weakening the Knesset and the weakening of the two major parties. Markedly, the direct election of the prime minister goes against centripetalism which promote dominant parliamentarism over presidentialism and the necessity of few elected offices, as this promotes inclusion and authority of political parties in ensuring cohesion and strong policy-making.

The Israeli prime minister is responsible for leading the politics of the state and has the duty of selecting a cabinet to run the day-to-day affairs of the state after receiving a vote of confidence from the Knesset. In Israel's case, the Prime Minister is typically the person in the Knesset who the president feels has the best chance to receive support from the majority in the Knesset (constructing and maintaining a coalition government) after party representation in the Knesset is clear and the party with the most seats is noted.²⁴⁴ As Mahler goes on to add, "as with other parliamentary political systems, then, the cabinet, not the legislature, is the day-to-day focus of public attention and is the engine that drives the machinery of government."²⁴⁵ While this is true, it must be noted that it is the Knesset that does the hiring and firing of members of the executive branch of government through votes of confidence or no confidence. The Knesset passes all legislation, serves as the pool from which the executive branch is chosen, controls the life of the government, elects the president for a fixed seven-year term, and "generally remains the dominant political structure in Israel-at least theoretically."²⁴⁶ Prime Minister-cabinet relations in Israeli politics is very unique with the prime minister's office

²⁴⁴ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 155.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, 156.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, 158.

not having as much weight and power as other states with similar politics. According to Mahler,

“Due to the coalition nature of Israeli cabinets and the fact that leaders of different political parties, even though they have agreed to be in the government coalition, are still leaders of their individual parties. One result of this is that the prime minister may make policy suggestions to his or her cabinet colleagues that will not have support of a majority of members of the cabinet (with the prime minister being the minority) leaving the prime minister with only two choices: support the views of the majority of the cabinet or resign—something that would not happen in the British case.”²⁴⁷

As noted above, Israeli politics tends to see the rule of coalition governments after its elections. It is noted, that since independence, Israel has never seen a majority situation in the Knesset, where a single party has won more than 50 per cent of the seats.²⁴⁸ Herman and Pope go on to note that “Israel, in fact, has been an oft-cited illustration of a regular minority situation, majority government, on in which a party with less than a majority of parliamentary seats (“a minority situation”) joins with other minority parties to create a majority government.”²⁴⁹ Coalition governments usually occur when no single party has a clear majority in the parliament, and usually happens within a multi-party system. Two or more parties are then forced to join together to create what is referred to as a “minority situation, majority government,” where the minority parties join together to form a majority in the parliament with 51 percent or more of the seats. In Israel’s case, the President will usually call the leader of the largest parliamentary group to form a coalition with the next largest party or other smaller parties so as to ensure

²⁴⁷ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 161-162.

²⁴⁸ Valerie Herman and John Pope, “Minority Governments in Western Democracies,” *British Journal of Political Science* 3 (1973), 191.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

support in the legislature.²⁵⁰ Coalitions are usually supported by the promises made by the proposer. That is, some sort of pay-off must be given to the party or parties invited to form the coalition. In Israel's case as Mahler notes, "in most instances, the payoff involves at least cabinet position (or positions), or the promise that certain piece (or pieces) of legislation that the prospective coalition partner has drafted bill be passed as part of the government's program."²⁵¹ It is important to highlight that after being chosen by the President, the prime minister has forty-five days to form government. This works to ensure that the prime minister does not take a long time in bargaining for coalition government and leave the state without a government, as is the case in states like Belgium and the Netherlands that sometime stake over 100 days to come to form coalition governments. This rule ensures the prime minister has set plans in place for government formation and maintains the integrity of the government.

Elections in Israel are conducted based on proportional representational rules, using the closed-list formula of party-list proportional representation. This means that parties make a list of candidates to be elected and voters nationwide vote for directly for their preferred party and not specifically for candidates. This method usually reduces the need for personality politics. Seats are then distributed to each party in proportion to the number of votes the party receives. Because Israel uses a closed list, the order in which the candidates from a party's list get elected are based on the internal methods of the party. It must be noted that the 120 seats in the Knesset are allocated to party's that meet or pass the electoral threshold, which in Israel is 3.25 percent (approximately 4 seats) as

²⁵⁰ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 181

²⁵¹ Ibid.

of 2014. Originally, the threshold was 1 per cent until 1988, when it was changed to 1.5 per cent until 2003 where it was raised to 2 per cent. Additionally, it is crucial to note that parties are permitted to form alliances in an effort to gain enough votes to meet the threshold as whole. It is noted that Israel's electoral system is very simple and facilitates easier voting for its citizens as they simply choose a party and not individual candidates. Similarly, the party-list system and the low thresholds makes the political climate favourable for smaller parties.²⁵² Israel's multi-party system has near fifty parties in total, with 17 of these parties being represented in the Knesset as of the 2015 election as singular groups and in alliances. It is widely accepted that the Israeli political system fulfills the two fundamental aspects of democracy, "it ensures a fair distribution of electoral power between competing parties, and it enables the representation of different social groups, minorities, and interests."²⁵³

Political History

Though much of Israel's historical roots are found in biblical manuscripts, the growth of the modern state has its roots in the development of Zionism and the stresses of anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century. Political Zionism, noted as "Jewish yearning to be redeemed in Zion"²⁵⁴ grew out of Theodor Herzl's Zionist Movement, founded in 1897

²⁵² Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 184.

²⁵³ Reuven Y. Hazan, Reut Itzkovitch-Malka and Gideon Rahat, "Electoral Systems in Context: Israel" in *The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems*, eds. Erik Herron, Robert Pekkanen and Matthew Shugart, 581-600, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) 581.

²⁵⁴ Eliahu Likhovski, *Israel's Parliament: The Law of the Knesset* (London, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1.

at the First Zionist Congress.²⁵⁵ The original aim for political Zionism was a political territorial solution for the Jewish problem, aiming to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law.²⁵⁶ Between the 1880's and 1920's, Israel's founders and large scores of migrants began moving to Palestine to increase the Jewish communities already there. The Yishuv, is the term used to describe the actual Jewish polity in Palestine, primarily as a direct of immigration.²⁵⁷ The Yishuv created many social and political institutions like the Zionist Organization and developed modern Hebrew as their new language and promoted increased political culture and nationalism.²⁵⁸ The Zionist Congress soon grew out of the Zionist Organization as “the supreme legislative body of the Zionist Organization.”²⁵⁹

During this time, there was increasing contention between the Jews and the Arab groups that inhabited Palestine. Similarly, at this time, World War II and the Holocaust caused an increase in the Jewish population in Palestine. At the end of the World War, Great Britain took control of the Palestinian territory and it is noted that “political efforts to organize the Yishuv started immediately after the British arrived.”²⁶⁰ A General Committee was responsible for representing the interests of the Jewish community before the government of Palestine and supervising the community's educational, welfare, and

²⁵⁵ Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 40.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, 28.

²⁵⁷ Gur Alroey, *An Upcoming Land: Jewish Migration to Palestine in the Early Twentieth Century*, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2014), 20.

²⁵⁸ Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine Under the Mandate*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 10.

²⁵⁹ Likhovski, *Israel's Parliament*, 3.

²⁶⁰ Likhovski, *Israel's Parliament*, 9.

religious affairs. It is noted that the current political system of Israel derived much of its proportional electoral procedures from this time.

A turning point in Israel's political history came when the British turned over the issue of Jewish refugees and Arab opposition to the infant United Nations in 1947. Mahler notes that "the United Nations created a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) on April 2, 1947, composed of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia."²⁶¹ With a margin of thirty-three to thirteen, with Britain abstaining, the United Nations voted to accept the UNSCOP recommendation as the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 in 1947. The leaders of the newly created Zionist Council met on the afternoon of May 14, 1948 to declare the independence of the state of Israel amidst war and chaos between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. At this time, the Jewish Provincial Council (chosen from the National Council and Jewish Agency) was transformed into the new Provisional Council of State and becoming the first government of Israel. The first election was held in 1949 where twenty-four parties representing the varying groups of the Yishuv contested the polls. These groups tend to be grouped into different blocs, notably those that represent religious interests, labor interests and center-nationalists.²⁶² The 1949 election saw sixteen of the twenty-four parties being represented in the Knesset. Elections in Israel followed similar trends as a result of the proportional system of government, seeing even parties contesting elections in 1973 and 1977 as blocs.

²⁶¹ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 36.

²⁶² Don Peretz, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 75.

Political Development in Israel

The state of Israel is often defined as “Parteienstaat (party-state)”²⁶³ due to the significant influence of the political parties in the state, and their role in the day-to-day function of the populace. Indeed, Mahler notes that “the building blocks of Israeli democracy have been its political parties.”²⁶⁴ Peretz adds, “the political system of Israel is a heritage of the pre-state era, evolving from the diverse ideological trends and interest groups within the Zionist Movement. Three large party blocs dominate the system: the Labour, religious and center-nationalist groups.”²⁶⁵ Simply, one must align to Asher Arian’s conclusion that “the style of Israeli politics is ideological.”²⁶⁶ It is seen however that over the years, ideological differences and divisiveness between right and left in Israel’s party politics has somehow weakened in light of national survival. Both Peretz and Mahler note that as parties merged into other blocs and unions, the tendency was to deemphasize ideology in an effort to find common grounds with other groups based on interests²⁶⁷ and also to ensure policy positions are inclusive and spans a wide variety of issues.²⁶⁸ Similarly, political development in Israel tied to socio-economic development in the state. Social issues and policy are seen to have been promoted during the early years of centre-left leadership but worsened during the decline in liberal democracy and exchange in power to right and centrist governments.

²⁶³ Emanuel Gutmann, “Israel,” *Journal of Politics* 25 (1963): 703.

²⁶⁴ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 189.

²⁶⁵ Peretz, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, 75.

²⁶⁶ Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Generation*, (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1985), 8.

²⁶⁷ Peretz, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, 75.

²⁶⁸ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 194.

To describe Israel's multiparty politics, this section of the paper will utilize Mahler's five groupings that categorize the political parties. It would be remiss to not note that there are other categorizations of these blocs across political science scholarship, but they tend to be similar to those of Mahler. The first grouping is that of the Left parties, which is now the Zionist Union, which finds its roots in pre-state Zionism and is also noted as the Alignment grouping (party list by the Labor and Mapai).²⁶⁹ Mahler notes that the Labour Party, which constituted a center-left stance started as Mapai '*Mifleget Palei* (Israel's Workers' Party) in 1930.²⁷⁰ The Labour Bloc is "a classic social-democratic political party with commitment to government activism to provide social and economic benefits for the public."²⁷¹ Mahler notes that between 1968-1974, the Labor Party (Mapai, Adhut HaAvaodah and Rafi) and Mapam (United Workers Party of HaShomer HaTzair and old members of the Adhut HaAvodah) joined together completely and called themselves the "Maarach" or "Alignment."²⁷² Mapam is noted to be a hard left political party in its early formation. Mapam left the Alignment in 1984 in protest to the Alignment joining Likud in a national government. The Left category in Israel also includes Hatnuah (the Movement, known previously as Kadinna), Meretz (Energy) which was founded in 1992 as a union of the Citizen's Rights Movement (CRM), Mapam, and Shinui.²⁷³ It is important to note that the Labour Party and left unions formed the dominant bloc for much of the early political history, until 1977 all

²⁶⁹ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 79.

²⁷⁰ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel, 198-202*.

²⁷¹ Ibid, 202.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid, 204.

Israeli prime ministers came from the Labour movement. The party has now lost its dominance in the polls.

The most dominant party in the right bloc in Israel is Likud (Union). Likud was formed in time for the 1973 election through a merger of the Free Centre Party (a bloc of the Herut (Freedom) Party) and the Gahal (Gush Herut Liberalism/Herut-Liberal) bloc.²⁷⁴ Mahler states that “Likud is seen as a right wing, nationalist party, inspired by the ideology of Zev Jabotinsky, a revisionist leader.”²⁷⁵ They are committed to the diminution of government regulation in the economy, on and off support to the two-state solution, fewer concessions to the Palestinians, and strong security concerns.²⁷⁶ Likud finds most of its support in the Sephardic constituency to stay in power and the Herut-Likud Bloc on the right has been the basis of most Israeli governments since 1977.²⁷⁷ Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home) and HaBayit HaYehudi (Jewish Home) are other parties on the right.

The Centre bloc in Israel’s early history, describes two different parties, Yesh Atid (There is a Future) and Kulanu (All of Us). Yesh Atid was founded near the 2013 election as “an alternative to the usual politics of the day.”²⁷⁸ Its noted to be a secular, centrist party which is critical of the religious parties’ influence in government and the state.²⁷⁹ Kulanu developed as a break off from the Likud party, and thus shares similar positions as them right bloc as they were formed in 2014 as a “clean” of former Likud supporters. Israel also has Orthodox Religious Parties, specifically Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians)

²⁷⁴ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 111.

²⁷⁵ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 205.


²⁷⁶ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 205.


²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 204.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

and the United Torah Judaism (coalition of two ultraorthodox religious parties, Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah (Flag of the Torah). The last grouping of political parties in Israel is described as the Far Left and Arab Parties; namely, Hadash, Raam, Balad, and the evolution of the Knesset in terms of the various parties (grouped by colour) is illustrated in the following Figure.





Sources: Haaretz.com; Knesset; Israel Democracy Institute; Project 61; *The Economist* *99% of votes counted
Economist.com

Figure 1. Number of Seats by Party and Political Stance in Israel, 1949-2015.
A.L.G., “The Economist Explains: The Evolution of Israeli Politics,” *The Economist*
(March 15, 2015). Accessed on April 10, 2018,
<https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-11>

Analysis of Israel’s political development starts significantly with the dominance of the centre-left from 1949 to the late 1970’s as illustrated above. As noted in the illustration below, Mapai enjoyed a time of one-party dominance from 1949 to 1961. Noting that Mapai never won a complete majority in the Knesset, they however always enjoyed a plurality in the votes for these years.²⁸⁰ Historically Mapai was,

²⁸⁰ Benjamin Akzin, *The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy*, 200.

“The largest vote-getter, the key ingredient of any government coalition, the standard-bearer of the society’s goals, and the articulator of its aspirations. Mapai also had the tremendous political advantages of a united and integrated leadership; a broad-based, well-functioning, and flexible political organization; no serious political opposition; and control over the major economic and human resources flowing into the country.”²⁸¹

The major thread that binds the center-left parties together and specifically defines Mapai’s time in power was its commitment to democratic socialism and welfare politics. As the most pluralistic party in Israeli politics²⁸², Shalev highlights that Mapai found much of its support across the classes and ethnicities. The middle class and upper classes supported the party for its positive incentives and access to resources.²⁸³ Indeed, support for Mapai allowed for greater access to housing, jobs, healthcare and other exclusive social welfare program. The party also got support from some Arab groups, which depended on the party’s dominance for their livelihood and at times, even restraint.²⁸⁴ Similarly, the large on set of immigrants in the 1940’s widened the working class and gave Mapai a chance for increased support. These non-aligned and non-partisan workers were easily captured by Ben Guiron’s charisma as well as bent to the dependence upon the labour movement, controlled by Mapai.²⁸⁵

During Mapai’s time in power, called the “statehood period”, there were significant improvements in the social sector as well as the economy. It is stated that Israel had a sharp transition from great inequality and other social issues to a time of

²⁸¹ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 83.

²⁸² Leonard Fein, *Israel: Politics and People*, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1968) 101.

²⁸³ Michael Shalev, "The Political Economy of Labour-Party Dominance and Decline in Israel", in *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, 1st ed.* (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 83-127.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

equality and social growth, “Mapai used the state in order to build a broad and strong public sector (governmental and Histadrut), while providing some support for the private sector and attempting to attract private investment from abroad.”²⁸⁶ Bareli notes that immigration caused significant inequality in the Israel society, but “economic indicators show that [Mapai] succeeded in narrowing the gaps substantially. Fanny Ginor, relying on several studies, shows that in the late 1960s Israel was one of the most egalitarian societies with regard to distribution of income.”²⁸⁷ Israel’s development under the left will be further discussed later in this chapter.

Ben Guiron and Mapai lost their complete one-party dominance in 1965 when the left contested the polls as the Alignment Grouping between Mapai and Ahdut HaAvoda. Between 1967 and 1970, the National Unity Government headed by the Alignment with Gahal, the National Religious Party, the Independent Liberals, Progress and Development and Cooperation and Brotherhood led in a coalition leadership of the country. Much of the left’s domination of Israeli government with Mapai’s one party dominance and the Alignment’s control up to the 1977 election was characterized by Israel’s economic self-sufficiency, agrarian and secular Jewish democracy which boosted human and social development as well as economic growth. In 1977, the Likud party made history by becoming the first right wing party to win a plurality in the Knesset. Though there were changes in the economic policy, specifically as it related to currency, there were no

²⁸⁶ Avi Bareli, “Mamlachtiyut, Capitalism and Socialism during the 1950s in Israel,” *Journal of Israeli History* 26, no. 2. (2007). Accessed on April 10. <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.uleth.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/13531040701552132?needAccess=true>

²⁸⁷ Bareli, “Mamlachtiyut, Capitalism and Socialism during the 1950s in Israel,” 210.

overall changes in the socio-economy of the state due to the government's focus on peace and settlements which caused mass discontent in the populace.

The 1981 election in Israel is cited as the impetus of the decline of liberal democracy in Israel. Lehman-Wilzig highlights that the violence was induced by the increased polarization of the populace, where there was increased competition between the two major parties Alignment and Likud. He adds that, "this was the first election in which the public believed both sides had a chance of winning, causing unrest and agitation."²⁸⁸ The election ended with the re-election of the Likud party that won one more seat than the Alignment. In fact, scholars like Arian state that Likud's victory was due to five main factors: incumbency, candidates, images, campaigns, violence, and ethnicity.²⁸⁹

The election of 1984 saw the Alignment returning to power and making a left-center government for the first time since 1987. Due to the Alignment's inability to form a government with any of the smaller parties, a unity government was formed with Likud and the Alignment sharing power with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir both being prime minister for two years each. The twelfth Knesset was led by Likud after their victory in the 1988 election, where they worked on improving the economic situation in Israel. It also saw the empowering of small religious parties as the "swing" parties that could make or break a coalition government. The 1992 election saw the return of Labor to power and greater focus on filling the short comings of the previous right-wing

²⁸⁸ Sam Lehman-Wilzig, "Thunder Before the Storm: Pre-Election Agitation and Post-Election Turmoil," *The Elections in Israel*, (1983): 207.

²⁸⁹ Asher Arian, *The Elections in Israel: 1981*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983), 1-5.

government. The 1996 election saw the change of the electoral rules where the prime minister was directly elected separately from the legislature. This saw Benjamin Netanyahu from Likud win the post of prime minister over Peres who took over when Rabin was assassinated. The Labor party won the majority of the seats in the Knesset however, but because Netanyahu was elected prime minister he was tasked with selecting government. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the new electoral rule significantly affected the two major parties seeing them lose near ten seats compared to the 1992 election.

The 1999 election saw Ehud Barak winning the office of prime minister over Netanyahu and formed the 28th government of Israel on 6 July 1999 with his One Israel Alliance that won a small majority of 26 seats in the Knesset election. This government collapsed in December 2000 and a national unity government was formed with Likud and smaller parties under Ariel Sharon who won the election for prime minister over Barak. Both governments did significant work to improve parliament to make government more stable and improve legislative policy. The 2003 election saw the end to the separate election of the prime minister and the Likud party won victory for the right under Sharon. It is noted that this Knesset spent a large amount of its time in heated debate over the economic policies proposed by the government. This government saw many allegations and investigations into Knesset members for corruption and other charges, furthering Israel's issues with liberal democracy. The 2006 election proved interesting for Israeli politics where the newly formed Kadima party won a majority of seats in the election and formed a coalition with Labour, Shas and Gil. The election was interesting as the Kadima's split from Likud meant decreased support for the Likud party which lost near

seventy-five per cent of its votes, as well saw the first time that a centre party would win the election.²⁹⁰

At the turn of 2009, political writers noted that ideological and political polarization within the public and parties had reduced, with most parties moving to the center. The Kadima party won victory for the center with a majority in the Knesset and the Likud party as a close runner up. In a twist however, the President called Netanyahu to form government due to the fact that there were more right leaning smaller parties in the Knesset at the time. The 2013 election was won by the common list alliance of Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, who formed a coalition with Yesh Atid, the Jewish Home and Hatnuah, giving them a total of sixty-eight seats.

The 2015 legislative election for the twentieth Knesset in Israel were held on March 17, 2015 with the major political parties going head to head after disagreements arose in the government coalition (Likud party with Yisrael Beiteinu, Yesh Atid, The Jewish Home and Hatnuah) over the state budget and a 'Jewish State Proposal.' In the end, the Likud party led by Benjamin Netanyahu the incumbent Prime Minister won with 23.40 per cent of the votes and 30 seats in the Knesset.²⁹¹ For the 2015 election, the Labor Party and Hatnuah formed a coalition, called the Zionist Union. The Zionist Union led by Isaac Herzog won 18.67 per cent of the votes and twenty-four seats. The other parties that won seats in the twentieth Knesset and passed the 3.25 per cent threshold (136, 854 votes) are listed below in Table 2, including the Joint List union of the Arab parties (Balad,

²⁹⁰ "Historic Overview of the Seventeenth Knesset," *The Knesset*.

²⁹¹ "Knesset Election Results: The Twentieth Knesset," *The Knesset*, (2015). Accessed on February 10, 2018. https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res20.htm

Hadash, the southern branch of the Islamic Movement, Ta'al and the United Arab List²⁹²), Yesh Atid, Kulanu, The Jewish Home, Yisrael Beiteinu, United Torah Judaism, Shas and Meretz. A total of 26 parties contested the 2015 election, with 4,210,884 persons of the 5,881,696 eligible voters turning out to vote giving the election a 72.34 per cent voter turnout. After winning the 2015 election, it is noted that building a coalition was rather difficult for Netanyahu and the Likud party as he was granted a two-week extension to form a coalition by President Reuven Rivlin.²⁹³ A narrow coalition was successfully formed on May 6 by the Likud Party with the Jewish Home, United Torah Judaism, Kulanu, and Shas. This gave the Likud party the bare majority of 61 seats that it needed to command the Knesset.²⁹⁴ Many political scientists noted that due to the Likud's lead in the polls, Netanyahu was able to form a coalition with less ideological divisions than his last government.²⁹⁵ The twentieth Knesset is noted to have fewer orthodox lawmakers, a record number of women, more supporters of progressive streams of Judaism, and more Arabs.²⁹⁶

²⁹² Lazar Berman, "Arab parties Finalize Unity," *The Times of Israel*, (January 22, 2015). Accessed on February 10, 2018. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/arab-parties-and-hadash-finalize-unity-deal/>

²⁹³ Josef Federman, "Israel leader gets 2-week extension to form government", *Associated Press*, April 20, 2015.

²⁹⁴ Jeffery Heller, "Netanyahu clinches deal to form new Israeli Government," *Reuters*, May 6, 2015.

²⁹⁵ Jodi Rudoren, "Win in Israel Sets Netanyahu on Path to Rebuild and Redefine Government," *New York Times*, March 18, 2015.

²⁹⁶ Judy Maltz, "More Women and Arabs, Fewer Orthodox in next Knesset," *Haaretz*, March 18, 2015.

TABLE 2. 2015 ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS

Name of Party/List	Leader	Number of valid votes	% of total votes	Number of seats
Likud	Benjamin Netanyahu	985,408	23.40	30
Zionist Union	Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni	786,313	18.67	24
Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal, United Arab List)	Ayman Odeh	446,583	10.61	13
Yesh Atid	Yair Lapid	371,602	8.82	11
Kulanu	Moshe Kahlon	315,360	7.49	10
The Jewish Home (Habayit Hayehudi)	Naftali Bennett	283,910	6.74	8
Shas	Aryeh Deri	241,613	5.74	7
Yisrael Beitenu	Avigdor Liberman	214,906	5.10	6
United Torah Judaism (Yehadut HaTorah, alliance between The Degel HaTorah and The Agudat Israel)	Yaakov Litzman	210,143	4.99	6
Meretz (Israel's Left)	-Zehava Gal On	165,529	3.93	5

Multi-party Politics in Israel

Many ascribe Israel's multiparty politics to the state's history, and the diverse ideologies and needs of the populace. While others note that it is the result of the electoral system itself and the existence of proportional electoral rules which promote the inclusion

and representation of all political parties within a multi-party system. Israel's history does much to facilitate the multi-party politics, with the state's ideological differences only being further facilitated by the proportional rules. Israel has seen near one hundred parties in its political history, developing from party unions, factions, breakaways and organization. These parties usually form on some religious, class, social or ideological platform and tend to represent the views of a portion of the state's voters. Political competition in Israel can get very intense, with debates in the Knesset stretching for some time. This is expected due to the number of parties that usually pass the threshold and the differences that exist among them. It is clear that each party in the Knesset and a part of the governmental coalition maintains strong party discipline and is loyal to their supporters and platform. This is a great reflection of Israel's political history as well as the political culture and socialization of the state.

Usually, parties maintain their popularity to the voters by reimagining themselves as new parties, reform parties or as blocs. Mahler notes, "this process of party creation involving factionalization and recombination is a fascinating way for political organizations to stay viable and relevant to the voters- or otherwise to disappear from the political scene altogether- and shows how a political system that is very responsive to the electorate might operate."²⁹⁷ Piron agrees by noting, "There are very real benefits to a political setting from having a fluid and responsive system of political parties- in that the views of the public really are represented in the electoral and representative structures of government, which helps the government of the day to have great legitimacy."²⁹⁸ The

²⁹⁷ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 198.

²⁹⁸ Shai Piron, "The Benefits of a Diverse and Pluralistic Political Parties," *Jerusalem Post*, (March 12, 2015), 15.

truth is, the Israeli party system and political landscape is indeed reflective of the definition of democracy given by Dahl and Schumpeter, that is, inclusive, representative and competitive. For inclusiveness and representation, the multi-party system allows for smaller parties and factions to easily develop and voice the needs of their voters. Israel with its multi-party politics and centripetal democracy allows for groups to easily form a political party to have a chance to influence public policy and represent their interests and push their agenda. Dalton, Farrell and McAllister also note in their work that interest groups and political parties form a linkage mechanism in democratic states, by ensuring that government and their policies are linked to public opinions and the interests of the public.²⁹⁹

In Israel, representing the public's interest is paramount in the strength of the party and the formation of coalition governments, as there must be some trade off as noted above when joining with other parties; usually, this trade off involves cabinet positions and pushing important pieces of legislature that are important to the invited parties. It goes without saying that many criticize Israel's multiparty system and coalition governments, and in fact raise possible implications for the Jamaican context. As discussed earlier, multiparty politics does have its drawbacks when it comes to forming coalitions as this process usually takes some amount of compromise and in Israel's case, comes with a time limit. The main problem in Israel and other states that have strong multiparty politics is that "having too many parties is often unwieldy...coalitions become

²⁹⁹ Russell Dalton, David Farrell, and Ian McAllister, *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 25.

harder to form and often include strange bedfellows.”³⁰⁰ Some argue that issues like the length of time it takes to form coalition governments, distracting politicians from the business of governing and the ability of small parties to render government incoherent by seizing control of the policy areas they care about leaves democracy vulnerable.³⁰¹

TABLE 3. PARTY DISTRIBUTION IN THE KNESSET FROM 1949 TO 2015

ENPP = Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties

ELECTION	TURNOUT	PARTIES IN THE KNESSET	ENPP	IPSC	LARGEST BLOC	SECOND LARGEST BLOC
1949	86.9	12	4.72	38.3	Centre-left	Left
1951	75.1	15	5.02	37.5	Centre-left	Centre
1955	82.8	12	5.96	33.3	Centre-left	Left
1959	81.6	12	4.91	39.2	Centre-left	Right
1961	81.4	11	5.35	35.0	Centre-left	Centre
1965	85.9	13	4.70	37.5	Centre-left	Right
1969	81.2	13	3.55	46.7	Centre-left	Right
1973	78.6	10	3.34	42.5	Centre-left	Right
1977	79.3	13	4.36	35.8	Right	Centre-left
1981	78.5	10	3.13	40.0	Right	Centre-left
1984	78.8	15	3.86	36.7	Centre-left	Right
1988	79.7	15	4.39	33.3	right	Centre-left
1992	77.4	10	4.38	36.7	Centre-left	Right
1996	79.3	11	5.61	28.3	Centre-left	Right
1999	78.7	15	8.69	21.7	Centre-left	right
2003	67.8	13	6.17	31.7	Right	Centre-left
2006	63.2	12	7.84	24.2	Centre	Centre-left
2009	65.2	12	6.77	23.3	Centre	Right
2013	67.8	12	7.28	25.8	Right	Centre
2015	72.3	10	6.94	25.0	right	Centre-left

IPSC= Seat Concentration (Share) of the largest party

Source: Alan Siaroff, “Data Set”

³⁰⁰ “Too Many Parties Can Spoil Politics,” *The Economist*, (January 12, 2017). Accessed on April 3, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21714355-more-choice-good-thing-within-limits-too-many-parties-can-spoil-politics>

³⁰¹ Ibid

The above illustration gives a general understanding of the multi-party politics in Israel as it relates to party distribution in the Knesset and the ideological organization of government. Importantly to Israel, it is seen that the effective number of parties has never fallen below three. This simply means that, at any time in parliament, there are more than the equivalent of three parties that are considered to be “empirically relevant.”³⁰² That is, due to their seat share in the Knesset these parties are considered to be relatively strong in influencing government or policy. The fact that Israel has such a high effective number of political parties (ENPP) means that inclusion is higher, where other parties play a role in government. Similarly, the table above notes that the highest percentage of seats ever won by a party was in 1969, when the centre left-grouping won 46.7 percent of the seats. This highlights an interesting part of Israel’s multiparty system and proportional rules, the fact that no party, no matter size can ever win a complete majority in the Knesset. Simply, this means that no party can ever have complete control of government and avoid cooperation on policy. Interestingly however, the table also highlights that government can avoid some amount of cooperation in regard to ideological cooperation.

Politics and Development in Israel

Israel’s multiparty system and proportional representation has long been the centre of scholastic criticism, with many political scientists noting that there may need to be some

³⁰² Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 183.

form of electoral reform as the politics of the state greatly affects the effectiveness of political institutions and policy. Israel's multiparty system and coalition governments do face some issues, specifically as it relates to the amount of parties present in the political system, the vast difference in political interests between parties, and the need for a coalition to gain a majority in the Knesset. Mahler makes it clear that "history combined with the proportional representation system that encourages new parties to form by making representation in the Knesset relatively easy, has encouraged the expansion of parties, which has complicated the coalition-formation process."³⁰³ The reality is, coalition governments in Israel are tricky due to the fact that a larger party must depend on more than one smaller party in an effort to gain a majority in the house. What makes this an even more contentious situation is the fact that all parties in Israel represent their own interests and particular grouping and therefore party discipline is usually high. The issue for Israel's case is that smaller parties have lots of power to blackmail politically, where if the majority is minimal, smaller parties can give ultimatums on political policy, "pass/support our policy, or we will withdraw from the government coalition and you will lose your majority and will no longer be prime minister" with a likely positive response from the prime minister.³⁰⁴ Additionally, these fragile coalition governments sometimes cause the government to not be able to act on a particular issue, as there may be opposition from one or more of the coalition parties who will withdraw their support and cause government to dissolve if an action swings either way.³⁰⁵ This is summed up by Rapoport and Weg: "the important consequences of coalition government and multiparty

³⁰³ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 184.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 184.

politics for the Israeli political system are several. First, they result in an increased party discipline and thereby in less individual legislative freedom, as the government has to be sure that it can depend upon coalition members to support government policy.”³⁰⁶ This individual legislative freedom is also lacking in Westminster systems like Jamaica.

While policy formation in Israel tends to be slower when it comes to specific issues like peace, an agreed upon budget, and social integration of Arabs and Jews; the state does put emphasis on their capacity to grant basic social services to the public. This section on Israeli politics and the paper on a whole will not dissect Israel’s ability to pass legislation on all issues, but how well the government works to ensure that public policy safeguards the human development of the state as seen in the early leftist dominance of the political arena. As the paper looks directly at the relationship between politics and development, it is seen that despite the competition and struggles between parties in the Knesset, the government, the legislature and individual parties are committed to ensuring that public policy benefits the citizens. The truth is, Israel has a centralized government with power vested in the cabinet and the prime minister for legislative decisions, and a dominant multiparty political system, that are developed from its political centripetalism. Arian clarifies this by noting that decisions on party politics and public policy are made “in the chambers of major political parties” and not by the sway of the media or necessarily the Knesset.³⁰⁷ It must be repeated that this is due to the fact that a coalition government tends to choose partners that will further its interests, and therefore these parties tend to have specific policy agendas. Similarly, Arian continues, “control of the

³⁰⁶ Annon Rapoport and Eythan Weg, “Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesset,” *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (August 1986): 577-596.

³⁰⁷ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 8.

party that forms the government implies control of the Knesset and control of the major ministries.”³⁰⁸ So while the coalition governments tend to be unstable for specific reasons, general public policy favouring better social services and economic development for the state tend to be achieved. Mahler highlights that,

“On a broader scale, Israel has a political system committed to the welfare state approach to social services. This means that the state will make sure that certain minimal standards of social goods are available to all citizens, including education and healthcare...Israel has a guaranteed minimum annual income; if someone is unable to earn a certain amount of money each year, the state provides the income to the individual directly...”³⁰⁹

In addition to the availability of social services, it is noted that Israel’s centralized economy allows “the government [to control] 40 per cent of the economy’s activity and directly influencing 90 percent of the country’s economic life.”³¹⁰ Arian goes on to add that, “these figures register enormous economic influence and hint at enormous political power. Add to that the fact that two-thirds of those that are employed work in services and three-quarters of the employed are salaried, and the impact of the control of the centralized economy is clear.”³¹¹ Relatively, Jamaica has also made specific changes in their social services to make public healthcare free for all citizens and public education in primary and secondary schools free, with subsidies for tertiary education in public institutions, among other social services. The Jamaican issue arises in the fact that these services are ineffective as they are poorly governed and tend not to reach the disadvantaged as noted in the previous chapter. While Jamaica struggles with violence,

³⁰⁸ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 8.

³⁰⁹ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 72.

³¹⁰ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 8.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

Israel struggles with war, unstable coalitions and integration. However, unlike Jamaica, Israel has effective state policies, a lower corruption index, higher human development and economic growth as well as higher democratic index than Jamaica which sits at a 7.29 out of 10 in democratic quality.³¹² The Economist's Democracy Index ranks Israel as a flawed democracy at 30th out of 167 countries with a score of 7.79 out of 10 for democratic quality, with their only low score being in the extent of civil liberties.³¹³ As for perception of corruption, Transparency International ranks them 28th out of 167, with a score of 64 out of 100.³¹⁴

It is crucial to note that Israel saw the most socio-economic development during its early years under the centre-left government. During the Mapai's one-party dominance of the polls from 1949 to 1965, and its participation in the Alignment up to 1973, Israel saw significant economic growth as well as developments in housing, health, education and other social issues. As Mahler points out, "from the time of independence, and in fact even before, the state played a major role in providing for the well-being of its citizens. This was true in a variety of social policy areas, including medical care, housing, employment, education, the provision of food and transportation, and many other social goods."³¹⁵ In the first ten years of Israel's independence, in what was known as the state-building era, Israel went through significant socio-economic growth. Historically, Israel is praised for its rapid growth and socio-economic stability as compared to other developing

³¹² The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2017 Free speech under attack," *The Economist* (2017). Accessed on April 1, 2018.
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2017.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2017

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Transparency International, "Israel", Accessed on March 1, 2017.
<https://www.transparency.org/country/ISR#>

³¹⁵ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 111.

countries at the time. In fact, this proved to be one of the most prosperous times for the country. Not only was it embracing liberal democratic principles, but the democratic socialism adopted by Mapai and the centre-left seem effective in improving the social relations of the population.

Economically, Israel's economy benefited from the closed market social welfare approach of the earlier years. Akzin and Dror posit that "Israel's economy since the time of its creation can be characterized as similar to those of other centralized economies with strong social welfare dimensions."³¹⁶ It is further noted that between 1948 and 1973 under the leadership of the centre-left, Israel's economy grew rapidly averaging 10 percent per year.³¹⁷ Shalev explains that Israel's socio-economic growth during these years under the centre-left is due to the increase in the work force due to immigration as well as the investments that funneled through the organizations of the old Zionist Labour Movement.³¹⁸ As noted earlier, Mapai under Ben Guiron proved popular among the classes and across ethnicities for these social policies and the availability of resources. Overall, during the second decade of independent Israel, styled "the years of consolidation," Israel's economy proved strong.

It is noted that following the Yom Kippur War of 1973 there were significant constraints on the Israeli economy due to the large military and defense expenditure. Mahler, citing Kanavosky highlights that "through the 1980's, the major difficulty facing the Israeli economy was the vast and continuing budgetary increases in the areas of

³¹⁶ Benjamin Akzin and Yair Aharoni, *Israel: High Pressure Planning*, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), 15.

³¹⁷ David Horowitz, *The enigma of Economic Growth: A Case Study of Israel*, (New York: Prager, 1972), 53.

³¹⁸ Shalev, "The Political Economy of Labour-Party Dominance and Decline in Israel," 89-97.

defense and security.”³¹⁹ Israel’s economy slowly recovered in the latter part of the twentieth century, with one of the highest gross domestic product (GDP) growth among western economies.³²⁰ Currently, Israelis ranked 19th in the world for human development and is considered to have “very high human development.”³²¹ The citizens therefore enjoy a higher standard of living than many European states like France, Belgium, Finland, Austria and Spain.³²² Chua writes that Israel has a “sophisticated welfare state, a powerful modern military said to possess a lethal nuclear-weapon’s capacity, modern infrastructure rivaling many other Western countries, and a high-technology sector competitively on par with Silicon Valley.”³²³ With this, Israel also has one of the world’s best educational systems to facilitate its elite work force. The World Bank records that Israel’s GDP is 317.74 (billion USD) with an annual growth rate of 4.1 per cent as of 2016.³²⁴

Israel’s Unique Position

The party system and government in Israel provides an interesting look at the workings of centripetal democracy, where there are strong political institutions that promote inclusiveness and political involvement, where there is a thriving multi-party

³¹⁹ Eliyahu Kanovsky, *The Economic Impact of the Six Day War*, (New York: Prager, 1970) 22.

³²⁰ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 112.

³²¹ The United Nations Development Programme, “Israel,” *Human Development Reports*, (2016). Accessed on April 15, 2018. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ISR>

³²² The United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone*, (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2016)

³²³ Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing, 2004) 219-220.

³²⁴ World Bank Group, “Country Profile: Israel,” *The World Bank* (2018). Accessed on April 15, 2018 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/ReportWidgetCustom.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=ISR

system and inclusion. However, there is also governmental instability and slower legislation on specific issues. Indeed, there is truth in Arian's observation that "Political Scientists who compare political systems find difficulty in fitting Israel in their schema...In many senses Israel's unique. Merely by its membership in the exclusive club of democratic nations (in which parties compete for power in free elections), Israel is in a special category."³²⁵ Israel remains the only country in the world that operates by centripetal rules with a parliamentary democracy that moved from a developing state to a developed one. It has a centralized government expressed through the role of the cabinet and the prime minister, prominent legislature, and political institutions that serve the interests of the populace, a multi-party system and proportional rules that facilitate broad inclusion, all of which are assumed to be the solution to Jamaica's political dilemma.

Israel perfectly mirrors the centripetal idea of a pyramidal political structure; that is, "it gathers widely at the base, channeling interests, ideas, and identities upward to a single, authoritative policymaking venue. At each level, some narrowing of perspectives necessarily occurs. However, the pyramid encompasses a diversity of political parties as well as a variety of informal channels of communication."³²⁶ Not to mention that Israel is categorized as a developed country by the IMF and the state does have high human development and a growing economy, both of which Jamaica still aims to achieve. The assumption is that if these rules were to be altered, that is, allowing for multiparty politics and the formation of a coalition government that strengthens political institutions, there would be better representation and inclusion in Jamaican politics. Though the political

³²⁵ Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 1.

³²⁶ Gerring, Thacker and Moreno, "Centripetal democratic Governance," 571.

system in Israel is more legitimate and efficient due to their long use of the centripetal system throughout history, the aim is to utilize these centripetal rules to facilitate similar efficiency and legitimacy in Jamaican politics.

Comparatively, a coalition government in Jamaica should not be as unstable as in Israel as Jamaica has a homogenous population and there exists no deep rooted ideological difference between the two main parties. It is assumed that if a multiparty political system should develop, there could be new parties that develop as breakaways from the two main parties or developed based on social interests and issues that are outside the scope of the existing parties, such as social liberal parties or green parties arising to the left of the political spectrum to keep balance in the political systems. There is no historical evidence of the development of fringe parties or extremist groups in Jamaica. Multiparty politics then could allow more comprehensive debates in parliament as the chances of these smaller parties gaining representation would be easier. With this, political violence from party adversarialism and patronage would be diminished, as parties would now actually represent the populace's interests on the national level. Similarly, with increased competitiveness of platforms in the electoral system, electoral behavior should change, with voter turnout improving and remaining high as presently in Israel. The ultimate assumption then is, as representation and inclusiveness take over the political arena, and strong political institutions become pervasive, political policy would become more effective and therefore the standard of living of the population should increase. It is this hypothesis that will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Considering the major challenges to Jamaica's democracy and development, it was hypothesized that a change from the Westminster political system to a centripetal democratic system could provide positive outcomes as seen in Israel. Specifically, the hypothesis stands that good governance will lead to improved human and socio-economic development as the literature shows that there is a positive relationship between the two. To measure governance, and what is considered 'good governance', it is best to look at the 'quality of democracy', highlighting both quantitative and qualitative measures. In any sense, good governance is reflected in Monroe's five measures: (1) improved political participation, (2) respectful political competition, (3) good socio-economic outcomes, (4) trust in government and support for democracy, as well as (5) little to no corruption, should all lead to high human development and socio-economic growth in developing states like Jamaica. To facilitate this, it is hypothesized that a centripetal democratic model should be implemented in Jamaica so as to allow multi-party politics through inclusion and representation, a centralized and authoritative government, as well as proportional electoral rules.

Jamaica has always been the primary focus of the thesis, based on concern that the current majoritarian rules do not fully represent the democratic principles of inclusion and representation. Jamaica currently battles with political violence, polarization, voter apathy, minimal economic growth and comparatively low human development. Similarly, the dominant two-party system and their similar, near the centre political stance have

controlled the politics of the state since independence with the electoral rules reducing any chance of smaller parties to affect public policy as the effective number of parties in parliament has always been two. To remedy these shortfalls, the centripetal democratic theory was suggested. This theory proved important as it rested on the tenets of inclusion, representation and an authoritative government. Centripetalism postulates multiparty politics, coalition governments, proportional electoral rules, and parliamentarianism and works best for unitary states. In an effort to see the true effects of centripetalism and their potential for Jamaica, it was necessary to find a state that utilized the centripetal democratic theory and the tenets missing in Jamaican politics as well as one that was once a developing country; Israel proved to be the best choice here. The state of Israel is therefore pertinent for the analysis and identifying if the characteristics of centripetalism provide greater governance and ultimately greater human development through state policy, than Jamaica does utilizing the Westminster system. It is assumed that Israel will present higher levels of political participation, better political competition and contestation, lower levels of corruption, better development through state policy, and better attitudes to political institutions.

The methodology for this part of the thesis is simple. The data for this analysis was collected using secondary sources found in international and local surveys. The research was conducted using statistical data from organizations like Transparency International, the World Bank, The Economist Intelligence Unit, the Israel Democracy Institute and Vanderbilt University. The information was collected online and recorded to provide for the interpretations section, where the information is represented in various forms of illustrations. It is pertinent to note that there were some shortfalls in the data collection

process, specifically as it related to the availability of the data itself. For some of the variables, it is seen that data for crucial years in Israel's political system is not available. Similarly, for some years, Jamaica was not represented on some international surveys, or specific variables in these surveys changed and were left out in some years. In addition, there were limitations in access to data and information on Israel that would have improved the analysis. The language barrier was also a hindrance for a succinct analysis of Israel. Overall, however, there is sufficient data and discourse to draw a conclusion to the hypothesis in this thesis.

The Quality of Political Participation

Subscribing to Munroe's first dimension of good governance and measure of quality of democracy, the quality of political participation will be analyzed. This variable is significant as it indicates that people are willing to participate in the selection of their government. It assumes that persons understand the democracy, and therefore support democratic governance. For the purpose of this thesis, voter turnout will be the measure used for the comparison of Jamaica and Israel. It is necessary to identify if the populace in Israel under centripetal rules are more inclined to participate in politics through conventional means than they are in Jamaica under majoritarian rules. The graph below highlights the vote-turnout for Jamaica (1962-2016) and in Israel (1949-2015).




Figure 2. Bar Graph showing voter turnouts in Jamaica and Israel between 1949 and 2016.

The bar graph above illustrates the comparative voter turnouts in Israel and Jamaica between 1949 and 2016. Although both countries have their elections in different years, it is still easy to identify and compare the turnout in elections. Israel saw its highest level of voter turnout in its first election of 1949, but more generally its turnout remained high—at or near 80 percent through 1999. This level of voter turnout is very good in an efficient democracy. When Jamaica got its independence in 1962, the first election had a voter turnout of 72 percent. Jamaica’s highest voter turnout numbers were recorded in 1976 and 1980 at the height of Jamaican partisanship, clientelism and violent competition between the dominant parties. Since those years, Jamaica has seen a slow decrease in its voter turnout, with the 2015 election seeing 47.7 per cent voter turnout,

less than 50 per cent of the eligible voters casting ballots. Israel has seen some of its lowest figures in recent years, but none ever lower than 50 percent. Since its lowest ever recorded turnout in 2006, the voter turnout levels have slowly risen to the average level in 2015 with 72.36 percent.

It is clear that both Jamaica and Israel shared steady voter turnout levels in early years, with Israel having a higher percentage of voter turnout in its first five years. Specifically, Israel had an average of 81.6 percent turnout in its first five elections, while Jamaica had 80.51 per cent turnout. These levels are very close, considering that in those years, Jamaica was a newly formed Westminster political system and Israel was effectively utilizing centripetal rules. It is also important to note that during the early political years of Jamaica, up to the early 1990's, political patronage and violence was an important part of political life and a huge variable for political participation. People were more inclined to vote when they were benefitting from patronage in those years. High immigration and the implementation of social welfare programs can also explain the higher turnouts in Israel elections as well. The latter years of decline for both countries is also crucial for understanding the relationship between the political system and political participation. For Jamaica, the 1990's and later saw the decline in political patronage and any form of social democracy that had gained momentum under Manley who left office in 1992. Many argue that voter apathy in Jamaica stems from a disregard of the benefits of voting and democracy. This became very clear in the 2016 elections when less than half of the registered voters did not turn out to vote, making many criticize the legitimacy of the government who garnered less than half of the support of the populace. It highlighted the flaws of Jamaican democracy. On the other hand, Israel's decline in voter turnout in

the early 2000's can be explained by citizens being apathetic towards politics of the state based on their socio-economic or democratic status. Crucial to this is the continued marginalization of Israel's poor and Arab groups since the turn of the century. As the political system aged however, and as more political groups like Yesh Atid in 2013 and the Joint List in 2015 formed, these groups started to represent the interests of the masses, promoting greater inclusion and participation. This allowed for a steady rise in the voter turnout levels in recent years, coupled with the increased competitiveness of the two major political parties for the 2015 election. Based on the analysis of the data, it is easy to conclude that while voter turnout seems to be high in the early stages of politics in both countries, when the electoral rules are judged over a longer period of time, the proportional rules of Israel's centripetal democracy that allows for a multiparty system is better at generating political support and representation than Jamaica's majoritarian system.

The Quality of Political Contestation and Competition

The quality of political contestation and competition posited by Munroe as a measure of quality of democracy is one that has been studied and measured by many other political science scholars. Munroe proposes that this variable should measure the balance between partisanship and adversarialism that exists in the politics of a state. The truth is, a good democracy balances party loyalty and partisanship with respect and some form of collaboration or cooperation. Lijphart in his earlier works argues that democratic stability stems from peaceful competition and cooperation between political elites of different cleavages.³²⁷ Whether these cleavages be religious, cultural or even political, Lijphart proposes that pure democracy has an “emphasis on cooperation and the avoidance of adversarial competition.”³²⁸ To reflect Munroe’s sentiments, measuring contestation and competition in a democracy centres on the political rhetoric and language of the political parties, whether it is that they are aggressive and promote violence, or that they promote peaceful cooperation. Ideally, political competition should contain discourse with “strong, vigorous, but nevertheless ‘friendly’ competition in a zero-sum game in which the players contemplate at least some levels of collaboration.”³²⁹ It further looks at how political leaders deal with acts of intimidation and violent partisanship. Overall, to measure this variable, there will be an analysis of instances that reflect political competition based on the specific categories of campaign rhetoric,

³²⁷ Arend Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” *Comparative Political Studies* 1, no. 1. (April 1, 2018). 3-44. Accessed on May 7, 2018. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001041406800100101>

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Munroe, *Renewing Democracy into the Millenium*, 16.

parliamentary respect and policy cooperation. The analysis will also cover political violence, coalition government and responsibility of opposition parties for both Israel and Jamaica. This section will use images as visual examples and representations as well as written recordings so as to come to a conclusion based on the significance of negative political competition in either country.

Campaign rhetoric for this analysis will look at how speeches, advertisements and overall language is used to persuade the populace into voting for a specific party. It will look at the extent to which a party's campaign is focused on presenting that party's manifesto and policy positions as opposed to belittling or insulting their opposition. Where the party uses campaigning to make the opposition look like villains, or less than worthy of political office, this will be seen as negative political competition. Campaign rhetoric in Israel revolves around party policies in regard to the economy, Arab equality, the Palestinian conflict and Zionism. Israel's negative campaign ads utilize specific remarks or actions of opponents to denounce the party's policy agenda. Competition in campaigning between parties tend to focus on controversial topics, with specific hints at divisive action between the far left and right parties. Some of the most negative print ads can be seen below in figures 3 and 4.



Figure 3. A campaign ad crafted by the Likud party depicting Zionist Union head Isaac Herzog as a cross-dresser. The Hebrew word mahapach — which can mean “makeover” and is most widely used to refer to a dramatic political reversal — is plastered across the ad, mocking Herzog’s use of the word during the campaign.³³⁰



Figure 4. A campaign ad crafted by the Likud party depicting Hamas head Khaled Mashaal. The ad had the heading, “Here is the man who always answers Tzipi Livni’s calls,” then-Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal is depicted with the word “Zibi?” inside a speech bubble. Zibi in Arabic is a crude word for male genitalia. In Hebrew it is used as a slang word meaning nothing, or rubbish, and here it is being used to allude to how Mashaal would likely pronounce Livni’s first name.³³¹

³³⁰ Toi Staff, “Likud ‘secretly funded campaign ads’ depicting Herzog as a cross-dresser,” *The Times of Israel*, (June 20, 2017). Accessed May 2, 2018. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-secretly-funded-campaign-ads-depicting-herzog-as-a-cross-dresser/>

³³¹ Staff, “Likud ‘secretly funded campaign ads’ depicting Herzog as a cross-dresser.”

There is no standout evidence in Israel of dirty campaigning, where parties are derogated or ridiculed. There are however examples of outright attack on a party's political stance and personal attacks against party leaders but not so far as to be violent or proposing violence. Ben-David and Yahin note one of Likud's ads in 2015 which they write,

“In what starts out as a chilling, ominous video, jihadists in a four-door pickup truck bounce through a desert landscape, waving a giant Islamic State flag. Upon closer inspection, something is off about this crew—their truck has an anti-Netanyahu bumper sticker and they've got glue-on beards and speak Hebrew, albeit with comically bad Arabic accents. They wave down a passing car and ask for directions to Jerusalem. “Take a left,” they are told, as the words “the left will capitulate to terror” flash onscreen.”³³²

They state in their interpretation of the ad that “the message of this Likud party ad is clear: Vote for the left in Israel's upcoming elections and get ready to see ISIS pour into the country, beheading and terrorizing Israelis, and sending the snuff films worldwide.”³³³ Similarly, Sales of the Jewish Telegraphy Agency notes the heated rhetoric ahead of the 2015 elections in Israel. He states, “Israel is no stranger to heated political rhetoric, but already the campaign in advance of the March 17 elections is shaping up to be a particularly fierce one, with the leading parties taking aim not merely at their rivals' policies but at their very commitment to the ideals of the Jewish state.”³³⁴ He adds to the fact that much of Israel's negative campaign rhetoric surrounds party positions,

³³² Ricky Ben-David and Nira Yadin, “The Israeli Rights dangerous Attack ads,” *The Daily Beast*, (March 2, 2015). Accessed on May 3, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-israeli-rights-dangerous-attack-ads>

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ben Sales, “Israeli left resurgent as campaign rhetoric escalates ahead of March elections,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, (January 26, 2015). Accessed on May 3, 2018. <https://www.jta.org/2015/01/26/news-opinion/politics/israeli-left-resurgent-as-campaign-rhetoric-escalates-ahead-of-march-elections>

“Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, facing the first serious challenge to his leadership since 2009, has attacked the Labor Party — the faction of Israel’s founders — as anti-Zionist. Labor has shot back, branding its recently forged alliance with the Hatnuah faction the Zionist Camp and presenting itself as a bulwark against the right. The two rivals even have the same campaign slogan. Likud banners read “It’s us or them.” Zionist Camp ads proclaim, “It’s us or him.” “The Labor Party chose an extreme leftist and anti-Zionist list,” read a message posted on Netanyahu’s official Facebook page following the Jan. 14 Labor primary. “There’s no meeting point between the nationalist and responsible Likud outlook, and the irresponsible leftist list.”³³⁵

The derogatory ads seen in Israel are very similar to those of the two main political parties in Jamaica with one fundamental difference, the topic of the ads. Jamaica’s majoritarian system and dominant two-party system has not only created fierce competition but has created a political atmosphere where the party-leader and the party are synonymous. In Jamaica’s case, the PNP and the JLP are in a state of constant antagonism in the media. For the most part, campaign rhetoric in Jamaica centres on personal attacks against party leaders and running members. It is less about policy issues and stances, than it is about degrading the other party and its members. One ad by the JLP’s youth arm the G2K (Generation 2000) highlights the “vulgarity and loudness” of then PNP’s leader Portia Simpson-Miller.³³⁶ The ad uses many clips of Portia Simpson-Miller in the middle of aggressive speech to highlight the leader’s “lack of control” and improper behaviour” for a leader.³³⁷ Other visual ads often represent the other party’s members as wild and uncontrolled, while promoting the paying party. Most campaign ads in Jamaican politics also have a catchy jingle, like “me and my neighbour, voting for Labour” for the JLP, and “now is the time, now is the hour, choose PNP for people

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Young Talent, “Jamaica Labour Party election ad- Portia anger management- election 2011,” Youtube Video, 1:00, December 19, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnXnWkqzxOQ>

³³⁷ Ibid.

power” for the PNP. It is the tendency however, that the most vigorous and demeaning ads tend to come from the party that is currently in opposition. The Jamaica Gleaner chronicles much of the campaigning of the 2007 general election,

“Attack ads from both the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) have been taking on a noticeably more aggressive tone since nomination day (August 7), with advertising messages more closely mirroring some of the platform rhetoric and tension, particularly in constituencies believed to be very close. In one of the newspaper ads, voters are warned: "Don't vote for a flip flop." The visuals show two images of Mr. Golding, one superimposed on a tattered blue NDP slipper and the other on a green JLP slipper. The tag line is 'VOTE for a leader you can TRUST'. The second newspaper ad has a large headline, 'TRUSTWORTHY' in bold orange lettering across the page. In the centre of the page is a pair of sturdy boots (orange of course) with the benchmark 'TRIED, TESTED, PROVEN'...”³³⁸

It is important to highlight that Jamaica’s campaigning ads and speeches for the recent election were altered to have less negative rhetoric and chances of inciting violence. This all stemmed from campaign related violence in the 2015 election which saw the death of a few persons: “The Police High Command is appealing to representatives of the two main political parties to refrain from inflammatory remarks following Tuesday night’s killings in Newlands, Portmore, St. Catherine. Head of the Criminal Investigation Branch, Assistant Commissioner of Police Ealan Powell, said the High Command is concerned about the political rhetoric on the campaign trail. The police are investigating claims the deaths were politically motivated.”³³⁹ They go on to add that,

³³⁸ The Jamaica Gleaner, “Political Ad Watch- Attack ads on the increase,” *Jamaica Elections 2007*, (August 12, 2007). Accessed on May 8, 2018. <http://www.jamaicaelections.com/general/2007/news/article-549.html>

³³⁹ RJR News, “Police concerned about political rhetoric on campaign trail”, *Local news*, (December 3, 2015). Accessed May 8, 2018. <http://rjrnews.com/local/police-concerned-about-political-rhetoric-on-campaign-trail>

“There is increased police presence in the area due to rising political tensions. More than 20 persons were detained in a joint police/military operation today in the community. The first killing occurred about 6:30 when Sadie Forbes of an Anglin Avenue address in Newlands... Meanwhile, Head of the St Catherine South Police Senior Superintendent Noel Christie told RJR News that Forbes may have been killed because she objected to political flags being posted in her community.”³⁴⁰

This type of political violence and partisanship inspired violence is not new to Jamaica as noted earlier in the paper, as Jamaica saw its darkest political days in the 1980’s when confrontations between the JLP and PNP saw around 844 people being murdered according to a 1980 poll.³⁴¹ This however, was at Jamaica’s worst political state; campaign and political rhetoric now pushes for peaceful existence between party members, especially during election times.

Parliamentary conduct and the ability to cooperate on policy initiatives is a crucial part of the quality of contestation in a stable democracy. Political parties must be able to respectfully engage each other in parliamentary debates and facilitate good policy outcomes that work to improve the state. In Israel’s case, the centripetal democratic rules create an atmosphere of forced cooperation because the multiparty system forces even the largest parties to cooperate with other parties in a coalition to form government. Israel’s government and Knesset are bound by an instituted code of conduct that every member of the Knesset, no matter political affiliation must abide by. Coupled with strict party discipline and the fact that one may find themselves off the party list next election, any form of cross-party disrespect tends to be during campaigns. On many occasions, Israel’s

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ H. G. Helps, “The bloody general election that changed Jamaica,” *The Jamaica Observer*, (October 30, 2012). Accessed on May 8, 2018. <http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/The-bloody-general-election-that-changed-Jamaica>

Prime Minister Netanyahu has been called “evil,” “distasteful,” with Zionist Union MK Amir Perez stating, ““Netanyahu will remain Netanyahu. An inciter and agitator who will stop at nothing to perpetuate his rule.”³⁴² Other than a few personal attacks in interviews or speeches, Israel’s Knesset meetings are not known for disrespectful or heated exchanges. It is known more so for heated debate over controversial issues. This is easy to understand considering the various parties that make up the legislature and the different interests they represent. Israel’s coalition governments operate on compromises and promises of specific bills passing in the legislature through support or on allocations in the state’s budget. When a party’s bill does not pass or there is major disagreement, parties of the coalition (having majority support in the Knesset) will start to leave. Harkov highlights one of the most recent occurrences of Israeli party politics,

“The hallways of the legislature were chaotic Monday night, with people in the coalition running around trying to make deals to get a majority on the bill to allow Interior Minister Arye Deri stop more stores from opening on Saturdays, a bill that is do-or-die for the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties. Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman and Yisrael Beytenu decided to vote against the bill. Then, more and more MKs came out against the bill - Likud MK Sharren Haskel said she couldn’t stomach voting for it, and MK Yehudah Glick, also of Likud, used the opportunity to try to extort support for a ban on smoking cigarettes before age 21.”³⁴³

This highlights an important part of the volatility of Israel’s politics. When the coalition falls, the largest party that won the election can either try to find another coalition partner to regain a majority or go to the polls, giving the populace another chance to show their support. This is quite different in Jamaica where if you disagree with

³⁴² Staff, “Likud ‘secretly funded campaign ads’ depicting Herzog as a cross-dresser.”

³⁴³ Lahav Harkav, “This is how Israel’s Coalitions Die,” *The Jerusalem Post*, (December 11, 2017). Accessed on May 8, 2018. <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/This-is-how-coalitions-die-517770>

the ruling party's agenda, the only thing the opposition can do is criticize and wait for the next general election to be called by the Prime Minister to have another chance.

Frankly, the competitive two-party system in Jamaica makes policy cooperation unnecessary and makes debates heated to the point of disrespect. Due to the fact that Jamaica's first-past-the-post rules allows government to be made-up of the party with the most seats, the ruling party is not dependent on the opposition party votes to pass their bills. In fact, the strict party discipline and close competition makes the ruling party the only important factor in government, while the opposition simply criticizes the bills being passed by the government in an effort to be seen as a better alternative for the next election. In fact, this makes the party in opposition highly critical and opposed to whatever bill is being passed by the governing party. This has created many intense and disrespectful exchanges between MP's in parliament, caused many walk-outs and adjournments. In one instance, opposition member Everal Warmington of the JLP called then Minister of Youth and Culture, Lisa Hanna, a "Jezebel and witch" in parliament as both parties debated over the PNP's proposed minimum wage policy.³⁴⁴ Similarly, tempers flared when then Minister of Security, Peter Bunting, accused the opposition leader, Andrew Holness, of inciting political violence in his speech that stated that Jamaican's are more likely to die if the PNP are in power. In response, Andrew Holness highlighted that the government does not want to cooperate with the opposition on state policies, calling Peter Bunting "disrespectful and out of order" and playing politics.³⁴⁵ These examples highlight the intensity of Jamaican partisanship and shed light on the

³⁴⁴ Ceen TV, "Everal Warmington calls Lisa Hanna a 'Jezebel' – CEEN Caribbean News – Jan 20, 2016," Youtube Video, 3:48, March 11, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2lyVMNihFuM>

³⁴⁵ Ceen TV, "Peter Bunting and Andrew Holness square off in JA Parliament -CEEN News- Nv 3 2015," YouTube Video, 5:21, November 9, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y7kJLHJnDbE>

quality of competition and contestation in the state. The majoritarian rules and competitive system allows for debates to easily escalate into violent exchanges and quarrels. The two-party system on the other hand does not facilitate cooperation in the least, as the winning party that forms government usually has enough seats to ensure that their bills are passed without the need for the oppositions vote or aid. Clearly, debates in Parliament occur as a result of institutionalization and not necessity. This arrangement thwarts democratic values, as specific interests are just heard in debate and not put into policy, as the opposition has little power in effecting any true change or input.

To conclude the analysis of this variable, it is seen that the quality of political competition and contestation is better in Israel than it is in Jamaica. Though by no great difference, Israel's forced cooperation on policy due to their coalition governments makes parties keener to being respectful and working together. The major instances of disrespect and poor competition are seen in campaign ads or between members of completely different factions, on different ends of controversial issues that will never work together. Similarly, when it is that parties disagree they tend to pull out of the government coalition and allow for a new election. In Jamaica on the other hand, disagreements in parliament result in partisan disrespect, quarrels, name-calling and threats of violent. This is due to the structure of the majoritarian system where the opposition parties remain in a position of inferiority and perpetual criticism. Additionally, unlike Israel, Jamaica has seen many instances of partisan violence during campaigns were political rhetoric incite some amount of violence or demean the opposition party as incapable.

The Level of Corruption in Public Sectors

Further utilizing Munroe's dimensions to analyze the quality of democracy, the level of political corruption in the public sector will be assessed. The level of corruption in the state is a specific test of the rule of law in the country, and if the political system as well as the state is operating fairly. Corruption within the private or public sector indicates an abuse of power and is usually seen through forms of clientelism, partisanship and high levels of corruption scandals. For this analysis section and the thesis, the level of corruption will be analyzed using the variable 'perception of corruption' with discussion of clientelism in both countries. Since it is that there is no true way to measure corruption, as it is usually a covert occurrence, perception of corruption is the best variable in measuring the phenomenon. This is integral in identifying if the government and public sector in the centripetal democracy of Israel are perceived to be more corrupt than in Jamaica's majoritarian system. The graph below highlights the perception of corruption as taken from Transparency International for Jamaica (1998-1999 and 2002-2017) and in Israel (1996-2017).




Figure 5. Line Chart illustrating perception of corruption in Jamaica and Israel from 1996 -2017.
Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index,”
<https://www.transparency.org/>

The above measure for corruption perception is taken from the corruption perception index as presented by Transparency International for 1996 to 2017. The perception index measures how corrupt the public sector of a country is as noted by business people and experts and scores the country between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10/100 (very clean). As seen in the chart above, Israel’s score has remained somewhat consistent over the years, with a decline in the last ten years, ranking it within the top twenty or thirty of the worlds cleaner countries with an average score of 6.5. It is seen that Israel’s score started to decline in 1998, then rose in 2001. The level of corruption started to steadily decline until 2007, where it rose again by .2. The level of corruption has fluctuated below the 6.5 average since then. Jamaica on the other hand is seen to have significantly high

corruption levels with an average score of 3.9. Jamaica's corruption levels were scored low at 3.8 in 1998 and remained below 4 for almost two decades until it peaked to 4.1 in 2015. Though the score fell again in 2016 to 3.9, Jamaica's lowest recorded score was 2009, and its highest score was 4.4 recorded in 2017.

Israel's history with corruption is one that is easily identified in scholarly works on the state. Though the data above doesn't provide for years prior to the first corruption index study done in 1998, authors like Mahler describe practices of corruption in Israel. It is seen that in the early years of Israeli democracy, during the dominance of the centre-left Mapai, many argued that the control over larger sectors of the state, especially as it relates to labour and housing, provided special treatment to their supporters while they were in office. Though this is assumedly true, it cannot be forgotten how political parties operate in Israeli democracy. These parties operate as larger institutions that provide a wide range of services for their supporters as noted earlier. Similarly, early pronouncements of corruption in Israel did not greatly affect the populace as a whole as the state still benefitted from high levels of productivity, socio-economic growth and human development during those years. On the other hand, Jamaica's missing years of data were some of the worst in the state's history as it relates to corruption. The decades preceding the 1990's to Jamaica's independence in 1962 were marked by high levels of political patronage, clientelism and cronyism. This phenomenon in Jamaica was the definition of Jamaican 'democracy' as it controlled political participation, undermined the rule of law and provided for the existence of political communities that were controlled by criminal overlords.

Starting at the years illustrated in the chart above, it is noted that Israel's level of corruption score fell in 1998, 1999 and 2000. During these years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and some of his cabinet ministers were investigated for fraud, reaching public trust and corruption. The chart also highlights that when the government was changed in 2001, perceived corruption decreased with Israel receiving a score of 7.6. Since then, Israel's corruption scores have decreased steadily with slight fluctuations, due to the high levels of political scandals that plague the government. Though these events have caused a fall in Israel's corruption score, the state still enjoys lower levels of corruption than Jamaica. This is due to the fact that corruption in Israel is not an institutionalized phenomenon and is highly criminalized in the state. According to GAN, "the government has put in place a comprehensive legal framework to combat corruption, and enforcement has been effective. The Penal Code addresses corruption offenses including bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and abuse of office. Government corruption has come under the spotlight in several instances; however, impunity is not a problem. Several corruption cases have been tried, and high-ranking government officials have received prison sentences."³⁴⁶

Comparatively Jamaica's corruption levels over the years have been heightened by the high levels of partisanship and ineffective rule of law that is present in Jamaican politics. There is a pervasive belief that those in public office misuse their position for private gain and that corruption spreads across all government institutions from the cabinet to the police force. There have been many scandals and coverage of politicians

³⁴⁶ GAN, "Israel- Israel Corruption Report," *Business Anti-Corruption Portal*, (2016). Accessed on May 1, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20160914234113/http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/israel>


and prominent members of society being reported to have benefitted or participated in some level of corruption with no impunity. Many blame the fact that although Jamaica has anti-corruption laws and institutions in place, they have little enforcement power. It is noted that while Israel too has corrupted politicians with high profile scandals, there have been instances of charges and impunity for these people. In Jamaica however, politicians or high-profile individuals tend to evade prosecution. There have also been many other cases of bribery, unfair treatment, partisanship, clientelism and even nepotism in the public sector. Jamaica's 2017 score is assumed to be higher due to the implementation of Jamaica Integrity Commission and the work of non-profit organizations like the National Integrity Action. Despite this however, many argue that the current Integrity Commission is weak and does not ascribe to international best practices.³⁴⁷

The illustration of the data above as well as the analysis and discussion confirm the findings that centripetal democratic practices will provide lower levels of corruption than majoritarian rules. This is due to the fact that the high levels of corruption and deep-rooted partisanship present with two-party politics forces individuals in power to seek to retain power at all costs. Even if one's party loses support in Israeli politics, there is still a strong chance of being part of a government coalition and contributing to policy formation. In contrast, political power in Jamaica is all or nothing and can be lost easily in the next election if support changes.

³⁴⁷ Greg Christie, "Jamaica's future is choked by cancer of corruption," *the Jamaica Observer*, (March 26, 2017). Accessed on May 1, 2018 http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Jamaica-s-future-choked-by-cancer-of-corruption_93609

The Quality of Socioeconomic Outcomes of State Policy

In analyzing the quality of democracy, it is necessary to determine the socioeconomic outcomes of state policy. Since the thesis highlights a positive relationship between democracy and socio-economic development, it is assumed that the state with the better democratic practices would have policies that improve the standard of living of their citizens and provide economic growth. The analysis will utilize standard of living as the variable, measured using the GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). As the worldwide accepted measure of standard of living, the PPP GDP is an adequate tool for comparing the value of a country's production and money; gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. The graph below will utilize PPP through the international dollar which has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. This variable is crucial to see if the standard of living is better under a centripetal democracy as in Israel or in the majoritarian system of Jamaica. Similarly, it is important in comparing the difference between the years and different governments in both countries, noting if a multiparty system with different changes in government under the centripetal system is better than the two-party system under majoritarian rule in Jamaica. To do this, there will be a comparison of the annual growth for GDP per capita. The bar graph below highlights the GDP per capita based on PPP for Jamaica and in Israel from 1990-2016. The line Chart illustrates the annual GDP per capita growth rate for Jamaica and Israel from 1990 – 2016.



**Figure 6. Column Graph demonstrating GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity for Jamaica and Israel, (1996 - 2017).
Knoema, *World Data Atlas*, <https://knoema.com/>**

The graph above highlights the significant difference in the standard of living in Israel and in Jamaica. Israel’s standard of living more than triples that of Jamaica in any given year starting in 1995. It is seen that Israel has had a steady increase in its standard of living since 1990. The state has had minor fluctuations however, where the PPP fell below trend from 2001 to 2006, then again in 2008, to pick back up the following years. Since then, the state has continued a steady increase in its standard of living with growth above trend. As seen in the trend forecast, Israel is projected to continue in its high growth. Overall, Israel has moved from a GDP per capita of 12969 international dollars in 1990 to one of 36340 international dollars in 2017. This is an increase of 180.21 per cent over the two and a half decades. The state is now experiencing

its highest recorded PPP and its citizens enjoy a good standard of living. Jamaica too has seen a steady increase in its standard of living since the 1990's, where it only slightly fell below the trend line from 1998 to 2002 then it steadily increased until 2009. However, Jamaica has seen a growth of only 46.62 per cent since 1990 and, as of 2016, Jamaica's GDP per capita at PPPs has remained shy of its growth trend for the last decade.

The PPP illustration of both countries exemplify their positions on the human development lists. Israel ranks among the world's most developed states, with high levels of human development and one of the best standards of living. Many scholars note that Israel benefits from its vast work force, estimated at 4.021 million as of 2017. The state has also made significant investments in its education programs especially as it relates to technology, improved access to employment specifically in the public sector and has reformed its health care. As of April 2018, Israel's unemployment rate is 3.6 percent³⁴⁸ According to the CIA World Factbook, Israel has a 97.8 per cent literacy rate with about 5.7 per cent of GDP expenditure on education as of 2014.³⁴⁹ Similarly, health expenditure is 7.8 per cent of GDP as of 2014 and life expectancy is 82.5 years.³⁵⁰ The state also benefits from some amount of aid from international allies. Israel's fall in GDP per capita at PPPs is usually blamed on shifts in financial resources during times of unrest and increased funding for the continued conflict with Palestine.

In contrast, Jamaica's highest GDP per capita at PPPs was recorded from 2005 to 2008 due to a general growth in the GDP of the state and strong performances in

³⁴⁸ Trading Economics, "Israel Unemployment Rate," *Trading Economics* (2018). Accessed on May 1, 2018 <https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/unemployment-rate>

³⁴⁹ Central Intelligence Unit, "Middle East: Israel," *The World Factbook*. Accessed on May 1, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html>

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

agriculture, tourism and mining. Overall, Jamaica has a very low standard of living and low socio-economic growth. The presence of natural disasters and Jamaica's susceptibility to changes in the external market are compounded by high external debt, poverty, poor human development resources and high levels of crime. These factors negatively impact Jamaica's productivity and standard of living, coupled with the fact that Jamaica does not have a large labour force like that of Israel and lacks the investment in its human resource capital. Currently, Jamaica's labour force is 1,335,100 persons with unemployment at 9.6 per cent.³⁵¹ As of 2015, Jamaica's incidence of poverty rate is 21.2 per cent with 12.2 per cent of the population living below the poverty line since 2005.³⁵² The health sector in Jamaica receives 5.4 per cent of the GDP and life expectancy in Jamaica 73.7 years. The education sector expenditure is 5.4 per cent of the GDP, with literacy rate at 88.7 per cent.³⁵³ The comparative analysis highlights that Israel's standard of living is much higher than Jamaica's as seen through the PPP of both countries. While Israel does benefit from a larger population and therefore has more productive sectors, the state also facilitates greater investments in crucial human resource areas to develop the human capital. On the other hand, Jamaica focuses much of its expenditure on clearing their large debt and policies are focused on tackling their high crime rate as this is seen as the major contributor to poverty and poor human development.

³⁵¹ Statistical Institute of Jamaica, "Main Labour Force Indicators," *Labour Force*. (2017) Accessed on May 1, 2018. <http://statinja.gov.jm/LabourForce/NewLFS.aspx>

³⁵² Central Intelligence Unit, "Central America and Caribbean Jamaica," *The World Factbook*. Accessed on May 1, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>

³⁵³ Ibid.

Attitudes towards Form of Government

The last variable presented by Munroe in determining quality of democracy is the attitude of the populace towards their form of government. For the purpose of a comprehensive thesis, this analysis will look at support and satisfaction with democracy. This is important in identifying whether the population likes and supports a democratic form of government. It highlights if anything, whether democracy is working in the country by presenting insight on trust in government and democratic institutions, tolerance of democratic rules, satisfaction and the performance of democracy. The analysis will therefore present data on the citizen's support for democracy. The data will be presented in two separate charts due to the different years for available data for each country. This variable is important in finding out if citizens not only trust government but support the system. The line chart and graph below highlight the support for democracy in Israel (1981-2011) and Jamaica (2006-2014).





Figure 7. Line Chart showing Support for Democracy in Israel, (1981-2011).
Source: The Israel Democracy Institute, “Israeli Democracy Index.”
<https://en.idi.org.il/centers/1159/1519>

The line graph above on Israel’s support for democracy shows that even though support in democracy fluctuated, support remains significantly high among the population. Notably, support for democracy was highest in the years that Israel was operating under centripetal rules. This is seen especially in 1984 where Israel had an overall democratic support of 91 percent. Similarly, 1999 saw support of the political system at 90 percent. Though Israel’s support for democracy as a regime type fell by about 13 percent in 2003 then to its lowest of 72.4 percent in 2006, 2010 saw an increase in support in the political system to 80.6 percent that continued to 81.8 percent in 2011. When the right won the election in 1988, support for democracy fell once again, assumedly due to the continued illiberal democratic values and rising socioeconomic issues. It is noted that after 2011, the Democracy Index survey in Israel no longer

includes support for or satisfaction with democracy in their questionnaire and data, as it is assumed that support for democracy is not of grave concern in the state.

Overall, the data shows an interesting correlation between the operations and outcomes of the political system and support. Firstly, much of the politics of the 1980's is marked by heightened centripetal rules and increased socioeconomic development. A deeper look at the numbers for the support for democracy highlights that the lowest support in the 1980's was in 1981 when liberal democratic values started to fall in the state. In 1984, the support for democracy rose significantly, arguably due to the fact that the centre-left won the election for the first time again since their monopoly at the polls from 1949 to 1973. Similarly, 1984 was the year of ultimate political cooperation in government as the national unity government was formed as broad coalition with parties across the spectrum. Support rose to the second highest recorded number in 1999 during the government of the centre-left who had been in power since 1992. Since then, support for democracy has not reached the heights of 1981-1999 as power had been exchanged between the centre and the right up to 2011. Notably, the lowest recorded support for democracy has been seen under the government of the right (the Likud party) with moderate numbers under centrist governance. It is easy to extrapolate that based on the trends, support for democracy has been slightly lower since 2013 as the right has been in charge of government since then. The data for support for democracy in Israel is straight forward, when the government works tirelessly to ensure liberal political values, increase socio-economic development and work towards cooperation then support for democracy is very high. When the government inhibits these things, then support and satisfaction in the political system is lower.



**Figure 9. Line Graph showing Support for Democracy in Jamaica, (2006-2016/2017).
Vanderbilt University, “Latin American Public Opinion Project- Jamaica”
<https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/jamaica.php>**

Over the five years of available data, support for democracy in Jamaica has fallen drastically. These findings are of grave concern for democracy in Jamaica and ties in perfectly to the necessity of this thesis. The highest recorded level of support was in 2006 at 78.8 percent, which then fell by about 5 percent to 73.9 in 2008. 2010 saw support fall again by almost 5 percent to 69.6 percent then 53.6 in 2012. The 2014 numbers are the most concerning, as support for democracy in Jamaica is at 42.5 percent. This number is shocking as it is simply saying that less than half of the respondents (reflective of the population) believe that democracy is the best form of government. It means that the majority of the Jamaican population are not satisfied with democracy as it is in Jamaica and believe that another regime type would be more effective in meeting their needs. Though the data is unfortunate, it is not surprising given Jamaica’s political issues. Support for democracy did rise in the 2016/2017 survey to 55.8 percent during which the

governing JLP stood on a banner of prosperity. This data and initial negative trend in support for democracy is easily corroborated by the decrease in voter turnout, the high levels of corruption and low standard of living in Jamaica.

Comparatively, the data shows that Israel has managed to maintain high levels of support for democracy in its population than Jamaica. Though there was higher support for democracy in Jamaica in 2006 than in Israel, Israel's democratic support has never fallen below 70 percent. Israel's fluctuating support is easily attributed to the party grouping in power, as support seems to increase when the centre-left is in government compared to when the right is in government. Support for democracy in Jamaica however has been on the decline since 2006, across the governments of the two dominant parties in power. The results are disturbing for the future of Jamaican democracy, as it is clear that the population struggles with support for the political system and is clearly not satisfied with its operation. It is even more surprising that even though Israel has seen a decline in its liberal values over the years, as well as engagement in international conflict, there is more support for democracy in that state than in Jamaica and its 'hailed a liberal democracy.

Conclusively, in this chapter, the analysis of the quality of democracy in Israel and Jamaica have presented stimulating findings. The analysis distinctly confirms the hypothesis that Israel's centripetal democracy has better quality of democracy than Jamaica. Though the hypothesis has been confirmed, there are interesting conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. Munroe proposed that the quality of political participation is important in assuming support for democracy. For the analysis, voter turnout was used as the measure and it is noted that while Israel has a higher voter turnout than Jamaica, they

both have seen a decrease in voter turnout and overall political participation over the years. Similarly, the quality of political competition and contestation highlights whether parties are open to cooperation or are strictly adversarial. The analysis looked at campaign rhetoric, parliamentary conduct and policy cooperation through a discussion on notable cases and examples in Israel in Jamaica. The findings show that Israel has policy cooperation due to the tendency to form coalition governments, as well as heated debates in parliament with no major cases of parliamentary disrespect. Jamaica, on the other hand, has no real examples of policy cooperation between the two major political parties and has a long history of political violence and parliamentary misconduct. The level of corruption in the public sector was also proposed by Munroe as a variable for quality of democracy. The analysis utilized the corruption perception index results from Transparency International. It is seen that corruption seems to be a pervasive part of Israel and Jamaica's democracies. The difference is however, that though Israel struggles with corruption, they have seen prominent individuals being investigated and charged for corruption and crimes against the state while Jamaica is seen to have high levels of corruption due to their continued struggle with clientelism and the inability of the justice system to charge persons for corruption.

For the quality of socioeconomic outcomes of state policy, GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) was used as the numeric measure for standard of living. The results clearly highlighted Israel's impressive standard of living, which fluctuated at times but has been on the upsurge. It is found that their great standard of living is due to their investments in social services and technology as well as their large work force. Jamaica's standard of living was well below Israel's as the state saw many years of low

GDP per capita based on PPP, with numbers barely meeting the projected trend. This is blamed on Jamaica's high level of violence, large debt and susceptible economy. Lastly, the analysis looked at support for democracy as a measure of the attitudes towards government in both states as a look into the support and satisfaction with democracy. The analysis showed that though support for democracy fluctuated over the years in Israel, it remained significantly high. Jamaica, on the other hand, saw a drastic decline in support for democracy over the years, highlighting the fact that Jamaican democracy is truly at risk. Overall, it is noted that democracy seems to be at its most efficient when the populace trusts the government and major parties work together to ensure representation and effective socioeconomic policies. In the end, the analysis shows that centripetal rules clearly improved Israel's numbers in the variables, while Jamaica's majoritarian rules presented issues for them in all the variables, specifically highlighting the current state of Jamaican democracy. Specifically, the dominant two-party system in Jamaica as well as its first-past-the-post system clearly affects the quality of competition and contestation, while historically influenced variables like political participation and the level of corruption. In Israel, the multi-party systems, proportional rules, coalition governments, and centralized government directly influenced the same variables as well as socio-economic outcomes of state policy. The variables support for democracy, the level of corruption in public sector and socio-economic outcomes of state policy are also affected by other social, demographic and economic factors.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

The thesis has highlighted the current deteriorated state of the Jamaican democracy by demonstrating the recurring political issues that affect its political system and development. These issues and the state of affairs in Jamaica prompted research on how best to advance Jamaica's prospects for development through improvements in good governance and democracy. The hypothesis was therefore proposed that the factors of a centripetal democracy missing from Jamaica, namely multiparty politics, proportional representation and coalition government are more democratic and promote good governance and ultimately better development in states. To analyze this assumption, Israel was chosen as the comparative state as it is the only state that possesses a centripetal democracy, a parliamentary democracy and was once a developing country. Therefore, the thesis sought to outline the theoretical and empirical undertones of the hypothesis before providing a context for the research and measuring it using Trevor Munroe's variables on quality of democracy. In the end, it was found that while a centripetal democracy in Jamaica will not guarantee the development found in Israel, electoral rules like proportional representation will promote good governance and ensure better inclusion and representation in the state. Similarly, proportional rules that will allow for a multiparty system and some form of cooperation or coalition in government will improve the quality of democracy in Jamaica and reduce its political issues which will go a far way in creating an environment conducive for development.

The above conclusion reflects the shortfalls of majoritarian institutions in developing states as the analysis of Jamaica as compared to Israel shows that Jamaica has lower democratic quality than Israel due to the effects of these institutions. Though other factors influence Jamaica's poor democratic quality and explains Israel's high quality and development, their contrasting democratic rules play a significant role. As suggested by Chapter One, majoritarian democracies are considered to be adversarial democracies based on their electoral rules, while centripetal democracies are seen to be more consensual. While majoritarian democracies do have their positives, Jamaica clearly highlight the negative aspects. Jamaica's democracy struggles with the concentration of power in a single party who do not have any accountability until the next election. It excludes a large sector of the population who voted for the opposition from government and policy formation. Centripetal democratic rules however fit perfectly to the Jamaican context. This is because centripetalism calls for a unitary state and parliamentary democracy which exist already in Jamaica, and proposes proportional electoral rules, multipartyism to improve inclusion and representation and coalition governments to allow policy cooperation. This is the perfect medicine for Jamaica's ailing democracy, ailing in the sense that it does not fit into the fundamental definition of democracy as outlined in Chapter Two. Jamaica does not foster true representation, participation and inclusion of the interests of all its population due to its electoral rules and party system. The only remedy set for this is a change to proportional representation which is not as exclusive as majoritarian rules. PR systems allow for greater representation, inclusion and avenues of participation for the populace.

This change in the political rules should directly influence development. Chapter Three highlights the relationship between politics and development. It is important to conclude that development centres on the enhancement of human potential as seen through improvement in socio-economic standards that will afford the populace a better life. It is argued that the greatest avenue for this type of development is through good governance where development is fostered through effective state institutions, proper management of the state affairs and increased interactions of citizens and their government. The only way to truly measure good governance is to look at the quality of democracy. Though many institutions have different variables to do this, the thesis utilizes Jamaican political scientist, Trevor Munroe's variables as outlined in Chapter Three. The necessity of this research and thesis were seen in Chapters Four and Five, when the states of Israel and Jamaica are examined in context. Jamaica's many persistent issues with democracy and their socioeconomic under-development are brought to light. The overview of the political system and evolution of state politics showed the length of Jamaica's struggle with democratic stability and development, as well highlighted the relationship between the country's two major parties, the People's National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party. Additionally, the sections on political issues and the relationship between politics and development in Jamaica clearly outlined the horrendous state of Jamaican politics and democracy, as well as how they are exacerbated by majoritarian rules and poor governance. Israel's political system overview was crucial in providing practical evidence of the operations of a centripetal democracy. Overall, it illustrated that Israel's heterogeneous population and tumultuous history along with proportional rules cause the state to have a large multiparty system with parties existing from the far left to the far right on the political spectrum. The section also showed the positives and

negatives of too many parties in the political system and the instability of coalition governments. Overall though, Israel must be lauded for its high standard of living, human development and prospering economy as well as stable democracy. Israel's centripetal democracy had better results in all variables, specifically, political participation through voter turnout, quality of party competition and contestation, corruption, the quality of socioeconomic outcomes of state policy, and support for democracy than Jamaica, proving that centripetal institutions affect democratic quality. These results are interesting and show that centripetal rules are best for Jamaica since it is that Israel moved from a developing state to a developed one under these political institutions.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN JAMAICA

Since it is that the thesis concludes that centripetal rules will ensure good governance by improving democratic quality, then prospects for the state include electoral engineering and reform. The truth is simple, to allow greater chances of development, political changes must be implemented. As Norris notes in her work on electoral engineering, "electoral reform is founded upon the principle that altering the formal rules matters based on the assumption that certain desirable consequences for social and political engineering can be achieved through the public policy process."³⁵⁴ These changes include the enactment of proportional representation rules in Jamaica. This conclusion is guided by Duverger's law that PR systems foster a multi-party system³⁵⁵

³⁵⁴ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, 5.

³⁵⁵ Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, 217.

and Lijphart's postulation that proportional systems are more effective in representing and amassing support for the political system.³⁵⁶ Though it can be argued that Jamaica benefits from good human rights, sufficient changes of government and good application of Westminster rules, in the end, the thesis subscribes fully with Norris' argument that,

“Elections are not sufficient by themselves for representative democracy, by any means, but they are a necessary minimal condition. Views differ sharply about the appropriate evaluative criteria, but most agree that, at minimum, elections must meet certain essential conditions to ensure democratic legitimacy. They should be free of violence, intimidation, bribery, vote rigging, irregularities, systematic fraud, and deliberate partisan manipulation. Contests should provide an unrestricted choice of competing parties and candidates, without repression of opposition parties or undue bias in the distribution of campaign resources and media access. Elections should use fair, honest, efficient, and transparent procedures from voter registration to the final vote tally. Parliamentary representatives should reflect the society from which they are drawn and should not systematically exclude any minority group. And campaigns should generate widespread public participation.”³⁵⁷

The argument for electoral reform in Jamaica, stems from the need to gain greater representation and inclusion for the population, but also to reduce the chances of political violence, poor policy cooperation and deep-rooted partisanship that comes as a result of the dominant two-party system. Norris' analysis of the effect of electoral engineering in thirty-two democracies has shown that party competition is greater, and the effective number of parties are more in proportional systems than in majoritarian ones. She notes, “the comparisons support the classic claims made by proponents on both sides of the normative arguments, namely that majoritarian elections usually generate one-party governments with a secure parliamentary majority, while proportional elections generally

³⁵⁶ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 162.

³⁵⁷ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, 4.

lead toward more inclusive multiparty parliaments and more proportional results.”³⁵⁸ She adds that her findings suggest that “the difference in party competition by electoral family proved relatively modest in size; worldwide, the mean number of effective parties was 3 .33 in majoritarian systems and 4. 74 in PR systems.”³⁵⁹ This means that in a PR system, there is greater chances of representation for different groups in the population. In regard to the effect of electoral engineering on voter turnout and political participation, Norris’ study concludes that,

“Previous studies have commonly found that the type of electoral formula shapes participation, with PR systems generating higher turnout than majoritarian systems. This pattern seems well supported by the evidence: ... even after controlling for levels of human development, the basic type of electoral system remains a significant indicator of turnout.”³⁶⁰

This stands on the argument that persons are disincentivized to vote in majoritarian systems as some seats are considered ‘party strongholds’ therefore voters may believe that they will waste their votes if they vote for anyone other than the incumbent. Similarly, under majoritarian rules, voter apathy rises when there is no other choice than the two dominant parties, or if the voter dislikes their MP but likes the party or dislikes the party but like the MP. PR systems correct these shortcomings by allowing smaller parties to have a chance of winning a seat in parliament as well as allowing voters to cast a vote they know to be helpful, thus increasing participation. Similarly, Norris’ study shows that the party system can influence voting behavior and participation, highlighting the argument that “wider electoral choices across the ideological spectrum mean that all

³⁵⁸ Ibid, 94.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, 161.

sectors of public opinion and all social groups are more likely to find a party to represent their views, preferences, and interests.”³⁶¹ Therefore, the more political parties that have a chance to get into government will push supporters to vote for their party, as well as increase competition.

It is due to the above benefits that the suggestion is made for Jamaica to implement a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system where the voter gets two votes on election day, one for their local member of parliament (using SMP) and the other for the party-list (MMP rules) that will be used to fill parliament.³⁶² Noteworthy, this was the form of proportional representation chosen by New Zealand when it switched from SMP. As Siaroff highlights, “Voters have separate votes for the local candidate and for the party list, and they can engage in “ticket-splitting.” Of these two votes, the party list is by far the more important because the goal of the system is to make the final outcome of seats as proportionally close as possible to the party list share of the votes for all those parties above the legal threshold.”³⁶³ The MMP system, combining single-member plurality seats and closed party list seats would be best for Jamaicans, as they will be able to choose the best representative for their constituency without feeling the obligation to vote along party lines. Similarly, the party list with the best set of individuals to form government will be chosen based on the proportional representation. Ideally, an open list system should be implemented to give citizens a chance to choose the members they deem best fit for the position, rather than parties to put on loyalists or long-time members on a closed list. Due to the fact that Jamaica is a small state, the party list seats should be based

³⁶¹ Ibid, 166.

³⁶² Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of both Worlds?* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001) 9.

³⁶³ Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes*, 180.

on one large country-wide constituency in Jamaica to keep the results proportional. Ideally, there should be a low minimum threshold for representation in parliament so as to allow smaller parties the chance to develop and have a say in legislation. It is also suggested that the district magnitude stays at one in each local constituency so as to induce citizens to vote for the Member of Parliament they believe will help improve their constituency despite party-lines and utilize their partisanship for the election for parliament. These changes in the electoral rules should definitely increase the inclusion and representation of the varying Jamaican interests, as well as allow for multiparty politics and cooperation through so formation of coalition governments as no party should have a majority in parliament. This being said, it is noted that the effect of this electoral reform will not happen quickly but take time to be achieved. Additionally, development as a result of this changes is expected to happen over time as citizens get use to the new rules and the flaws of the political system are corrected.

PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE WORK

This research proves to be only the tip of the iceberg in assessing the effects of politics on development, especially as it relates to the quality of democracy under majoritarian systems. The research highlights the void in political science scholarship when it comes on to the shortfalls of the Westminster system in developing countries as well as the lack of study on the implementation of PR systems in homogenous societies like Jamaica. There is a need for future work to be done on the relationship between demographic make-up, history and socio-economic contexts on the implementation of

consensual democratic models. This stems from the fact that Israel is the only state that has implemented the centripetal model of democracy that was once developing. Though this is true, Israel lacks the historical background of states like Jamaica or other countries that were once colonized and fought for independence. Future work can also uncover the socio-economic effects of the Westminster model on developing states that do not have the economic capacity to ensure a high standard of living for their citizens. There is little notable work or research on the politics of developing states and how democratic practices affect these societies. It is interesting to see how democratic principles that have been handed down to these states have historically affected their political and socio-economic trajectory, and how these systems have become so institutionalized that even the slow breakdown of democracy is seen as normal. It would be interesting to discover whether electoral reform is possible in these developing states specifically.

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